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«Serious consideration of this choice [of a 
profession! is certainly the first duty of a 
young man who is beginning his career and does 
not want to leave his most important affairs to 
chance. [Yet,] we cannot always attain the 
position to which we believe we are called; our 
relations in society have to some extent already 
begun to be established before we are in a 
position to determine them»
(K. Marx, Keflections of a Young Man on the 
Choice of a Profession, written in 1835, in K. 
Marx - F. Engels, Collected Works, Lawrence & 
Hishart, London, 1975, vol. I, pp. 3-4)
«Every type of social order, without exception, 
must, if one wishes to evaluate it, be examined 
with reference to the opportunities which it 
affords to certain types of persons to rise to 
positions of superiority through the operation 
of the various objective and subjective
selective factors»
(M. Weber, The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" 
in Sociology and Economics, written in 1913, in 
M. Weber, The Methodology of the Social 
Sciences, Free Press, Glencoe, 1949, p. 27)
í ¿ * * ^ * í
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. The Theoretical Puzzle: Taking Politics as a Career
If «career politicians have become a fashionable bogey, 
to be condemned, deplored and curbed» (Riddell 1995, 186) in 
all contemporary Western societies, nowhere is this more 
evident than in Italy in the first half of the 1990s, where 
the reaction against career politicians has given a decisive 
push to the break-up of the existing political system. This 
anti-politician sentiment is particularly widespread among 
the Italian youth, who show less interest in politics than 
their peers all around Europe (cf. chapter 4, S 1)* Few of 
them participate in political activities. Still fewer of 
them aspire to a political career and the necessary 
apprenticeship which may qualify them for political office.
Few, however, does not mean none. What about those 
young people who have such aspirations? Why do they have 
them? These questions go beyond mere curiosity, since the 
bulk of top-ranking politicians is drawn from the relatively 
limited pool of the young and ambitious who have paved their 
way to political success much earlier. Even at a time when 
career politics is the object of mass resentment in Italy, 
the most important party leaders of the Left and the Right 
have first experienced leadership in the youth organizations 
of their parties. From there they have progressively moved 
up the vertical ladder of party offices.
itlhrtÜI
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On the whole, «political professionals» remain the 
biggest occupational group among Italian MPs of the "Second" 
Republic: they constitute almost one third of the total. 
This seems to mean that under the short-term process of 
«elite circulation» lies a long-term trend: the
professionalization of political representation. As social 
differentiation proceeds, political activities tend to 
require full-time commitment and specialized personnel1. 
Consequently, political systems need to attract career- 
minded individuals, for whom the ambition of attaining 
political office is as fundamental as the desire of a salary 
is to the normal aspirant employee. But if it is important 
to know why a certain employee knocked on a given firm's 
door (in fact, the supply side of labour markets is
extensively researched), to know why some young individuals 
choose a political career is no less important.
Practically no research has taken the problem into
serious consideration until now. What pushes some youth to 
be active in politics with a perspective of 
professionalization? What makes them politically ambitious? 
More operationally, is it possible to predict which young 
individuals are more likely to embark upon a political
career?
The present study seeks to answer this question. Its 
implications are far-reaching. By contrast with other types 
of regimes, democracy functions due to self-selected
1 As Lagroye (1991, 223) observes, «la professionalisation politique
participe de l'extension d'une catégorie de *professionnels de la 
représentation" dans les sociétés contemporaines».
3individuals who decide to run for political office. 
Understanding the process by which these individuals come 
forward is crucial to coming to terms with how real 
democracies work. Does self-selection reflect the special 
motivation and "taste" for politics of some random citizens? 
Or does it reflect the control of distinct resources which 
are out of reach of the bulk of people? If the latter is the 
case, discrimination primarily operates - in a subtle but 
most effective way - by discouraging the possible political 
aspirations of persons who do not possess such resources. 
This is clearly at odds with the principle that democratic 
regimes entail equal opportunities for all to take part in 
political life; and it may also deprive the polity of many 
potential good politicians who lack only the resources to 
start.
Furthermore, the degree of openness of political 
recruitment affects the legitimacy of political systems. If 
those that are eligible belong to a restricted stratum of 
persons, political alienation may become widespread and 
public control of governing elites may be weakened. Instead, 
if the roots of political ambition are socially dispersed, 
the democratic tree is likely to grow stronger. 2
2 . The Methodological Premise: Rediscovering
Individuals in Political Analysis
But is it worthwhile to study politicians? Some argue 
that it is not, given that whether or not political actors 
matter cannot be proved. As a consequence, individuals are
A H t f í t t f i «j ' nnjUHn w » W ^
played down in some research approaches - such as 
institutionalism and radical structuralism. Marxists like 
Poulantzas (1978, 62; also 74, 124-5, 129), for instance,
define individual agents as nothing more than 
«"personifications" of Wage-Labour and Capital», that is as 
«supports or bearers of an ensemble of structures» which are 
the only real forces behind events2. "Old" and "new"
institutionalism, albeit to a lesser extent, demonstrate the 
same tendency to remove concrete individuals from the 
picture. The stress on the «ubiquity of routines» and the 
advocacy to «see action - including action in politically 
important and novel situations - as instituzionalized 
through structures of rules and routines» leads them to
conclude that fundamentally «political actors are driven by
institutional duties and roles» (March-Olsen 1989, 24, 23,
159). This approach proposes the same conception of
political research which was well established at the
beginning of the twentieth century, when « it was not
considered necessary to discuss the politician. Occasionally 
he was mentioned in a dim sort of way, but always as if he 
were an intruder who did not fit in and was soon destined to 
disappear. [..] Textbooks on politics maintained a splendid 
isolation from the haunts and manners of the politician» 
(Lippmann 1922, cit. in Eulau 1969, 371). 2
2 However, marxists who are more sensitive to Marx's early writings 
contest this vision (cf. Miliband 1970).
This is not to deny that «structures» and 
«institutions» are influential factors3. Structures and 
institutions do influence events, but this occurs first of 
all by influencing individual expectations and behaviour. 
Individuals, not abstract entities, affect reality prijna 
facie. Hence, focusing on the individual mediation of social 
forces brings us one step closer to the explanation of 
events and can reveal the effective conditions of human 
choices. Such a methodological rationale lies behind this 
empirical study.
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3. The Empirical Problem: Explaining the Political
Ambition of Youth
This research is about political ambition. Despite 
popular disapproval, ambition is not a pathology of 
political systems. On the contrary, it is necessary in every 
society. It provides a supply of political actors needed to 
maintain a structure of political roles. Were these actors 
not to exist, the polity would dissolve. More realistically, 
democratic representation hinges on ambition, since «without 
the politician's ambition driving him or her to capture and 
hold a congressional seat, the public's mandate loses its
3 As Whitmeyer (1994) argues, the claim that the actor is «foundational 
of social structure» is not incompatible with a structural analysis of 
those opportunities and constraints in which individual action is 
embedded.
6force and its withdrawal holds no threat» (Fowler-McClure 
1989, 238 )4.
As will be pointed out in chapter II, demand and supply 
of political personnel interact in such a way that only 
people in particular "positions of departure" become 
legitimate candidates for further political advancements. 
Seeking to fill these positions, individuals who aim and 
«prepare to play active political roles usually become 
differentiated at an early age from their more passive 
contemporaries» (Lasswell 1965, 21)5.
More precisely, the most vigorous «sifting and sorting 
of the general population until a relative handful from each 
generation is left to hold office» (Prewitt 1970, 57-8)
takes place when the would-be politicians choose to become 
active as incumbents of some role which political recruiters 
consider as an apprenticeship, while their age peers stay 
aloof. These apprenticeships can be identified
4 On the other hand, ambition is as necessary as it is dangerous. 
Democracy needs people ambitious enough to commit themselves to striving 
for political power, and modest enough to agree to legal rules and rule- 
based defeats. This concern led The Federalist (1981, 160) to propose 
the constitutional separation of powers as a device that makes «ambition 
counteract ambition» and thereby prevents the emergence of hegemonic 
aspirations.
5 Generational and demographic constraints can alter the chances of 
promotion in some circumstances, delaying the entry of ambitious young 
individuals or discouraging them. On the one hand, exceptional phenomena 
of mobilization may yeld a surplus of political aspirants as a side- 
effect. Thus, after a revolution or prolonged uprising there is always a 
problem of re-allocating former full-time activists to different 
occupations. Failure to do so can produce threats to the social order - 
such as terrorism, as in Italy in the 1970s. On the other hand, even in 
normal times the demographic phenomenon of the extension of active life 
can slacken new recruits' careers. As a matter of fact, in contemporary 
Western societies «the age at which inheritances of positions are handed 
on is getting later and later and the juniors of the dominant class are 
champing at the bit» (Bourdieu 1993, 101).
7retrospectively, by exploring where the careers of current 
political elites actually began. This information is 
important in order to «locate the men to whom it is 
reasonable and appropriate to assign ambitions for these 
offices» (Schlesinger 1966, 195).
In any case, political ambition turns out to be 
unequally distributed among social actors. The second part 
of chapter II contains a review of the competing 
explanations of why some people join political groups and 
become full-time activists, and others do not. These 
explanations focus either on psychological configurations or 
social conditions (cf. infra).
In chapter III the object of the empirical analysis is 
introduced. The early career paths of the Italian MPs of the 
1992-1994 legislature are scrutinized to find the most 
common "entry points". Data show that the bulk of the older 
generation of Italian leaders had begun their careers at the 
head of party youth organizations. Therefore, at the 
beginning of the 1990s in Italy, a leadership office in the 
youth organizations of the main parties was regarded as a 
highly common stepping-stone to political power. At that 
time, youth parties were where politically ambitious young 
people had to be. By being admitted to such an elite 
breeding ground, ambitious youths were assured of an 
opportunity to be considered for a successful career in the 
political world.
This is why the top cadres of the party youth 
organizations have been selected as the object of fieldwork. 
While their age peers set their sights on more conventional
l j l l l iw i '
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career plans, these individuals chose to devote most of 
their time and energies to political activism in a party 
structure. Charged with some leadership responsibilities, 
they were (and, most of all, imagined to be) natural
candidates for replacing senior leaders. They formed the 
core of a «reserve political class». They were the would-be 
career politicians par excellence.
Chapters IV to VII compare a sample of 115 leading 
activists of the main party youth organizations to a control 
group of 322 nonactivists of the same age cohort in Italy6. 
Given their promising positions in the party structure, 
young activists - all under 30 years of age - embody
political ambition at an early stage. Inasmuch as the
analysis is carried out shortly after their decision to 
engage in full-time militancy, studying them is expected to 
shed light on the sources of political ambitions more 
directly than is usually done by drawing from memoirs, 
biographies, and historical records of adult leaders.
While designing the inquiry, the concern was to gather 
- through structured interviews - data about three main 
groups of factors: personality traits, social origins, and 
social networks. On the one hand, psychological theories 
hold that the aptitude to enter politics stems from some 
alterations of the normal personality at an earlier stage of 
the lifecourse. Politics repairs such abnormalities, or
gives expression to the value orientations which are 
associated with them. On the other hand, sociological
6 Details of the sampling procedures are given in chapter IV, S 2.
9accounts underscore the influence of belonging to certain 
social categories (e.g., male, upper class, and so on). 
These accounts tend to assume that people with specific 
attributes are subject to specific processes of 
socialization or intergenerational transmission that induce 
them into politics. By contrast with this kind of 
explanation, finally, socio-structural theories contend 
that, especially in contemporary societies characterized by 
a fragmentation of class cultures and lifestyles7, personal 
attributes are likely to be poor indicators of individual 
dispositions. These are seen rather as depending on some 
aspects of the social networks in which the individual is 
embedded. From a socio-structural standpoint, political 
ambition would be spurred by particular configurations of 
these networks - notably, the existence of strong ties with 
long-standing activists.
Chapters V, VI, and VII analyze the explanatory power 
of these three types of independent factors in the context 
of this study (table 1). In chapter VIII, lastly, the main 
models that can be reconstructed on the basis of the 
literature are contrasted with a new model. In a nutshell, 
this model seeks to focus on the circumstances that make the 
price of political ambition seem high to some people and 
advantageous to others. Evidence proves that the perspective 
of a career involvement in politics reflects a particular 
configuration in the structure of capital distribution at
7 Evidence contained in Ester et al. (1993a) provides a convincing 
picture of this process in economically advanced Western countries.
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the micro level; yet, capital is to be taken as a more 
multi-faceted object than in Marxism and the "interest" 
leading to political involvement not as an action to defend 
a merely economic integrity*
Table 1: Plan of the empirical study
E x p l a t i a n d u t n  E x p l a n a n » Chapter
Politica!
A m b i t i o n
Adolescent
Deprivations
Value
Orientations }
V
Social Position 
(background factors) > VI
Social Position 
(network factors) } VII
Integrated Model >s V ili
4. Themes and Levels of Inguiry
This research can be read on three levels. First, it is 
an empirical description of young party activists in the 
context of the transition from the so called "First" to the 
"Second" Republic in Italy. The picture portrays the supply 
lines of an army dismantled soon afterwards - i.e., the 
Italian political class. Although we cannot know whether 
these reserves will ever reach the front, they were the 
specimen of the aspirants to a political career in a 
political system which many viewed as a prototypical 
partitocrazia. As such, the inquiry may interest students of 
recruitment, parties, and Italian politics in general.
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Second, as democracies rely more than other regimes on 
the self-selection of their political personnel, accounting 
for how this selection originates in a concrete case can be 
seen as a contribution to democratic theory. In particular, 
the study addresses the question of whether there are 
factors which restrict the pool of prospective politicians 
from an early age, and thus predefine - at the risk of 
systematically excluding some talents - the "human material" 
from which voters then choose their leaders.
Third, as it seeks to understand what makes young 
adults enter a given career line, this investigation may 
also offer some insights into the process of reproduction of 
social structures - a research field which is central to 
sociological theory and cannot be dealt with by social 
mobility studies only (cf. Bertaux-Thompson 1993).
Finally, this work is committed to descriptive 
theorizing. However, the empirical conditions of political 
recruitment should also be of interest to those who are 
concerned with evaluation and prescription, as an 
unavoidable starting point for assessing the capacities and 
thrusts of ruling elites. If it is true that «nul régime n'a 
découvert une recette infaillible pour confier les quelques 
milliers de postes d'importance à quelques milliers d'hommes 
d'intelligence supérieure, de caractère ferme et de bonne 
volonté» (Aron 1965, 27), the ideal formula cannot be found 
unless we know the actual ingredients.
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CHAPTER II
WHO ENTERS POLITICS AND WHY:
TWO PERSPECTIVES OF RESEARCH ON POLITICAL RECRUITMENT
1. The Two Faces of Political Recruitment 
Matching individual ambitions with collective needs is 
a crucial issue for the integration of social structures1. 
Historically, the various ways in which this matching takes 
place can be called recruitment systems• They consist of 
mechanisms by which:
a) Individuals propose themselves to fill social roles 
(the supply-side process);
b) Individuals are distributed among social roles (the 
demand-side process).
These two processes define the interplay of individual 
actors and social structures in many social settings2. In 
politics, they outline the functioning of political 
recruitment3.
1 This issue was first dealt with by Simmel (1968, 28-30) in his 
discussion of the third «a priori of society». In more recent 
sociological theory, it lies at the core of Bertaux's (1977) concern for 
the «distribution of human beings into social positions» - what this 
author calls «distribution anthroponomique».
2 Having to account for the complementary forces of demand and supply, 
studies on educational and labour markets are field-specific parallels 
of this subject.
3 A similar framework for the study of political recruitment has been 
developed by Norris (1995a).
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The demand side concerns the regulation of competition 
among political aspirants. Gate-keeping procedures have to 
be forged so as to reward those candidates who are most 
capable and willing to serve the selectors' interest. How 
this is achieved in reality is a paramount problem of 
political systems. It will be examined in the first part of 
this chapter (§ 2).
The supply side concerns political vocations. Only a 
few people make themselves available to occupy vacancies in 
local councils, party boards, parliaments and governments. 
Why them? How the impulse to enter politics comes up and 
persists in prospective rulers is the other fundamental 
question in the study of political recruitment. We will turn 
to its theoretical aspects later on in this chapter (§ 3).
The two perspectives on political recruitment represent 
different approaches for answering the key question: How are 
we to identify who will take up a political career and why? 
The demand-side approach sees things from the viewpoint of 
the selectors: the requirements they use in filtering out 
candidates define the attributes of prospective politicians. 
On the contrary, the supply-side approach takes the 
viewpoint of these politicians: the conditions under which 
their ambition emerges define their incentives.
Both of these approaches are limited when taken alone 
but complement each other. Both will therefore be used in 
this study. The demand-side perspective helps to identify 
the most likely potential politicians - who may he expected 
to take up a political career (chapter III). The supply-side
14
perspective helps to identify what induces this potential - 
why they take up a political career (chapters IV to VIII).
Before doing this, however, the variants of demand-side 
and supply-side approaches need to be reviewed. This review 
will help to choose the procedures and variables to be 
employed in the empirical part of the research.
2. Demand-side Approaches to Political Recruitment 
In a demand-side perspective, «political recruitment 
refers to a varied set of institutional processes by which 
political jobs beyond the citizenship level and beyond the 
rank-and-file participants in campaigns and organizational 
life are filled» (Marvick 1976, 38; also Almond 1960, 31).
Since candidates are positively screened for something they 
have more than the defeated in the eyes of the selectors 
(individuals or institutions), the approach focuses on the 
requirements for political selection - sometime referred to 
as the «opportunity structure» of recruitment (Seligman
1971). What Seligman calls a structure - perhaps 
inappropriately - is the set of dimensions on which the 
selectors evaluate aspirants to a political office4.
4 Seligman's theory of recruitment is typical of the demand-side 
approach, inasmuch as it is based on the functionalist reasoning 
implicit in it: each political system selects the most suitable 
politicians. This author links «opportunity structure» to the type of 
regime. His quite obvious concluding hypothesis is that the greater the 
opportunity, the more democratic the decision making. The intermediate 
factor explaining this relationship is «political risk» - i.e., the 
costs which fall on the defeated. They are «high» under authoritarian 
rule, and «low» under democratic rule. However the causal path 
connecting these three variables is not clarified.
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2.2. Precursors: From Plato to Weber
The requirements for political selection have been 
investigated since antiquity. Given the mainly prescriptive 
standpoint of pre-modern accounts, however, they need only 
be mentioned as examples of the long-standing importance of 
the issue. While Plato1s programme remains a major point of 
reference when discussing the selection of political leaders 
normatively (cf. Popper 1962, 120-37)5, Aristotle is perhaps 
the first thinker to face the «question of the ways of 
appointing the magistrates» descriptively. In the fourth 
book of his Politics, he proposes a three-dimensional 
classification of the recruitment systems in the Greek 
cities of the time: «One of those three determining points
is, who are the persons who appoint the magistrates? The 
second is, from whom? And last, in what manner?» (1944, 361-
2). A plethora of combinations of active and passive 
electorates and voting devices are consequently overviewed. 
Aristotle thus treats selection systems as the cornerstones 
of differing constitutional structures, yielding perhaps the 
most clear-cut approach to political recruitment until the
5 Chapter Ten of Plato's Republic introduces the crucial problem in 
terms of political philosophy - how to identify who is right to rule. 
Plato proposes to choose the «Rulers» from among the class of the 
«Guardians» in their youth. This choice has to to be made through three 
tests, which demonstrate «who, when we look at the whole course of their 
lives, are found to be full of zeal to do whatever they believe is for 
the good of the commonwealth and never willing to act again its 
interest» (Plato 1945, 104). The tests consist in maintaining such a
will against all odds: «thefts» (loosening of conviction caused by 
persuasion or by the passing of time), «violence» (infliction of «pain 
or suffering»), and «bewitchment» (indulgence in «the allurements of 
pleasure» or subjection to «the spell of panic»). The conclusion is that 
«all who do not reach this standard we must reject» (ibid., 105).
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birth of empirical political science. However, his analysis 
is hardly applicable to contemporary political systems.
In the Middle and Modern Ages, the theme of the «just 
ruler» - «legitimacy», one would say nowadays - obscured 
that of the functioning of recruitment. Typically, 
justifications or rejections of ongoing sovereigns left 
little or no room for description of current practices. Even 
in Machiavelli (1956, 39), an account of the methods for 
non-born princes to acquire political power is laconically 
reduced to two possibilities: «o con le armi d' altri o con 
le proprie». Equally expeditious is Marx, according to whom 
the problem is marginal. For governors act «on behalf» of 
the real power-holders (i.e., the capitalist class), 
political leaders' recruitment is predicated on their 
capacity to protect class interests (cf. Miliband 1977, 67- 
74).
Recruitment comes to the fore as a central theme of 
descriptive political theory only with the Italian elitists. 
In Gaetano Mosca's view, in particular, the method of 
selection and the degree of social differentiation of the 
recruits depend on the recruitment «tendency» prevailing at 
any given time - the demand-side and system-level 
independent variable6. According to Mosca, the ruling class 
by nature tends to make its privilege hereditary. In this 
case, he speaks of «aristocratic tendency»: the new
6 This idea was later imported into American political science by 
Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, 226), who maintained that «what is important 
and what varies from one body politic to another is the set of 
principles according to which the elite is recruited».
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incumbents are most similar to their predecessors. The 
opposite occurs when the «democratic tendency» is at work: 
varying «social types» enter the ruling class in the process 
of political succession. Albeit loosely and sparsely, Mosca 
attempts to specify the conditions that facilitate a more 
open access to power - i.e., the shift toward the 
«democratic tendency» (apparently the opposite trend does 
not interest him). A first condition is fulfilled when 
«aptitudes to command and to power-wielding are no longer 
the monopoly of the legal rulers»; a second, when «a change 
takes place in the distribution of the resources on which 
power is based, or new resources arise»; a third, when the 
political class «is no longer capable of performing the 
social functions for which it came to power» (Sola 1982, 48-
9). The democratic tendency then has the upper hand. Renewal 
at the top can be violent ( «revolution» ), or take a smoother 
form («infiltration») consisting in the cooption of a 
counter-elite that usually is formed among the ruled. Mosca 
does not explain why one or the other form of renewal 
occurs. He is also rather vague about the outcomes of the 
different systems of recruitment, although it seems that for 
him the «aristocratic tendency» makes for a more 
disinterested but less representative political class.
Finally, it should be noted that in his review of the 
methods of selection - besides inheritance, cooption, and 
violence - Mosca leaves no place for election. Even in 
democracies, in his view, recruitment happens before 
elections - that is, at the moment when candidatures are put 
forward. At the polls, the choice is so restricted that the
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voter has no real power of decision. Thus, in relation with 
the Italian political system of his time, in a famous 
passage he writes:
«If each voter gave his vote to the candidate of 
his heart, we may be sure that in almost all cases the 
only result would be a wide scattering of votes. [ .. ] 
If his vote is to have any efficacy at all, therefore, 
each voter is forced to limit his choice to a very 
narrow field, in other words to a choice among the two 
or three persons who have some chance of succeeding; 
and the only ones who have any chance of succeeding are 
those whose candidacies are championed by groups, by 
committees, by organized minorities. [In sum,] the 
representative has himself elected by the voters, and, 
if that phrase should seem too inflexible and too harsh 
to fit some cases, we might qualify it by saying that 
his friends have him elected» (Mosca 1939, 154).
Extreme though it may seem, this insight suggests that 
systems of recruitment have to be explored prior to their 
final stage. It is indeed at the preceding stages that the 
major selection of possible rulers is likely to occur. 
However, the demand-side macrovariables - the «tendencies» - 
that Mosca proposes for determining the prospective ruling 
class are difficult to operationalize7.
7 Vilfredo Pareto's theory of the circulation of elites also includes 
some interesting remarks, albeit cryptic and of little use for our 
purpose, about the process of political recruitment from a demand-side 
perspective (cf. Parry 1969, 60-3; Bobbio 1973, 22-4; Powers 1987, 129- 
33). Pareto’s view is that in normal times power is transmitted through 
(biological and cultural) inheritance. But with time the rulers 
unavoidably tend to lose the character that brought them to the 
leadership, become milder and, at the same time, greedier. A 
disequilibrium arises when power is not in the hands of the best endowed 
(Pareto 1964, 532-3, esp. $ 2040; and 539-40, esp. $ 2055 and 2057). As 
the talent and force of the governors decline, the system demands a 
change of elites. The doors are open to some qualified outsiders from 
the lower class. Unfortunately, because he is ahistorical and abstract, 
Pareto does not dwell on how these emerging elites can be identified 
empirically.
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Max Weber's concern for political selection emerges 
after World War I, paralleling his increasing involvement in 
German politics8. He restates the problem in the most 
tragic, passionate, and at the same time lucid way: «What
kind of a man must one be if he is to be allowed to put his 
hand on the wheel of history?» (Weber 1948, 115). In search 
of an empirically based answer, the German scholar engages 
himself in an unsystematic but insightful comparative study 
of how institutional arrangements drain the available «human 
material» of political leadership. He regards «the
differences between political structures as differences in 
the types and qualities ’selected' to predominate within 
them» (Beetham 1985, 110; also Hennis 1988, 182-3).* This
leads him to sketch a demand-side model of political 
recruitment, in which the crucial intervening variables are 
the roles of parliaments, parties and electoral systems.
Parliament is in the foreground of the analysis. The 
concrete cases that help Weber in his modelling are Germany 
and Britain at the turn of the twentieth century. The German 
Reichstag was then endowed with limited powers of policy­
making. It could only enforce «negative» policies, such as 
vetoing governmental bills or presenting popular petitions; 
the cabinet was not responsible to it, and bills could not 
be initiated by the MPs. In addition, a constitutional rule 
(article 9) prohibited them from becoming ministers.
8 This concern is primarily expressed in Parliament und Regierung and 
Politik als Beruf. Although both are pamphlet-like works, there is some 
agreement that they contain value-free analyses of reality (cf. Beetham 
1985, 22-5; Cavalli 1993, 42). This interpretation is adopted here in 
retracing Weber's outlook on political recruitment.
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Therefore, according to Weber, the German Parliament 
attracted ideologues without a sense of responsibility and 
pragmatism, devoted to demagogy and patronage. At the same 
time, the monarch - who appointed the cabinet - was a 
«political amateur». His choices mainly relied on status and 
other ascriptive considerations. Thus, in no way "true" 
leaders, with the personal characteristics outlined in 
Politik als Beruf («passion for the cause», 
«farsightedness», «sense of responsibility»), were likely to 
rise to power. In contrast, the British Parliament had 
«positive» powers: law-making and, particularly in Weber's 
view, the control of the bureaucracy. The select committees 
of the House of Commons were especially appreciated by 
Weber, since they appeared as those «school[s] of intensive 
work on the reality of administration» that made British 
parliamentarians competent and pragmatic. Excellence among 
them emerged out of the concrete capacity to make the 
administration more effective, not out of demagogy. In turn, 
the chance to make one's name in parliament, and through 
this to reach the cabinet, attracted the best minds of the 
country to the legislature. In Britain, due to the role of 
parliament, argued Weber, MPs constantly formed a reservoir 
of realistic leaders capable of subjecting one quarter of 
the human race to their will.
After the First World War, Weber reconsidered to some 
extent his previous hypothesis about the importance of 
parliamentary selection. His focus shifted to an earlier 
stage of political recruitment - the selection of 
candidates. In Politik als Beruf, the interaction of party
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structures and electoral systems is described as affecting 
different types of political recruitment. With the extension 
of the suffrage, a tendency towards the personalization of 
politics was held to be highly probable. Party officials and 
local notables would have resisted this development. In the 
tension between the emergence of personal leadership and the 
persistence of mass organization, a decisive role was to be 
played by the electoral system. According to Weber, 
proportional voting tends to lead to an alliance between 
party apparatuses and interest groups. This would bring to 
parliament a bunch of particularist representatives and 
lobbyists. Majority voting, on the contrary, tends to force 
party machines to choose prestigious outsiders - the only 
ones capable of conquering a mass electorate - as their 
candidates. Paradoxically, if the patronage-oriented party 
machine is to survive, a "clean" leader is needed9.
2.2. Excursus: Political Recruitment and Democratic
Theory
Latent in Weber's reasoning is the issue of the 
relationship between political recruitment and democracy. 
Schumpeter's (1950) well-known theory that democracy is a 
procedure for generating political leaders clearly
originates from Weber's perspective10. Both thinkers,
9 A first example of this process according to Weber was the sudden rise 
and success of a respectable figure such as Woodrow Wilson within the 
boss-dominated Democratic Party in the United States.
10 More precisely, the Weberian element in the 'realistic' conception of 
democracy which Schumpeter inaugurates is that «the central feature of 
modern society» is not its democratic character but «its need for 
leadership» (Parry-Moran 1994, 5).
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however, seem to be too acritical about the virtues of 
universal suffrage. In particular, their viewpoints are 
predicated on the implicit assumption that the majority 
principle brings about the emergence of the most talented 
leaders. But why should more popular men be better 
statesmen? Not necessarily a good general on the «electoral 
battle-field», to take Weber's image, is a good policy­
maker11. Implicitly, faith in plebiscitary democracy means 
faith in the majority's capacity of choice.
To this objection, Weber would probably reply that 
elections do not mean that the best leader is chosen, but 
only that there is the widest recognition of who is such a 
leader. If nobody can claim to hold indisputable criteria of 
judgment about who would be the most valid ruler in absolute 
terms, at least the democratic procedure is most valid in 
maximizing consensus around this judgment.
Unfortunately, this argument expresses nothing more 
than a form of absolute relativism - a position that Weber 
was not allegedly prone to sustain. Yet, this must be 
accepted if it is claimed that democracy is the best method 
of political selection. In fact, no concession to relativism 
is made by the alternative view of democracy that sees it as 
the best method for communicating to the defeated minority 
that it is a minority - i.e., that it cannot depend on the 
largest following should it seek to seize power with force.
11 The argument is not new. It dates back at least to Bryce's (1888, 
100-10) remarks about «why great men are not chosen Presidents» in the 
U . S . More recently it has been used again, among others, by Sartori 
(1987, 140-1; 1993, 96-100) and Baechler (1985, 84).
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The democratic procedure of political recruitment, then, can 
be defended less for its selection capacity than for its 
peace-keeping virtue, since it discourages those leaders who 
have a smaller number of supporters from resorting to 
violence. From a recruitment perspective also, the strongest 
argument for democracy is that it secures peace rather than 
better rulers (cf. Popper 1962, 124).
2,3, Stages of Political Selection
Let us turn back to the main problem to be settled in 
this first part of the chapter: How can prospective 
politicians be identified? From Mosca we can retain the 
suggestion that even in democracy a great deal of political 
selection takes place before election. From Weber, we borrow 
the idea that a causal path links electoral systems, party 
models, and type of political personnel. More recently, a 
number of demand-side schemes of recruitment have been 
proposed to incorporate these preliminary intuitions.
In contemporary democratic systems, the recruitment 
process is a combination of different mechanisms of 
selection operating at successive stages. Prewitt (1970, 8) 
draws a «Chinese box puzzle» framework, in which the 
population is sorted according to its degree of political 
involvement. Thus, from the widest number of ordinary 
citizens is drawn the (1) «Dominant Social Stratum»; this 
expresses the (2) «Politically Active Stratum», within which 
one finds the smaller circle of the (3) «Recruits and 
Apprentices»; some of these then become the (4) 
«Candidates», among whom the (5) «Governors» are chosen.
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Recruitment stages can be seen as the "leaps" from one
status to the next - the whole process consisting, as
Prewitt says, in how «from the many are chosen the few». 
Yet, although it is most often empirically true that 
«socioeconomic characteristics partly determine the 
reservoir from which officeholders are selected» {ibid., 
26), entering the «Dominant Social Stratum» is a process of 
social mobility (or immobility), not of political 
recruitment. The socially privileged are not necessarily 
driven by political ambition, nor promoted up the social 
ladder by the selection of political personnel.
Seligman (1971, 3) sets forth a different 
classification, stressing stages rather than statuses. He 
distinguishes a «general model of the political recruitment 
process» comprising four phases, each of which «modifies the 
roles of those who pass through it»: «eligibility», 
«selection», «role assignment», and «role behavior». 
Seligman's terminology, however, is unfortunate: it is quite 
generic and it refers more to the outcomes of each step of 
the recruitment process (e.g., «role behavior») than to its 
dynamics.
Herzog's (1971, 519; 1975, 46-52) sequence is more 
precise. It considers the following stages: «political 
socialization», «activation», «selection», «appointment», 
and «entry into the elite». Explicitly, the first two stages 
are not part of the screening system. They represent moments 
in the formation of the supply in the market of political 
personnel: following their «political socialization» and
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«activation» aspirants come to the fore12. The subsequent 
three stages, instead, are on the demand side of the model. 
They correspond to the barriers to be overcome in the route 
to the top of political hierarchies in democratic systems: 
being selected as a candidate, being elected, taking a 
leading role among the elected.
The number and nature of these stages, however, is 
unavoidably contingent on the legal framework of reference. 
The variety of constitutional devices limits the scope of 
any workable scheme of the political recruitment process. 
Herzog's model seems to be applicable to pariiamentary 
systems other than West Germany, but not without exceptions. 
For instance, when France was a parliamentary democracy, 
General De Gaulle was appointed prime minister (in 1958) 
without having to pass any electoral test - i.e., the normal 
«selection» stage. Yet the procedure was formally correct. 
Political actors who have skipped one or more steps of the 
process can always be found. All the available schemes, in 
sum, are designed inductively and can only claim a 
probabilistic validity.
Given our aim of identifying potential politicians, the 
schemes just reviewed seem too wide and encompassing. In a 
very general way, they suggest treating recruitment systems 
as being composed of progressive and crucial thresholds. 
From an operational point of view, these thresholds consist
12 The term ' activation' is a literal translation from the German 
Activation. Although it does not correspond to the normal English usage 
of the word, it will be used hereafter given the lack of any viable 
alternative.
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of rules that vary across political systems. As will be seen 
in the next sections, these rules can be manifest (§ 2.4) or 
latent (§ 2.5)13. They are the best available indicators for 
identifying the social actors that are most likely to enter 
politics from a demand-side perspective.
2.4. Manifest Rules of Political Selection
There is a large number of manifest rules for 
leadership selection: inheritance, rotation, lot, purchase
of office, forcible appropriation, examination, cooption, 
and election (Keller 1963, 179; Marvick 1968, 277-8;
differing classes in Loewenstein 1990, 27-9). In modern
democracies, only one of these has been definitely excluded: 
force14. Meanwhile, only one is regarded as completely 
legitimate: election. But, although this principle is
necessary in all democratic systems, it is sufficient in 
none. Even in the United States, where it is most 
extensively applied, there are non-elective political 
offices. Comparative evidence indicates the persisting 
recourse to all the other criteria of political selection in 
the contemporary world.
Transmission of political power by inheritance, for 
instance, is effectively at work in Japan, where in 1990 a
13 'Rule' has two meanings in the social sciences. On the one hand, it 
refers to criteria that guide individuals' action; in this case, we 
speak of manifest rules. On the other hand, the term refers to a 
regularity that emerges unintentionally in social life; in this case, we 
speak of latent rules.
14 A previous section (S 2.2) has shown that democracy is, indeed, best 
characterized as a recruitment system that discourages the use of 
violence among competing actors.
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quarter of the Diet members (more than 40% in the LDP) were 
second generation deputies (Fukai-Fukui 1992, 30; also 
Rothacher 1993, 49-52). Another outstanding example is 
China: «The relatives of China's senior leadership have 
become one of the most significant recruitment pools for 
China's 'second' and ’third' generation of leaders» (Scot 
Tanner-Feder 1993, 90; for other cases, Putnam 1976, 61; 
Czudnowski 1975, 188-90). In the U.S., too, «prior to World 
War II, [..] heredity was a crucial path to the Congress for 
women. During those early years, a majority of congresswomen 
were widows of former legislators [.. ]. Even in the period 
1968 to 1975, approximately one of every four new women in 
the House was the widow of a congressman or congressional 
candidate» (Hulse Thompson 1985, 72-3). Furthermore, 
inheritance is still the principle for the succession of the 
Heads of State in constitutional monarchies.
Rotation is an established rule for bestowing the 
Presidency of the Council in the European Union; at the 
national level, albeit in informal terms, it is a quite 
frequent outcome of elite pacts. Lot has come to be used 
rarely, except for the selection of juries in criminal 
courts, and as the mechanism for choosing who is elected in 
the case of a draw in many political systems. However, it is 
achieving wider currency. Proposals for forming «assemblies 
of randomly selected citizens», at least as «advisory 
councils to every elected official», have found outstanding 
advocates in recent times (Dahl 1991, 12 and 16). Purchase 
of office is illegal everywhere, although votes are 
regularly bought and sold in many regions of the world.
Moreover, even in richer countries electoral success is 
often correlated to campaign investments - and this may well 
appear an indirect form of venality of office. Examination 
is the typical device for screening candidates for the civil 
service; it is also the customary way to choose party 
candidates in British constituencies and for the approval of 
presidential appointees to the Supreme Court in the U.S. 
Senate.
Finally, there is cooption - namely, designation to 
elite membership made by the existing elite members15. No 
rule in the stages of «selection» and «entry into the elite» 
appears as common as this one. Cooption is also the most 
common procedure for appointing incumbents to offices in 
corporations, associations, and other non-political groups. 
Compared to other rules, it is less structured and leaves a 
wider autonomy of judgment for the selector. Usually, this 
encourages the selector to choose on the basis of the 
primary criterion for human association: homophily (i.e.,
the similarity appeal). As a consequence, cooption tends to 
promote continuity in succession. Better than other methods, 
cooption maintains group identity in spite of individuals' 
replacement (Loewenstein 1990, 253-4).
In the process of political recruitment, the paramount 
role of cooption at the «selection» stage is linked to that
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15 Since Mosca's and Pareto's times, a more specific use of this term is 
sometimes referred to in political science and sociology, meaning «the 
process of disarming competitive elements by appointing them to offices» 
(Calvert 1987, 7). As can be seen, this alternative definition mixes up 
the method of selection and one of its possible purposes. Incidentally, 
in his further treatment of political succession, Calvert resorts to the 
more general definition of the concept.
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of parties as selectors - a quasi-monopolistic role in 
comparative perspective (Bartolini 1986, 263-5; Blondel 
1990, 198-9; Lagroye 1991, 230). Almost everywhere 
candidates in elections run under party flags; the choice of 
candidates is normally attributed to party committees (the 
selection of which is in turn problematic). From Michels 
onwards, an extensive empirical literature has been gathered 
to show that cooption is typically adopted by such 
committees (e.g., Duverger 1969, 167). Loewenstein (1990,
270-1) observes that a special form of cooption is at work 
here. He calls it «representative cooption». In contrast to 
its purest form, in this case the coopted individual is not 
bound to become part of the coopting group, but rather to 
represent it elsewhere16.
In any case, cooption results in selection being guided 
by the criteria of social and cultural affinity. It is 
highly improbable that "strangers" - however brilliant their 
curricula - will be proposed. Why is this so? A point which 
is usually neglected is that cooption allows for some 
personal guarantee to be placed on the chosen individual by 
a part or all of the choosing group. This is what "sponsors" 
are for. They are held responsible for their protégés' 
failure. The tacit legimitacy of the method mainly relies on
16 Loewenstein analyzes a wide array of variants of cooption. His work 
probably contains probably an exhaustive historical review of the cases 
in which this method has obtained legal recognition (Roman 
magistratures, committees in British local government, Belgian Senate, 
American Vice-Presidency, et alia). Loewenstein also turns to the two 
contemporary institutions where one can find informal but routine 
recourse to cooption: parties and corporations. Yet, this part of the 
book is less documented. Pathbreaking though it is, Loewenstein’s study 
fails to explore the dynamics of cooption processes.
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this insurance being associated with it. The alternative 
method - election - does not give such a insurance. Bad 
choices made via an election cannot be indemnified, only 
repaired - but not before the next term. Because of this 
functional advantage, representative cooption may be 
compatible with a democratic context17. Provided the 
sponsors are known, the represented can make good of their 
losses at the sponsors' expenses18. f
To recapitulate: the rules which govern selection are 
fundamental in separating potential politicians from other 
citizens. Each rule implies some key requirement for 
selection: kinship for «inheritance», timing for «rotation», 
chance for «lot», wealth for «purchase of office», force for 
«appropriation», specific competence for «examination», and 
similarity for «cooption»19. Particular attention has been 
paid to the latter rule, given its empirical importance 
within parties. However, little is known about how 
sponsorship relations are formed in politics. Why does the 
sponsor X prefer Y to Z? And why does Y aim at X's rather 
than W's sponsorship? To know that similarity guides such
17 On this crucial point, Loewenstein is rather vague, even though he 
does not adopt the radical stance according to which the use of cooption 
in political recruitment makes of democracy a myth, as Michels and the 
early Mosca do (Cotta 1990, 10-1).
18 Empirically, cooption is also a common selection device in the last
stage of the political recruitment process - the «entry into the elite» 
- at the top of contemporary democratic regimes. «Only in two pluralist 
democracies, Australia and New Zealand, are ministers elected by 
Parliament) in the other thirty or so democracies they are appointed or 
co-opted by peers» (Dogan 1989, 1). Even though the institutions and
characters are different, the process is the same as in the «selection» 
stage.
19 In contrast, «election» poses less restrictive requirements to 
potential political aspirants.
31
mutual choices gives only a limited help: similarity of 
what? Class, status, value orientations? Therefore, even if 
we happen to know what is the manifest rule for political 
selection in a given system, this would not help much in 
identifying the lot of the prospective politicians. Latent 
rules, to which we now turn, appear more useful when seeking 
to predict who is more likely to enter politics.
2.5. Latent Rules of Political Selection
Even in regimes based on the equality of political 
rights and opportunities, political elites tend to have 
specific attributes which may be regarded as those 
requirements for being recruited that are fixed by latent 
rules of selection. However, such attributes tend to be 
context-sensitive: what is prized in one system at a given 
time is not appreciated in another at another time.
A more comprehensive approach focuses on the 
«opportunity structure» that is held to characterize 
selection in every political system (Schlesinger 1966). In 
Schlesinger#s usage, «opportunity structure» defines the 
probabilities that a category of individuals has to reach 
another office20. The basic idea is that in every political 
system there is a tendency to value the previous experiences 
of candidates for political posts. Latent rules define the 
suitability of individuals with given curricula and career 
timetables for filling political vacancies. One or more past
20 Despite the homology, Schlesinger*a «opportunity structure» differs 
from Seligman's concept reviewed before.
1incumbencies are the "appropriate" passages for making a 
would-be politician a serious aspirant to higher positions.
In Schlesinger's work ( as in this one), political 
ambition is regarded as an attribute of positions in a given 
opportunity structure rather than a subjectively expressed 
motivation ( the validity of which is always dubious). In 
other words, subjective ambition is predicated on the 
objective odds of promotion21. These have to be assessed by 
empirical research.
As an application of the theory, Schlesinger’s study 
proves that there are orderly paths to higher political 
offices in the United States (ibid., 89 ff.). For instance, 
thirteen paths account for more than 70% of the variance in 
the careers of U.S. Senators in the period 1914-1958. 
Although Schlesinger is able to chart three-stage career 
sequences in the form of «frequency trees», his approach is 
best illustrated by focusing on the opportunities for 
successive advancement associated with a single stage
e.g., the first office ever held by incumbent Senators 
(table 1). Historical precedents show that positions in the 
law enforcement, administrative, or state legislative 
systems are the most typical "launching-pads". By contrast,
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21 In the late 1960s, the link between subjective wishes and objective 
chances established by Schlesinger was underscored also in Bourdieu's 
and Passeron's studies of educational careers. They pointed out that 
each social category in the structure of educational opportunities 
monitors «conditional probabilities» of social mobility (that the 
researcher validates statistically) through a «process of 
internalization of the category's objective destiny» (Bourdieu-Passeron 
1977, 226). In spite of criticisms (Boudon 1973, 55), this assumption 
has become widespread in research on status attainment and mobility 
processes (e.g., Erikson-Goldthorpe 1992, 304).
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in order to reach the Senate/ a too "far-removed" or too 
"close" start (such as, respectively, a local council or the 
Congress) are, for opposite reasons, less successful career 
plans.
Table Is Entry points of the political careers of U.S. 
Senators (1914-58)
Law Enforcement 
Administration 
State Legislature 
Local Council 
No Prior Office 
Congress
Statewide Office 
Unknown
Total
N %
117 26.0
102 22.7
97 21.6
37 8.2
37 8.2
26 5.8
14 3.1
20 4.4
450 100.0
Source: Elaborated from Schlesinger (1966, 92)
Schlesinger1s rationale for studying opportunity 
structures is their expected ultimate influence on 
politicians * behaviour. Career opportunities prompt 
ambition, and ambition ties office-holders to their 
constituents, making them fear the loss of office. 
Consequently, they are stimulated to support policies suited 
to the voters' interests. Much in a functionalist vein, the 
theory states that opportunity structures are devices 
through which political systems regulate political outcomes 
so as to make these correspond to public demands.
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Figure 1: The causal connections of Schlesinger's ambition 
theory
LEVEL
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Although nowhere is it stated explicitly, Schlesinger1s 
ambition theory can be summarized in a causal chain (figure
l)22. Most of the subsequent empirical works on political 
ambition have concentrated on some part of this model (cf. 
Prewitt-Nowlin 1969? Black 1972? Bullock 1972? Hain 1974; 
Rohde 1979? Brace 1984; Carroll 1985; Hibbing 1986; Squire 
1988? Hibbing 1991; Burt Way-Mae Kelly 1992; Kiewiet-Zeng 
1993; Herrick-Moore 1993). In the next chapter, the 
influence of the opportunity structure on the targets of 
individual ambition - the first macro-micro link in the 
model - will constitute a starting point for the empirical 
analysis. In particular, we will rely on Schlesinger1 s basic 
«idea that a political structure acts on the choices of
22 The first and the last elements of the causal chain are at the system 
level and the two intermediate ones at the individual level, as in the 
general model of sociological explanation proposed by Coleman (1990, 6 
ff.).
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individuals so as to systematically affect all political 
office-seekers» (Black 1972, 145; cf. also Prinz 1993, 28). 
Since historical patterns show the statistically more 
successful pathways to the top, the politicians-to-be are 
likely to design their careers accordingly, setting their 
sights on some rather than other offices.
Schlesinger's approach is not without problems, 
however. First, its validity is contingent on the «stability 
of the system». When a political system changes abruptly, 
the rules of political selection change. But even when the 
system remains stable, some deviation from the rules may 
occur over time. This undermines the value of the 
opportunity structures at time X as indicators of the 
requirements for political recruitment at time X+l.
A related problem is the definition of the time scale 
in which opportunity structures are to be calculated. What 
are the criteria for fixing it? Schlesinger fails to account 
for this issue23. Yet, a solution is quite important for the 
replication of the approach. Plausibly the time scale has to 
be accorded with the research perspective. If one attempts 
to find systemic regularities like Schlesinger does, the 
period considered must be as long as the system duration. 
This is not the case when the research focus is on the 
strategy for promotion of politically ambitious actors. 
Office-seekers set their goals on the basis of their own
23 For instance, while Schlesinger's reconstruction covers a 44 years 
span (1914-1958) for U.S. Senators and a 58 years span (1900-1958) for 
U.S. Governors, there seems to be no theoretical reason for this 14 year 
difference.
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perception of the opportunity structure. They ground it on 
the direct experiences of their political life: if they have 
been in politics thirty years, they take as a reference 
point the career paths of the politicians on the scene in 
the last thirty years or so. In our case, analyzing the 
youngest political generation, we will need to draw a rather 
short-run opportunity structure, corresponding to the short 
career experience of the actors studied (i.e., young 
political activists).
This leads to the last weakness of Schlesinger' s work: 
«While Schlesinger can chart recruitment patterns, his data 
do not permit an examination of ambition directly» (Black 
1972, 144). In other words, Schlesinger does not examine the 
supply-side conditions for the emergence of ambition. The 
empirical investigation of the next chapters will attempt to 
fill this gap, using the opportunity structure as a means to 
single out young ambitious politicians and, then, study them 
directly. Schlesinger's approach helps to understand through 
which institutional filters and channels the lot of the 
available politicians is screened. The subjective conditions 
that make people enter this lot constitute a different 
theoretical question, to which the chapter now turns.
3 . Supply-Side Approaches to Political Recruitment 
Political recruitment was not approached from a supply- 
side standpoint until relatively recently. In the pre- 
democratic age, only usurpers proposed themselves for 
political office. The rise of political ambition as a more
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mundane and widespread phenomenon coincides with the 
emergence of universal franchise. This brought about what 
has been called a «democratization of expectations» (Keller 
1963, 182) about the distribution of political power.
Theoretically, thus, in liberal democracies the gates 
of political recruitment are open. Yet, those who are 
available for political office are still relatively few. 
Empirical tests show that self-exclusion is more important 
than selectors' bias in shaping the social composition of 
political elites24. Whatever the cause for this may be, 
political ambition affects only a tiny minority of the 
population. It must even be stimulated and cherished, since 
«a political system unable to kindle ambitions for office is 
as much in danger of breaking down as one unable to restrain 
ambitions. [..] Government, above all, depends on a supply 
of men so driven» (Schlesinger 1966, 2). Such a «drive» to 
«self-selection» of potential politicians constitutes that 
«one thing in common which distinguishes them greatly from 
their fellow citizens» (Bealey 1988, 230). Its origin is the 
key question of political recruitment theory in a supply- 
side perspective.
Seeking to explain political recruitment by identifying 
politicians' "anomaly", existing supply-side models have
24 Supply-side factors proved to play a stronger role than demand-aide 
factors in the process of recruitment of MPs in Britain, given that 
applicants who failed to become candidates did not differ from both 
actual candidates and MPs. Yet they differed much from the population 
(Norris-Lovenduski 1993).
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assigned causal priority to various aspects of personality, 
social origins, and social networks2S,
25 Historically, the first fragmentary accounts of the "anomaly" of the 
political man can be found in Ostrogorski, Weber, and Pareto.
Moisei Ostrogorski's analysis anticipates and, probably, inspires 
Weber's ideas to a great extent. The Russian scholar depicts two types 
of politicians, the «Professional» and the «Gentleman». Professional 
politicians - a novelty in nineteenth century British politics - are 
«personnes qui vivent exclusivement de la politique» (Ostrogorski 1903,
I, 556) ; the gentleman politician is a more traditional figure, «censé 
avoir des ressources indépendantes provenant de ses terres et non de 
spéculations ou d * 1appointments» (ibid., I, 5). A similar classification 
emerges from the American political world. Ostrogorski points out that 
the critical dimension of «census» (wealth) is linked to «temperament»
(motivation). Focusing on the political personnel of American party 
conventions, he draws three ideal-types of politicians: a) «politiciens 
mercenaires», who take part in politics «on business»; b) an 
intermediate stratum of non-professional politicians motivated by a mix 
of vanity and interest for spoils to dispense to friends; this stratum 
is made of «petites gens remplis de petite vanité» and also «personnages 
d'un rang plus élevé» who, «sans être des professionels, trouvent, dans 
cette situation éphémère, des satisfactions d'amour-propre, ne serait-ce 
que la satisfaction très modeste de voir leur nom imprimé dans le 
journal local, ou, s'ils sont d ’un tempérament nerveux, des occasions à 
émotions plus ou moins fortes», and, lastly, «places et d'autres "bonnes 
choses" [à] procurer à des amis»; c) «enfin il y a une catégorie de 
délégués obscurs, humbles, libres du cant de ces respectables 
personnages et qui ont le désir sincère de s'acquitter de leur tâche 
pour le bien publique» (ibid., II, 214).
The blueprint of this typology was revived and emulated by many scholars 
- among whom Max Weber (1948). In Weber’s more famous distinction, those 
who «live off politics» and those who «live for politics» correspond 
respectively to Ostrogorski's professional and gentleman politicians.
A different supply-side theory of political recruitment is presented by 
Vilfredo Pareto. Pareto holds a vision of men as psychologically marked 
by some basic and universal traits {residui). The six basic classes of 
residui are unequally distributed among the population, political elites 
have a prominent share of «residui di classe I» or «residui di classe 
II». The first kind of residui is called «istinto delle combinazioni», 
the second «persistenza degli aggregati». Those politicians who have 
more of the istinto delle combinazioni are «materialisti»; if they are 
part of the governmental elite, Pareto calls them «volpi». Those in whom 
«persistenza degli aggregati» prevails, Pareto calls «idealisti»; if 
they are members of the governmental elite, they are named «leoni». 
Concerning goals, «foxes» are interested in material rewards and 
pleasures. Their political performances, therefore, are aimed at 
maintaining order and social peace. As leaders, they rule by 
«concessions». Their tendency to compromise is a by-product of their 
fundamental ability to combine things, people, and ideals. They are 
masters of consociational practices ante litteram. The goal of «lions», 
on the other hand, is the fulfillment of their principles. Sometimes 
Pareto seems to say that they like superiority as such, but, in any 
case, they neglect material rewards. They invest all their energy in 
exalting their own principles - whatever they may be - and inflexibly
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3.1. The Importance of Personality
Freud's emphasis on childhood as the seedbed of adult 
actions was imported into political research primarily by 
Harold Dwight Lasswell in the 1920s. Political recruitment I
was perhaps the first field of application of the then I
revolutionary conjunction of psychoanalysis and political 
science. The idea that politicians are guided by some 
"peculiar" and "pathological" force at the psychic level had 
been expressed before - even though in an impressionistic 
form. Michels (1962, 205), for instance, had written that
political men are moved by a «natural greed for power»* 26.
Lasswell found this image of the homo politicus also in the 
works of two of his scholarly mentors - Charles Merriam and 
Alfred Adler - and in Eduard Spranger's Lebensformen, which 
influenced him greatly (Greenstein 1977). However, he 
elaborated on it in the light of Freud's conceptions. The 
result was the first supply-side theory of political 
recruitment.
In Psychopathology and Politics (1977), Lasswell adds 
to the basic idea that political personalities are «power- 
oriented» an account of the crucial «developmental sequence» 
of such an orientation and the corresponding behaviour -
i.e., self-selection for political roles27. This sequence
promoting them. In doing this, they do not hesitate to use violence. If 
they happen to come to power, they rule by «coercion».
26 Weber (1946, 116) shares Michels’ judgment in Politik als Beruf: «The
politician [.. ] works with the striving for power as an unavoidable 
means. Therefore, ’power instinct’, as is usually said, belongs indeed
to his moral qualities». As an assumption in their theories, the point 
is taken again by Schumpeter (1950, 282) and Downs (1957, 27 ff.).
27 Lasswell (1977, 273) drew on clinical records of mentally disturbed 
American former-politicians and «life-history interviews with
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comprises three stages: the first during childhood, the
second during puberty, the third at maturity. Initially, 
there is «a repressed and powerful hatred of authority, a 
hatred which has come to partial expression and repression 
in relation to the father, at least in patrilineal society» 
(ibid., 75). For the sake of psychic balance, the subject 
needs to overcome the sense of inferiority deriving from
paternal domination. This happens in the second phase of the 
process, through a «compensation» consisting in the
«displacement of private motives from family objects to 
public objects». Finally, there is a «rationalization of the 
displacement in terms of public interest»28. Lasswell sums
it all up in a «general formula which expresses the
developmental facts about the fully developed political man 
[that] reads thus:
p } d } r - P
where p equals private motives; d equals displacement 
onto a public object; r equals rationalization in terms of 
public interest; P equals the political man; and } equals 
transformed into» (ibid., 75-6).
The initial situation, Lasswell writes, «is shared by 
the political man with every human being» (ibid., 76). But
politically active persons. The interviews elicited free associations 
from the subjects, thus obtaining a body of material more amenable to 
"depth" interpretation than was obtained by traditional methods of 
interviewing and participant observation». No full transcription of 
these interviews is provided (it seems that they were burnt 
accidentally) ; the number of them is not even reported. Needless to say, 
by current standards the empirical support Lasswell gives to his theory 
is weak.
28 por example, «the merciless exploitation of the toolless proletariat 
by the capitalists may be the rational justification of the attitude 
taken up by the individual toward capitalism» (Lasswell 1977, 75).
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almost everybody displaces his own hatred on private objects 
(such as bosses at work). Only a minority turns to public 
objects. Finally, only a few within this minority find a 
rationale for their aggressive outlook in the public sphere. 
The occurrence of both the second and third psychological 
processes is what makes a political man29 *.
Las swell is aware that his is not as yet a model that 
explains fully the causes that lead some people to move into 
politics. So, he asks himself, «upon what does the 
displacement and the rationalization depend?» (ibid., 76). 
No answer can be found in Psychopathology and Politics*0. In 
a later writing, Power and Personality (1948), Lasswell 
comes back to the point with a more worked-out hypothesis 
which is accurately summarized by Greenstein (1977, xvii- 
xviii):
«Political men are typically individuals seeking 
to compensate for an unconscious sense of damaged self­
esteem resulting from earlier experiences in which 
rewards and sanctions were intermixed in such a way
29 No sexist connotation must be attributed to the use of the concept of 
"political man" or male pronouns for referring to the general category 
of political activists in the whole of this study.
Lasswell (1977, 77) seems to believe that the starting mechanisms are 
different in different types of politicians. Hence, he moves on to 
interview-based portraits of «Agitators», «Administrators» and 
«Theorists» (a classification he borrows from Spranger). Apart from the 
psychoanalytical details, Lasswell*s «Agitator» is, in the final 
analysis, not very dissimilar from Pareto's «Lion», for he «easily 
infers that he who disagrees with him is in communion with the devil, 
and that opponents show bad faith or timidity [.. ] The agitator trusts 
in mass appeals and general principles» (ibid., 7 8 - 9 ) .  «Administrators», 
on the other hand, displace their feelings of low self-esteem, developed 
in early life, on the «well-worked-out ordering of parts», «the 
imposition of uniformity», «the desub jectificat ion of the situation» 
(Lasswell 1 9 4 8 ,  62). Their ultimate goal is just the compulsive 
accomplishment of duties. «Theorists» are named but not dealt with. 
However, there is no theoretical account of the crucial process 
differentiating politicians from non-political men.
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that, though the individual did not become emotionally 
incapacitated as the result of the sanctions, he was 
left with an insecurity that was vented in a compulsion 
to exercise power».
Political man, thus, is the product of "some but not 
too much" repression in childhood. His self-esteem was 
lowered by the Oedipus complex, but not to the point of 
abandoning the quest of redress (Bryder 1994, 404).
However, some problems are left unsolved. Firstly, 
Lasswell does not help to determine the boundary between low 
and too low self-esteem. Secondly, the reasons for which 
«rationalization» takes place at a later stage are not 
clarified. Thirdly, and consequently, his hypothesis is 
difficult to operationalize. Attempts to do so have focused 
on either the last or the intermediate term of the 
psychological process depicted by Lasswell; respectively, a 
high power drive and a low self-esteem31.
In Lasswell's writings, the idea that political men 
feel a stronger need for domination than ordinary people 
«has been continuously modified, but the core notion 
remains» (Stone 1981, 11)32 • Applying content analysis or
projective techniques (in particular, the Thematic 
Apperception Test (TAT)), a series of studies conducted in
31 Other attempts to test Lasswell1 s theory were carried out with more 
generic psychopathology scales (Rutherford 1966; Marcus 1969; Carlson- 
Hyde 1980). However, they were not able to demonstrate a firm 
relationship between psychic symptoms and political activity or to link 
their evidence to the guiding theory.
32 Lasswell (1954, 223) had some afterthoughts with respect to the 
pathological nature of this need; he thus wrote that «it is probable 
that a basically healthy personality is essential to survive the 
perpetual uncertainties of political life».
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the 1950s and 1960s addressed the «politicians as power-mad» 
hypothesis (as Putnam [1976, 73] called it). Comparing 
student candidates to academic governmental bodies and 
"ordinary" students, Veroff's (1957) findings confirmed it. 
Winter's (1973) replications and extensions of this research 
corroborated previous results. By contrast, when focusing on 
party activists or members of State legislatures, McConaughy 
(1950), Hennessy (1959), and Harned (1961) found no 
significant support for the hypothesis. Above all, drawing 
on McClelland's (1961) scheme of basic personality needs, 
and with a wider and more internally diversified sample of 
political actors than their predecessors, Browning and Jacob 
(1964, 89) reached the conclusion that «simply being a 
politician does not entail a distinctive concern for 
power»33. Yet all these studies have serious sample limits 
and conceptual inaccuracies. The power motive is 
operationalized in different and not entirely consistent 
ways. Moreover, since they were influenced by the then 
ongoing debate about authoritarian personality, some 
scholars tended to intertwine «power-seeking drive» and 
«authoritarianism» (or related concepts) in empirical 
research. In particular, discovering a high level of 
«dogmatism» among Italian parliamentarians, DiRenzo (1967a; 
1967b) presented this result as consistent with Lasswell's
33 Browning (1968) obtained more qualified results in a later study, in 
which motivations and situations of political involvement were related. 
He found that individuals high only on the Affiliation Need scale 
entered the political arena only when strongly requested by others, 
whilst self-selected candidates scored lower on the Affiliation Need 
scale and higher on both the Power and the Achievement Need scales.
However, «dogmatism» is a pathology of the
level of personality, while the «power-seeking
drive» operates at the motivational level. A link between 
the two is neither empirically proved by DiRenzo nor 
theoretically implied by Lasswell's model34 5.
In principle, authoritarianism would even seem to be a 
trait more germane to Lasswell's idealtype of the political 
personality. As in Lasswell's picture, repression during 
childhood also figures as the triggering factor in the 
Frankfurt School's account of the authoritarian
personality36. Hence, although no empirical research has 
made it explicit, a linkage between the political and the 
authoritarian personality may be considered as one of the
possible hypotheses about the roots of political ambition.
In general, the existing tests of the «politician as 
power-mad» hypothesis are inconclusive. Some commentators 
have even objected that a wrong focus had been chosen, 
namely politicians in an «institutional» rather than 
«functional» sense: «The population to which Lasswell refers 
when he speaks of "political man" is not comparable, say, to
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theory34.
I cognitive
1
34 A similar conclusion was reached by a psychological comparison of 
political activists and nonactivists among American college students 
that found the first group to «value leadership more» and to be 
«definitely more ascendant and assertive» (Kerpelman 1972, 113).
35 DiRenzo's research has been the target of some well-argued 
methodological criticisms (Tullio Altan-Marradi 1976, 309-10). After a 
replication with a sample of American State legislators, DiRenzo (1977) 
himself revised his controversial thesis, introducing the variable 
‘political culture’ as the catch-all intervening explanation.
36 Levinson (1968, 24-7) and Scheepers et al. (1990, 15-8) give short 
but precise accounts of the nature and origins of the authoritarianism 
complex according to the Frankfurt School, whilst Gabennesch (1972) 
reviews alternative frameworks and developments exhaustively.
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the population of delegates to an American presidential 
nominating convention» (Greenstein 1977, xiv-xv).
Closer to Lasswell's original theory are the studies 
focusing on the self-esteem of activists prior to their 
involvement in politics37. This is the second form of 
research aimed - more or less directly - at testing the 
theory. The argument that individuals deprived of self­
esteem in their infancy are overrepresented among political 
leaders is put forward in the large majority, if not all, of 
the psychobiographies of presidents, dictators, ministers, 
and mayors written in the 1950s and 1960s (cf. Knutson 1973, 
50)38.
Unfortunately, this hypothesis is seldom reckoned with 
in non-idiographic research. A study of British prime 
ministers from 1809 to 1940 seems to be the only exception 
(Iremonger 1970). In a nutshell, this study claimed that the 
development of abnormal ambition among British premiers was 
a consequence of their lack of affection and loneliness at 
an early age (61% of them were orphan children). For these 
political leaders, Iremonger argued, the satisfaction of a 
mass scale consent functioned as a substitute for the love 
they could not receive in face to face relationships.
37 Self-esteem is usually defined as nthe evaluation which the
individual makes and customarily maintains with regard to himself: it
expresses an attitude of approval or disapproval, and indicates the 
extent to which the individual believes himself to be capable, 
significant, successful, and worthy. In short, self-esteem is a personal 
judgment of worthiness that is expressed in the attitudes the individual 
holds toward himself» (Coopersmith 1967, 4-5).
38 More recent authors using this argument are Kearney (1983), Rintala 
(1984), Kets De Vries (1993).
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However, «her statistics are marred by error and, like most 
commentators in this field, she exploits every ambiguous 
report or equivocal event in a way favourable to her 
hypothesis» (Berrington 1974, 369). Firstly, orphans in the 
British elite groups were more numerous than Iremonger 
assumes (Berrington estimates 36% of peers in 1841); the 
percentage of the bereaved among prime ministers remains 
very high, but not exceptional. Secondly, according to 
biographical accounts, some prime ministers did not display 
«personal unhappiness» in their private life (for instance, 
in their marriage); in contrast with Iremonger's thesis, 
political power was not the unique psychic gratification 
they could afford.
An important revision of the "deprived self-esteem" 
argument was advanced by Barber (1965). His analysis of the 
personality structure of Connecticut State legislators led 
him to underline both very low and very high self-esteem as 
subjective preconditions for entering politics. As he 
observed, the choice of a political career «is likely to be 
taken by two kinds of people: those who have such high self­
esteem that they can manage relatively easily the threats 
and strains and anxieties involved in this change [of life 
habits]; and those who have such low self-esteem that they 
are ready to do this extraordinary thing to raise it» 
{ibid., 223-4). However, Barber's assessment of self-esteem 
is largely impressionistic and is not methodologically 
structured. Perhaps for this reason, his argument has not 
been taken up by successive research (for an exception, cf. 
Clarke-Donovan 1980).
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Ziller's (1969; Ziller et al. 1977) projective 
technique, requiring self-ranking in relation to a variety 
of social roles in interviews, appears more reliable. Ziller 
proved that candidates to U.S. State legislatures with low 
self-esteem had greater chances of being elected. But these 
chances peaked when a second personality trait was present: 
complexity of the belief structure (88% of the candidates 
scoring low on self-esteem and high on complexity won the 
race)39. Elaborating on this finding,
«Ziller suggested that the "political" person is 
more responsive than his apolitical counterpart. 
Responsivity is a joint function of the desire to 
relate to other people and the ability to relate to 
others. These two charachteristics stem from low self­
esteem and high complexity. A person with low self­
esteem is thought to have a less stable basis for self- 
evaluation. Thus, he is more likely to try to adapt to 
other people [.. ]. The more complex person [..] is more 
able to find points of similarity with other people» 
(Stone 1974, 102-3).
39 After Ziller, «complexity» has been extensively researched by Tetlock 
and his associates, in assessing the concept, Tetlock takes into account 
the following issues: «Do [the subjects] see only good consequences 
flowing from options they reject? Do they divide the world into 
polarized "us" against them camps? Do they acknowledge uncertainty and 
the need for additional information in making policy decisions? Do they 
see causation as a fundamentally simple or complex process (univariate 
or multivariate, unidirectional or bidirectional, additive or 
interactive)? Do they acknowledge that reasonable people might view the 
same event in different ways?» (Tetlock-Boettger 1989, 210). 
Operationally Tetlock (1985, 268-9) defines the complexity of belief 
structures as being composed of «two cognitive stylistic variables, 
differentiation and integration. Differentiation refers to the number of 
dimensions of a problem that are taken into account in evaluating or 
interpreting events. [..] Integration depends on whether [one] perceives 
the differentiated characteristics as operating in isolation (low 
integration), in first-order or simple interactions (the effects of A on 
B depend on levels of C, moderate integration), or in multiple, 
contingent patterns (high integration)». It must be noted that this 
definition of complexity does not fit perfectly the definition of the 
concept in "traditional* psychology (Eysenck 1954, 182-5).
¡¿i£i*ti«ii«e53553BH
Another account that gives particular importance to the 
structure of beliefs prior to entering politics is Erikson's 
(1959). This explanation begins with a theory of the 
development of the Self in which the transition from 
adolescence to youth is regarded as the most critical stage 
in the construction of personal identity (Erikson 1980; cf. 
also Alwin 1994)40. During this «identity crisis» human 
beings are confronted with the issue of their own place in 
the world41. This confrontation is most dramatic for future 
political leaders. Their «identity crisis» is marked by a 
search for coherent solutions to the great issues of 
mankind. Choosing to become politically active results from 
the discovery of an ideology that solves such puzzles. As a 
logical corollary of Erikson's theory of leadership 
development, success in overcoming strong ideological 
uncertainty and confusion during adolescence may be seen as 
a distinctive trait, not only in the formation of leaders 
but also the large category of prospective political men.
Overlapping to a substantial extent with the concept of 
self-esteem is that of «locus of control» (Rotter 1966). 
Rotter distinguishes between the polar types of «Internal»
(I) and «External» (E) individuals - those who feel in 
control of their destiny and those who feel at the mercy of
48
4® In Erikson's view this is not the only phase of self-questioning that 
individuals must face in life: every stage of the lifecourse is 
characterized by a specific crisis. Erikson identifies eight such 
crises.
4* Adolescents, says Erikson (1980, 109), must trace the boundaries of 
their self-recognition - i.e., what «connotes both a persistent sameness 
within oneself (self-sameness) and a persistent sharing of some kind of 
essential character with others».
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the outside world. In contrast to Lasswell's view, this 
theory postulates that political ambition is likely to be 
proportional to the strength of the «internal» tendency
within the individual personality. People engage in politics 
inasmuch as they see themselves capable of affecting their 
environment and mastering future events. A «sense of 
political efficacy» is then expected to be particularly high 
among political activists, as it turned out to be among
participants in elections in a very influential work
(Campbell et al. 1960). Yet evidence is, once again,
contradictory. Members of self-help associations (Levens 
1968) and members of black political movements in the 
Southern States of America (Strickland 1965) were found to 
score high on the I-E scale? this was not the case among 
other political activists (Rosen-Sailing 1971; Silvern- 
Nakamura 1971), while black political extremists who had 
taken part in riots even proved to fit into the «external» 
type of personality (Ransford 1968; Renshon 1974)42.
A return to a modified version of Lasswell's 
psychoanalitic legacy took place in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Among the variety of «borderline personality organizations», 
the stress was placed on the narcissistic personality - the 
psychosis in which libido reflects back on the ego. The 
theoretical framework of reference (Kohut 1971? Kernberg
42 A factor analysis of the I-E scale has shown that the scale joins two 
distinct kinds of expectactions, personal and political control: «A
belief concerning felt mastery over the course of one's life, and a 
belief concerning the extent to which the individual citizen is deemed 
capable of exerting an impact on political institutions» (Mirels 1970, 
226).
1975) was not originally associated with political 
psychology43. However, it was subsequently extended to the 
study of leaders such as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Volkan 1981; 
Volkan-Itzkowitz 1984) and Oswald Mosley (McIntyre 1983). In 
these cases, the drive to enter politics and the ambition of 
succeeding in it are held to be rooted in a peculiar and 
relatively unfrequent form of Oedipus complex, in which the 
child's «mechanism for remedying frustration and 
incompleteness is to attach himself to an ideal object 
(Kernberg) or idealized parental image (Kohut), [that] is 
the fantasized image of the all powerful, all knowing, all 
giving, all loving parent» (Post 1986, 678). In particular, 
according to the Kohutian theory, the source of the child's 
personality deficit would be the mother's «inflated self», 
which leads her to distance herself from the husband and to 
impose on the son her hopes to fulfil some idealized 
aspiration. In more psychoanalytic terms, «the oedipal 
complex is of a particular kind since identification tends 
to be with the mother's unrealistic aspirations 
(incorporated in the grandiose self) rather than with the 
father» (Brown-Thomas 1986, 57). The son is attracted to 
politics as a way of gaining the mother’s affection by means 
of his power. Yet, promising as they are in giving new 
substance to the original Lasswellian insight, the accounts 
of political ambition based on the narcissistic personality 
or other psychic maladjustments still lack wider empirical
43 Kohut (1978, ch. 46) directly applied his theories on narcissism to 
messianic and charismatic personalities, but only as a special case of 
an all»encompassing approach.
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confirmation. Moreover, they tend to be grounded on data 
that lend themselves to an almost unending elasticity of 
interpretation. As in all psychoanalytic research, their 
supposed evidence refers to subconscious events that 
occurred during infancy, which is practically impossible to 
check in a reliable way (for even stronger criticisms, cf. 
Gellner 1985). As a consequence, not all the theories 
reviewed in this section will be tested in the empirical 
part of this study.
The search for psychopatology at the root of political 
ambition is without a testable basis not only because of 
methodological difficulties, but also because of the ill- 
defined scope of the theories. Are they meant to cover any 
kind of political ambition? In fact, they seem more 
convincing in explaining the cases of exceptional leaders 
and adherents of extremist movements than in accounting for 
political self-selection in normal times and at lower 
levels.
Dissatisfaction with the existing personality-based 
approaches to political ambition is widespread even within 
the discipline of political psychology (e.g., Knutson 1973,
46-7; Sniderman 1975, 144; Hermann 1977, 14-5; Burns 1978,
13-5). The conclusion that «efforts to demonstrate the 
relevance of predispositions in recruitment have been 
neither numerous nor very successful» (Czudnowski 1975, 211) 
still holds. A more complex and yet unknown interaction of 
psychological and sociological processes is required to 
account for the development of the homo politicus.
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3,2, Youth Activists: A Challenge to the Personality 
Accounts
The existing theories of political self-selection were 
shaken by the rise of youth movements in the late 1960s. 
The unforeseen mobilization of thousands of volunteers in 
newly formed political groups challenged the existing views 
about the causes of individual activism. Although with new 
claims and style and refusing the preexisting opportunity 
structure, youth activists placed themselves on the 
political scene and performed political roles. How and why 
did they join the movements? What differentiated them from 
non-active peers?
Many pieces of research of the time failed to trace a 
fully-fledged picture (e.g., Zinn 1965? Draper 1965; Ehle 
1965; Newfield 1966; Coles 1967). Others (e.g., Lipset 1972; 
Oberschall 1993, 320-3) focused on the macrosociological
antecedents of movement formation (such as the lack of elite 
circulation and the baby boom in the second half of the 
1940s), and therefore paid little attention to the sources 
of individual involvement. However, those studies which 
faced this question squarely found considerable evidence 
against the Freud-Lasswell perspective on political self- 
selection. Far from obeying some psychological need for 
symbolic parricide, young activists seemed to express a 
motivation to put into practice their parents’ values 
(Solomon-Fishman 1964; Flacks 1967; Keniston 1968? Block et 
a l . 1969; Cowdry et al, 1970? Braungart 1972; Lewis-Kraut 
1972; Wood-Ng 1980; McAdam 1988). In other words, they «were 
not rebelling against their parents but were carrying out
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the political orientations learned in the home» (Braungart- 
Braungart 1990, 294). This finding was variously
interpreted, giving rise to a still open debate about the 
more general theme of the development of political activism.
At first, some authors tried to adjust the
psychoanalytic theory to this finding. In particular, 
Keniston (1968) analyzed the infancy and the family dynamics 
of the life of the leaders of the 1967 Vietnam Summer 
Movement. To come to grips with the apparent continuity 
between the fathers' and sons' principles, and at the same 
time maintain a psychoanalytic framework, Keniston 
elaborated an ad hoc theory. He argued that the young 
political leaders were motivated by an unconscious will to 
repair their father's inability to live according to the 
principles which he taught his children. Thus, in a sense, 
Keniston sees activism as a way to overcome the Oedipus 
complex by showing the father that the son is superior to 
him as he is able to act consistently with his beliefs. 
Suggestive as it is, the theory is nonetheless poorly 
tested. Even worse, within Keniston's limited sample
(seventeen individuals interviewed in depth) there are some 
cases of politically active parents that apparently do not 
fit the theory.
After Keniston, interpretations of recruitment to youth 
movements distance themselves from a conception of political 
ambition as an effect of some psychic process. Almost all 
are based on comparisons of the family background of young 
activists and nonactivists. They share the idea that being 
born into a "special" position in the social structure
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counts more than being caught in a "special" unconscious 
syndrome during childhood. Profound divergences arise, 
however, about the definition of "position in the social 
structure". Until recently, these positions used to be 
defined in terms of social attributes (e.g., class, gender). 
Explanations based on such a traditional sociological 
approach «hinge on discovering that persons with similar 
attributes behave similarly in response to shared norms» 
(Weliman-Berkowitz 1988, 3). By contrast, a socio-structural 
approach has emerged. It assumes that positions in the 
social structure are defined by typical configurations of 
social relationships. Individual action, thus, would be 
better explained in terms of social network constraints. The 
two sociological paradigms provide us with alternative 
accounts of the origins of political activism. We now turn 
to an examination of each of them.
3.3. The Im portance o f  S o c ia l O rig in s
Political recruitment is an instance of the process of 
matching people to jobs. As the analysis of this process 
defines the agenda of status attainment research, several 
studies of political recruitment happen to share the basic 
assumption of much if not all status attainment research: 
social origins determine occupational achievements.
Without a doubt social origins count: evidence
throughout the world shows a strong association between 
background variables and occupational destinies. Existing 
research, however, seems more preoccupied with how much than 
with why this is the case. Social mobility tables - the
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dominant analytical tool in the field - can only record the 
outcomes of the process of status attainment, but they say 
nothing about the causal chain which leads to such 
outcomes44. Inequality of opportunity, thus, is accounted 
for, as Boudon (1973, 13-4) lamented long ago, on the basis 
of factors which have been proved to be statistically 
significant without clarifying the way in which they act as 
«generating mechanisms». In spite of the extensive empirical 
work in the meanwhile, twenty years after Boudon's lament 
«we have many more coherent findings now about how specific 
variables affect mobility or attainment than we have 
coherent stories about why (and under what circumstances) 
those results obtain» (Baron 1994, 390). The basic problem 
remains: why do social origins matter?
Social origin variables lend themselves to two types of 
explanations which, albeit not systematically, run through 
the literature. S tr u c tu r a l i s t explanations focus on 
d i f f e r e n t ia l  command on s o c ia l  resources: social origins 
influence what some youths have the power to do and others 
not. C u ltu r a l is t explanations underscore d i f f e r e n t i a l
44 Some scholars of social mobility are aware of this shortcoming, up to 
the point of writing in the concluding page of one of the most 
influential works in this research area: «It would seem especially 
important to move down from the level of macrosociological relationships 
to study more immediately the social processes that are involved in 
class mobility or immobility: in particular, the various ways in which 
members of one generation in fact apply their resources in order to 
enhance the mobility chances of their successors» (Erikson-Goldthorpe 
1992, 397). To shed light on the dynamics of these processes, in the 
main two methods - «cumulative mobility tables» including complete work- 
history data (Featherman-Selbee 1988) and «social genealogies» (Bertaux 
1995) - have been proposed hitherto. For an assessment and an overview 
of similar methodological understandings, see Dex (1991).
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a s p ir a t io n s: social origins affect what young individuals 
tend to aspire to45.
The most prominent structuralist accounts of the 
importance of social origins are probably Bourdieu's and 
Passeron's (1964) «cultural capital theory» and Boudon's 
(1973) «economic constraint theory»46. While in status 
attainment research the influence of social origins is 
frequently framed in a structuralist perspective (e.g., 
Treiman-Yip 1989, 376; Ganzeboom et a l . 1991, 296)47, such a 
perspective has been substantially neglected in the 
literature on political recruitment.
The culturalist accounts of the impact of social 
origins on youth's status attainment argue that the younger 
members of different classes adopt occupational aspirations 
consistent with the status of their reference groups, among 
which there are usually their parents. The core of this
45 Within each of these broad theoretical perpectives there are a number 
of more specific hypotheses which have been developed to account for 
occupational or educational stratification. In fact, research on 
educational inequalities seems to have stimulated theorizing to a larger 
extent (cf. Boudon 1973, 56-62; Gambetta 1987, 73 ff.; Blossfeld-Shavit 
1993, 6-7).
46 The cultural capital theory posits that children from lower-class 
families do not acquire at home those symbolic abilities which are 
prized by school teachers and employers; they tend therefore to be 
handicapped in educational and occupational contests. The economic 
constraint theory contends that lower-class offsprings are disadvantaged 
since they have to face higher costs than middle-upper class youth in 
the competition for entering high status educational and professional 
careers.
47 Many also conveniently switch from one type of explanation to the 
other. Goldthorpe, for instance, refers sometimes to «differing degrees 
of advantage or disadvantage [.. ] in terms of economic, cultural, and 
social resources» {Erikson-Goldthorpe 1992, 302), sometimes to 
«normative differentiation along class lines» (ibid., 17; cf. also 
Goldthorpe-Marshall 1992, 388). The two explanations are not mutually 
exclusive.
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theory, which has several variants, is that «any successful 
socialization tends to persuade agents to collaborate with 
their own destiny» (Bourdieu 1988, 216)48.
According to this last view, the decision to enter 
politics would correspond to parental and environmental 
influences in defining the young's life prospects. Weaving 
together the threads of the research on youth activism in 
the U.S., the following passage presents a summary of the 
accounts of political ambition based on a culturalist theory 
of status attainment:
«The findings of these studies are [ .. ] best 
interpreted by recognizing that the childhood 
experiences of activists were imbedded [sic] in a 
particular su b cu ltu re in the American middle class - 
that is, a tradition of belief and everyday practice, 
transmitted through families that tend to cluster in 
particular residential neighborhoods, and that have 
over time established an institutional framework for 
inculcating their shared perspectives. I refer to the 
su b cu ltu re of what might be called the "intelligentsia" 
[.. ] . Young people growing up in families embedded in 
the subculture of the intelligentsia experienced two 
sorts of moral injunctions: first, you should devote 
your life in some way to social betterment; second, you 
are a person of outstanding potential who ought to 
fulfill your unique promise in a significant way. [..] 
I think that it is plausible that what was found for 
student activists in the sixties can be more broadly 
generalized - i.e., socialization of many kinds of 
political activism in many historical contexts is often 
best understood as an aspect of identity-formation 
occurring within particular subcultural contexts» 
(Flacks 1990, 284-5).
48 The most elaborated attempt to link origin and attainment through 
socialization to differential aspirations appears to be the «Wisconsin 
model» (Sewell et al. 1969), which can be summarized as follows:
«Significant others are seen as having an influence on the goals of the
young person, and these goals are viewed as instrumental in the
attainment process. The theory anticipates that the encouragement by 
significant others will vary according to the social position and
demonstrated ability of the child, and that this encouragement will 
affect the level to which he aspires» (Kerckhoff 1976, 369). The
theoretical antecedents and successive specifications of the Wisconsin 
model are illustrated in Haller (1982, 9 ff.).
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This account differs substantially from 
psychopathological ones. Although psycho-cultural elements 
are part of the picture, the decisive influence is not 
attributed to specific events of the primary socialization, 
but to its occurrence in given subcultures. Normal 
socialization in certain environments forges youth's 
aspirations in a way that makes political activity 
interesting and appealing.
In particular, Flack's account seems to fall into the 
«crystallization model» of the development of political 
activism (Merelman-King 1986). This holds that prospective 
activists are subject to more intense injections of 
political orientations («inculcation» would seem the right 
word to stress in Flack's quotation), and therefore nurture 
stronger attachments to these ideal contents. Briefly, the 
activist can be described as an «over-socialized» individual 
who «finds it difficult to accept the non-fulfilment of 
values» (Tapper 1976, 141-2) which he sustains firmly from 
the adolescent years onwards49.
Elaborating on this, we can extend the account to the 
special case of p a r ty activism. The actor of the 
«crystallization model» may be expected to be attracted by 
expressing his political "impulse" in a political party when 
he finds a tight correspondence between his and the party's
49 In this view, radical activism is a moral response to the 
disillusionment of experiencing the failure of the society to work the 
way in which one has been taught it ought. Therefore, apart from its 
psychoanalitic inferences, Keniston's explanation can fit into this 
explanation as well.
value patterns. Since in principle parties propose 
themselves as groups based on structured and consistent sets 
of values, in the case of party activists «crystallization» 
refers to both the stability and the consistency of the 
activist# s values.
A softer image, corresponding to a «sensitization 
model» (Merelman-King 1986), is proposed by Prewitt (1965) 
in order to account for the vast amount of evidence 
reporting the family's transmission of political activism 
(cf. also Wright 1971, 106; Czudnowski 1975, 188-90; Putnam 
1976, 76-7; Perkins 1986; Sherkat-Blocker 1994). This view 
maintains that «if the family or other authority figures are 
politically involved, they are likely to pass on that 
interest to youth under care»; the adhesion to this interest 
derives from the child's acceptance of «political activity 
as a normal part of their [elders'] life-style» (Prewitt 
1965, 107 and 109).
As the stress on life-style rather than on values 
distinguishes the «sensitization» from the «crystallization» 
hypothesis, they can be framed within two analytically 
distinct but empirically overlapping forms of parental 
political socialization, which Dalton (1982) calls the 
«attitudinal and the social-milieu pathways»:
«The attitudinal pathway [.. ] is based on direct 
interpersonal value transfer (through imitation, 
reinforcement, explicit education, and similar 
processes), with children internalizing parental 
attitudes as a result of these experiences. [This 
pathway] involves the learning of broad attitudes which 
are deeply embedded in an individual's belief system; 
these attitudes should be resistant to later-life 
change. [Through the social-milieu pathway], parents 
transmit certain social characteristics to their 
offsprings and place them in a social milieu which can
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influence attitudes independent of parental views» 
(ibid., 140 and 154).
An attempt to measure the effect of various parental 
characteristics on the political participation50 of their 
offsprings was made by Beck and Jennings (1982), who used 
path analysis with a large panel of young Americans and 
their parents interviewed at eight years distance. Although 
these authors claim that their empirical findings support 
the view that active participation in politics depends 
ultimately on some mechanism of political socialization at 
an early age51, their conclusion is cautious and rather 
vague in relation to the ways in which family culture 
influences youth activism:
«Parent civic orientations may set the tone of 
family discourse on politics. Parent interest probably  
promotes discussion of politics in the home, awakening 
the child's interest in the world of politics. Parents' 
political knowledge can enhance the child's own 
understanding of politics in these discussions. Less 
cognitively based orientations, such as political 
efficacy, p ro b a b ly are transmitted less consciously by 
parents, but they are no less l i k e l y  to be included in 
the attitudinal baggage the young carry with them into 
adulthood» (Beck-Jennings 1982, 98; italics added).
Using the same data, a subsequent study compared 
activists to nonactivists more specifically (Merelman-King
1986). Three main predicting factors of future activism 
among 18 years old individuals were identified: the
50 Clearly political participation is a broader phenomenon than 
political activism. Nonetheless, logically the conditions that affect 
the former should be part of the explanation of the latter.
51 The same result is obtained by Sigel and Hoskins (1981) 
analogous study dealing with a sample of younger individuals.
in an
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intention to become active at an older age (92% fulfilled it 
eight years later), a higher similarity with parents' and 
friends' party identification (85% cast the same vote as 
these two reference groups), and a stronger sense of 
political efficacy. Evidence also showed that activists 
tended to change their views with time more than apathetics, 
but constantly toward firmer and more convinced statements 
than they had expressed at a younger age. Since «activists 
displayed a unique pattern of political attitudes as early 
as the age of 18» (ibid., 487), Merelman and King sustain 
the primacy of early learning in the development of the 
ambition to participate actively in politics. The 
culturalist explanation of the importance of social origins 
in the attainment of a political activist status would be 
re-affirmed. However, why do future activists have such a 
«unique pattern of political attitudes» at the age of 18? 
Merelman and King are not able to attribute the political 
activists' difference to any specific socializing agent, 
event or mechanism. Therefore, their analysis is incomplete 
in relation to a fundamental theoretical point.
Globally, the results of the existing research on the 
relations between social origins and political ambition are 
poor. In particular, they provide us with under-determined 
models. Belonging to some social categories (e.g., being 
male, educated, and from a bourgeois family) may be found to 
be almost necessary conditions for becoming politically 
active. Yet they are not sufficient, since so many male,
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educated, and bourgeois youths do n o t affiliate with a 
political group52. *
3. 4 .  The Im portance o f  Networks
A different picture of the roots of political activism 
is drawn by those scholars who propose a social network 
approach to the problem:
«In trying to understand why some young people 
join political groups while others from a similar 
background do not, we found that while family political 
socialization and family culture may influence the 
thrust of offsprings' politics, actual entry into 
political groups appears to have more to do with 
opportunity structures - that political activist groups 
are available to join and that direct contact is made 
by friends inviting or urging the young person to 
affiliate with the political group» (Braungart- 
Braungart 1990, 297)53.
Originally, this was a common and substantial, although 
theoretically understated, result in some American studies 
of local political recruitment of the 1960s (Bowman-Boynton
52 Some scholars underscore another aspect of social origins which can 
affect political activism: birth-order. Various hypotheses have been 
elaborated to account for the evidence showing a majority of first-borns 
among power-holders, although the methodological validity of these 
studies has been judged «sufficiently defective* (Somit et al. 1993, 
151). Psychologists have stressed the higher concern of first-borns for 
their younger sons and daughters, which can successively extend itself 
to the rest of society (Stewart 1977, 211). In other words, first-borns 
would be subjected to a stronger primary socialization, so that in 
highly politicized families they may be pushed more towards political 
involvement. This can be called the «conformism» hypothesis. Meanwhile, 
sociologists of education have observed that «younger sibs and children 
in large families have less adult attention, which produces weaker 
educational outcomes» (Coleman 1988, 112; contra, Hauser-Sewell 1985). 
More generally, first-borns may have the advantage of capturing a prior 
control not only of parents' attention, but also of inheritable family 
political resources. This can be seen as a «priority of heritage» 
hypothesis.
53 The concept of 'opportunity structure' is often used by this approach 
without reference to either Seligman or Schlesinger (cf. $ 2). In fact, 
this terminological choice is quite unfortunate.
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1966? Schwartz 1969; Prewitt 1970; more recently, Ehrenhalt 
1991, 31-2). For instance, 68% of Prewitt's councilmen 
openly admitted that «their political recruitment [was due] 
to influence of other persons», and «nearly a quarter of the 
councilmen report[ed] that councilmen and other local 
officials helped shape and nourish their ambitions for 
political office» (Prewitt 1970, 111). There is reason to 
believe that self-declarations even underestimated reality, 
because «persons like to think of themselves as "self­
starters", a self-image especially attractive to 
politicians, which precludes dependence on others» (ibid.). 
Additional evidence supports this argument: more than half 
the respondents said that they knew «very well» some 
«incumbent councilman prior to running for office» (ibid., 
113). The author's contention was that
«working your way through the channels leading to 
public office is simply not something you "just decide 
to do". For most councilmen, it is the result of social 
experiences and personal contacts which draw them into 
and up through the network of relationships which 
control - whether by design or not - access to 
political office. [••] We can conclude that the 
recruitment of councilmen is affected by the sponsoring  
and co-optive strategies of established leadership» 
(ibid., 112 and 119; italics added).
On the basis of this evidence, in his summary of the 
literature for the term 'political recruitment and careers' 
in the In te r n a tio n a l Encyclopaedia o f  th e  S o c ia l S c ie n c e s ,  
Marvick (1968, 278) writes that «the importance of sponsors 
- "who you know" rather than "what you know" - cannot be 
discounted in political recruitment».
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Subsequently, the second wave of inquiries on student 
activism in the 1970s and 1980s also proved that connections 
to family members and friends favorable to political 
involvement decisively affected the chances of being 
involved (e.g., Zygmunt 1972; Turner-Killian 1972, 365;
Useem 1975, 11-8; McCarthy-Zald 1977, 1214-5). A secondary
analysis of a large set of previous investigations suggested 
that «the network channel is the richest source of movement 
recruits» (Snow et al. 1980, 790)54. More precisely,
«findings indicate that the probability of being recruited 
into a particular movement is largely a function of two 
conditions: (1) links to one or more movement members
through a preexisting or emergent interpersonal tie; and (2) 
the absence of countervailing networks» (ibid., 798). The 
fulfilment of these two conditions determines the
individual's «structural availability» and accounts for 
«differential recruitment» to a (broadly speaking) political 
activity55. Thus, «"structural availability" for social 
movement participation renders "attitudinal affinity" to a 
movement completely irrelevant» (Emirbayer-Goodwin 1994, 
1431). What counts is the socio-structural location in a 
particular network of prior participants.
54 This hypothesis has also been validated as regards recruitment for 
religious movements ( Stark-Bainbridge 1980; Ebaugh-Vaughn 1984) and, 
albeit less systematically, other forms of political participation 
(Verba et al. 1995, 17).
55 As noted, «recruitment explanations [that] stress structural
availability (are) a variation on the differential association
hypothesis popularized by criminologists two generations ago» (Knoke 
1990, 69).
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Tests of this hypothesis were made possible by the 
application of network analysis concepts in the social 
movements literature especially (e.g., Walsh-Warland 1983; 
Rosenthal et al. 1985; Briet et a l. 1987; Della Porta 1988; 
Cable 1992). However, activism is clearly defined as a full­
time individual commitment to a political group (thus being 
closer to our study object) only in McAdam's studies of 
Freedom Summer - a civil rights organization mainly formed 
by American youth in 1964 (McAdam 1986 and 1988; McAdam- 
Fernandez 1990; McAdam-Paulsen 1993). From a theoretical 
point of view, McAdam’s works also tries to respond to the 
criticism addressed to the network accounts of recruitment - 
namely, to posit the causes of participation entirely 
outside the actor and thus reduce the interplay between 
social forces and recruits to a mechanical stimulus-response 
model (Wallis-Bruce 1982; contra, Snow et a l . 1983? cf. also 
Klandermans-Oegema 1987; Marwell et a l , 1988; Kriesi 1993). 
In order to overcome this structural reductionism, McAdam 
shifts the focus of research from «recruitment networks» to 
«micromobilization contexts» (Friedman-McAdam 1992; McAdam- 
Paulsen 1993), seeking to assess which, how and why prior 
social relations attract activists into movements and 
organizations. This implies a change of the independent 
variable from that of "structural tie" to that of 
"significant other". Thereby, those «personalogical» [sic] 
and «attitudinal» elements (McAdam-Fernandez 1990, 1) that 
had previously and perhaps too rapidly been dismissed are 
brought back in.
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Borrowing the symbolic interactionist notion Of
« identity salience » 56, McAdam and Paulsen (1993, 647)
propose a supply-side theory of recruitment in which the
decision to become active is the result of four conditions:
«(1) The occurrence of a specific recruiting 
attempt, (2) the conceptualization of a tentative 
linkage between movement participation and identity, (3) 
support for that linkage from persons who normally serve 
to sustain the identity in question, and (4) the absence 
of strong opposition from others on whom other salient 
identities depend».
In the empirical test of their theory, these authors 
find that the final choice to become politically active is 
best explained by an explicit alignment of individuals «with 
a specific community or reference group» in their own 
accounts of the reasons for which they intended to join the 
movement (ibid., 656). Even though in their previous works 
on recruitment they had emphasized the crucial effect of 
strong ties with other recruits, McAdam and Paulsen come to 
believe that prior ties «would appear to encourage activism 
only when they (a) reinforce the potential recruit's 
identification with a particular identity and (b) help to 
establish a strong linkage between that identity and the 
movement in question» (ibid., 663).
This model imposes sufficiently restrictive conditions 
which fit with the fact that political activism is a rare
«From a structural symbolic interactionist perspective [..], the self 
is partially composed of the social positions that an individual holds 
and enacts. That is, the self can be conceptualized as a set of social 
identities, where identities refer to positional designations assigned 
by others and accepted by the individual him- or herself» (Thoits 1986, 
259). As these identities are organized hierarchically, some are held to 
be more «salient» than others for self definition (Stryker 1981; 
Stryker-Serpe 1994).
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phenomenon. There are difficulties, however: above all, the 
model begs the question of why, among the many identities 
they can share, incipient recruits attach particular 
salience to the one which emerges from some ties rather than 
others. Introducing reference groups as independent 
variables only shifts the puzzle: Why does one become
attached to a particular reference group instead of 
another57?
A network approach, finally, may help to test whether 
another factor, substantially ignored by existing research, 
sustains political ambition: the control of a large s o c ia l  
c a p i ta l. To have a wide range of social ties can be an 
important instrument of personal power, as it allows the 
trading of those resources (information, advice, favours, 
support) controlled by virtue of one's social positions58. 
In politics, even more than in other social fields, the 
volume of social ties is important regardless of with whom 
these ties are, as it indicates direct connections to 
potential voters and thus constitutes the chief instrument 
of patronage.
Unfortunately, agreement on the definition of «social 
capital» is limited. Bourdieu adopted the term in order to 
account for «the actual or potential resources linked to a 
more or less institutionalized and enduring network o f
57 A related problem is the causal ordering of the independent 
variables. What comes first: attachment to a reference group or to the 
tie which awakes an interest in that group?
58 The general idea was already expressed by Hobbes’ (1985, 150), when
he noted that «to have friends, is Power: for they are strengths
united».
r e la t io n s of inter-knowledge and inter-acknowledgment» 
(1980, 2; also 1986, 248-9). Subsequently Bourdieu has 
written that social capital «consists of resources based on 
connections and group membership» (1987, 4). Coleman (1990, 
302), who treats of the concept at length, offers no easier 
way to operationalize it when he states that «social capital 
inheres in the structure of relations between persons and 
among persons»59.
To a certain extent, this conceptual ambiguity is a 
result of the use of the term as an umbrella of phenomena 
analyzed at different levels - macro and micro (for a 
distinct criticism, cf. Lin 1995, 687). In the macro sense, 
social capital is a public good; in the micro sense, it is a 
private good (cf. Coleman 1988, 116-8). An operational 
definition of the second meaning of the concept is proposed 
here: social capital (SC) consists of all the support one 
can mobilize through available social ties. Its volume (V) 
is determined by the number of people that can give some 
(more or less large) help in some (more or less frequent) 
situations. Its power (P) depends on the r e so u rc e fu ln e ss (R) 
of the individuals included and the s tre n g th (S) of the ties 
linking them to ego60. Thus: SC = V*(R*S), or SC = V*P.
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59 Admittedly Coleman borrows the concept from Loury (1977). Subsequent 
and slightly different definitions can be found in Lamont-Lareau (1988), 
Flap (1988, 104), Flap (1991, 6181), Putnam (1993), Meyerson (1994, 
384), Anheier et al. (1995), Burt (1995).
60 This formal definition expands on Bourdieu's insight, according to 
which «the volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus 
depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively 
mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or 
symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom one is 
connected» (1986, 249).
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4. C onclusion
Analyses of recruitment are concerned with how the 
social order reproduces itself by managing to allocate 
social roles to individuals. This management occurs in two 
complementary ways: a) "gates" are set up to select 
potential incumbents for each role (the demand-side), and b) 
aspirations pre-distribute persons among different selection 
contests (the supply-side)61.
In the field of p o l i t i c a l recruitment, attention must 
be paid respectively to the «selective» and «self-selective» 
tendencies in a political system (Prewitt 1965). Both 
tendencies will be dealt with in succession in the following 
chapters. First, a demand-side analysis of the opportunity 
structure for the potential aspirants to legislative roles 
in Italy in the early 1990s will be conducted, on the basis 
of a slightly revised version of Schlesinger's method 
discussed in a previous section (§ 2.5). This will allow for 
an identification of the «recruitment-relevant 
apprenticeship positions» (Czudnowski 1975, 230) in which 
young politically ambitious individuals are most likely to 
place themselves at the start of their careers (chapter 
III). The characteristics of the individuals identified in 
this way will then be investigated (chapters IV to VII). 
Finally, the main supply-side theories of recruitment 
reviewed in this chapter will be tested and reformulated
61 In a hypothetical condition of social equilibrium, one may think of 
the first process as leading to the most rational use of human 
resources, and the second as preventing the threats of widespread 
frustrations because of social positions that are too sharply desired.
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(chapter VIII), seeking to give an empirical answer to the 
basic question with which this study is concerned: What
draws some young people rather than others to a political 
career62?
62 Statistically, and in more operational terms, the problem is the
following: «Given the existence of two populations A and B; given a
random sample of individuals which we know for certain come from A, and 
another random sample which we know for certain come from B; how do we 
set up a rule to allocate further individuals, of whose origin we are 
uncertain, to the correct population?» (Kendall 1980, 145). Discriminant 
analysis and logistic regression are the most appropriate technical 
solutions. Yet logistic regression is not sensitive to the strict
assumptions of discriminant analysis - that is, equality of the group 
covariance matrices and multivariate normality of the exogenous
variables (Klecka 1980; Lachenbruch 1975; Maxwell 1977, 94 ff.; Norusis 
1993, 1-45). Although it is «unlikely that the two methods will give 
markedly different results», statisticians suggest the use of logistic 
regression «especially when many of the independent variables are 
qualitative» (Press-Wilson 1978, 705).
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CHAPTER III
FINDING THE ENTRY POINTS OF POLITICAL CAREERS 
IN ITALY IN THE EARLY 1990S
1. M onitoring  P o l i t ic a l  Careers fo r  Loca ting  Am bition  
A variety of studies highlight the existence of 
specifically political «career lines»1 in the Italian 
occupational structure (e.g., Cotta 1979; Schizzerotto 1993; 
Bettin-Magnier 1995). Scholars of the "First" Italian 
Republic also used to outline these career lines as 
typically: a) initiated within party structures, and b) at 
an early age. In the next chapters, we will assume that 
these two regularities not only described the main features 
of the job trajectories of the existing political elite, but 
also functioned as guidelines for its prospective members. 
Ambitious would-be politicians are likely to monitor past 
careers to put themselves on the fast track. As Schlesinger 
( 1966, 9) surmises, «if lieutenant governors have become
governors in the past, then men who want to become governors 
will first seek to become lieutenant governors»2.
1 The concept of 'career line' (or 'job trajectory') can be defined as 
«a work history that is common to a portion of the labor force» 
(Spilerman 1977, 551).
2 The assumption that individual ambitions are normally affected by 
observed structural constraints about career opportunities has been 
discussed in greater detail in chapter II (§ 2.5).
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In more general terms,
«for aspirants seeking the path to the political 
summit, distinguishing thoroughfares from dead ends is 
a practical concern. Should a politically ambitious 
youth in America aim first for a job in the state 
legislature, or the federal bureaucracy, or a 
prestigious law firm? Should a would-be Soviet leader 
set his sights on the state administration, or the 
party's "agit-prop" apparatus, or the secret police? 
Should an ambitious Latin American enter local 
politics, or the army, or some multinational 
corporation?» (Putnam 1976, 47).
In Italy, as in most democracies, parliament is likely 
to be «the initial summit of ambition» (Rose 1987, 73) for 
any political aspirant. Evidence in this chapter will 
demonstrate that by far the most common entry point3 of the 
career line leading to MP status in the early 1990s in Italy 
was activism in a party youth organization. On the basis of 
this precedent, we expect young aspirants to take their 
first political jobs in a party youth organization more than 
in any other kind of political group4.
The importance of youth party office as an entry point 
for political careers will be shown on the basis of various 
evidence. Firstly, we will screen where (§ 2) and when (§ 3) 
Italian parliamentarians of the 11th post-war legislature
3 An ‘entry point' is defined as «a job in the career line held by a 
significant proportion of persons without prior employment in another 
position in the trajectory» (Spilerman 1977, 560; in fact, this author 
prefers the more rhetorical term 'entry portal'). As a synonym, the 
concept of 'apprenticeship position' will be used to indicate a «gateway 
to political office» (Prewitt 1970, 12; cf. also Czudnowski 1975, 230; 
Matthews 1989, 92-3). In a different sense, apprenticeship as a type of 
political socialization is analyzed in Dawson et al. (1977, 100-4).
4 Although first jobs are often studied for predicting subsequent career 
achievements (cf. Lipset-Malm 1955), this is not our research interest. 
It does not matter whether young party activists are actually bound to 
become professional politicians when older. What matters is that they 
expect so.
73
(1992-1994) spent their political apprenticeship. Secondly,
we will identify the achievements in the early 1990s of the
youth party leaders of the mid-1970s (§ 4).
\
The first part of the chapter is based on a dataset of 
careers of Italian MPs, mainly drawn from their official 
biographies and from party sources5. The available data 
concern 826 (85.3%) out of 968 parliamentarians6. The second 
part of the chapter relies on a different dataset describing 
the status attainments in the 1990s of the 435 past-members 
of the ruling bodies of the party youth organizations of the 
DC, PCI, and PSI during the period 1974-777.
5 The biographies of Italian MPs are contained in an official yearbook: 
I deputati e i senatori dell’undicesimo Parlamento repubblicano, 
Edizioni Italiane, Roma, 1992 (commonly known as La Navicella). Although 
somewhat deceptive as the only source, this volume is an useful starting 
point for any research on political elites in Italy, provided other 
sources (party papers, official party files, and informants) are taken 
into account. A few cases have been excluded from the analysis where it 
has not been possible to assess a priority of institutional recruitment 
(e.g., whether party or local government offices came first).
6 Most of the MPs whose first political position is not known probably 
followed a party-centered career. The bulk of them were likely to have 
had experience of politics in local party organizations, both in the 
youth and the "adult" sections. They have not been included in the 
dataset, however.
7 This dataset records the names of the members of the Young Christian 
Democrats' (MGDC), Young Communists* (FGCI), and Young Socialists' (FGS) 
national councils (consiglio nazionale) and executive committees 
(comitato centrale or direzione nazionale) between 1974 and 1977. These 
names were subsequently checked in the 1991 and 1994 editions of two 
Italian «who's who» - that is, the Annuario Generale Italiano (better 
known as the «Guida Monaci») and the Guida delle Regioni. This procedure 
was supplemented by information from party activists, who examined the 
individual findings to avoid mistaken identities. These informants also 
pointed out that many of the individuals who are not mentioned in the 
«who's who» were however still involved in active politics in the early 
1990s (either in local party offices, or in the government of smaller 
towns). Therefore, the figures given in S 4 are likely to be indicators 
of political professionalism ex defecto.
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2 . The E n try  P o in ts  o f  th e  P o l i t i c a l  C areers o f  I ta l ia n  
MPs (1992-1994)
Half the MPs elected to «the last parliament» of the 
"First" Italian Republic (Ricolfi 1994a) began their 
political life in a party position. More precisely, the most 
common entry point into politics was an office in a party 
youth organization (table 1).
Table 1: E n try  p o in ts  o f th e  p o l i t i c a l  ca reers  o f  I ta l ia n  
MPs (1992-94)
N %
Youth Partya 253 30.6
Local Government^ 240 29.1
Party 158 19.1
Interest Groupc 67 8.1
Public Authorityd 37 4.5
Association® 36 4.4
None 35 4.2
Total 826 100.0
a Including those who held office in religious and student youth 
associations
b Seats in ward, municipal, provincial, regional councils
c Membership of the executive board {local or national ) of trade
unions and professional orders
d Membership of the executive board (local or national) of a public 
enterprise, hospital, health and economic development agency or 
commission, and the like (usually bodies of sottogoverno composed 
by party nominees)
e Membership of the executive board of a national association (e.g., 
environmental, feminist, antiabortion)
Success in local elections was the stepping-stone of 
the political careers of almost 30% of parliamentarians8.
8 The importance of a political experience at the local level has 
diminished in Italy since the earlier legislatures. Globally, 58.2% of 
the 1992 MPs were elected to a local council before entering Parliament
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Yet, the importance of this f i l i è r e  of recruitment must be 
qualified. On the one hand, it was typical of backbenchers: 
only 11% of the former or current ministers and party 
leaders elected to parliament became politically active in a 
local council - more or less the same proportion as in past 
legislatures (Cotta 1979, 259), On the other hand, access to 
local government offices was almost impossible without 
preliminary allegiance to party committees in the "First" 
Republic - witness the fact that 94.2% in 1987 and still 
87.8% in 1993 of Italian mayors were party members (Bettin- 
Magnier 1989, 211; Bettin 1996).
Entry into politics v ia unions, lobbies, associations, 
or sottogoverno (appointments to public authorities) was the 
case for 17% of the MPs. But, again, practically every 
appointment to public or semi-public authority was made by 
parties, and in some cases parties also had a say in the 
appointment to top positions in dependent associations. It 
was very rare, finally, to enter the Chamber or the Senate 
without any previous political experience: this was the case 
for only 4% of the MPs. «Cross-over political careers» 
(Herzog 1975) based on extra-political prestige were totally 
atypical in Italy9.
(49.1% had been municipal councillors, 14.6% municipal assessors, 16.3% 
mayors, 14.5% provincial councillors, 16.7% regional councillors at 
least once). These figures are appreciably lower than the corresponding 
ones for 1948-1972 and 1979 parliamentarians (Cotta 1979, 171; 
Guadagnini 1984, 604-8).
9 Differences in the channels of first political recruitment were also 
significantly linked to a number of other characteristics of 
parliamentarians. For instance, women were drawn more often from 
associations (which became more important for recruiting candidates in 
the 1994 general election [Censis 1994)), whereas party youth 
organizations and public authorities promoted almost exclusively men (in
wj»wmiMi¥¥¥riinfinnniiniaMnaaBaaaMft
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In 1992 the «partyness of political recruitment» is 
confirmed to be the strongest characteristic of Italian 
parliamentarians, as it was for their predecessors since 
1946 (Cotta 1979; Guadagnini 1983 and 1993). Most often 
party selection took place in the youth organizations.
Table 2: E n try  p o in ts  o f  I ta l ia n  MPs re p re se n tin g  d i f fe r e n t  
p a r t ie s  (in  row
ENTRY POINTS
1 1 Youth Î Adult I Local I Public | Lobby JAs s ' ioni Others|
1 | party 1 party 1 I>oO' |auth'ity| 1 1 1
| PARTY 1 31 1 19 1 29 1 5 | 8 1 4 | 4 1
|DCa 1 37 1 18 1 26 1 6 | 7 1 4 | 2 1
| FDSb 1 26 1 27 1 28 1 2 | 9 1 4 I 4 1
|PSIC 1 30 1 18 1 32 1 5 | 9 1 2 | 4 1
| PRI- PLId 1 33 1 14 1 25 1 5 | 10 1 3 | 10 |
| LEAGUEe 1 3 1 24 1 47 1 5 | 7 1 7 | 7 1
|MSIf | 63 1 2 1 26 1 5 I 2 1 0 | 2 1
|OTHERS | 20 1 16 1 28 1 2 I 8 1 18 | 8 1
N-826
Democrazia Cristiana
Partito Democratico della sinistra (former Italian Communist Party 
[PCI]); MPs of Rifondazione Comunista (RC) are also included in 
this category
Partito Socialista Italiano; MPs of Partito Socialdemocratico 
Italiano (PSDI) are also included in this category
Partito Repubblicano Italiano; Partito Liberale Italiano 
Lega Nord
Movimento Sociale Italiano
95% of the cases); MPs recruited from union and party structures were 
less educated than their colleagues who started in a public authority 
(82% graduates) and youth party organizations (74% graduates). Recruits 
from the leadership of associations were more frequently elected in 
Northern regions (54%), as well as MPs without any political experience 
(48%); among the parliamentarians launched by union and public authority 
positions, only 12% were elected in the Centre of Italy.
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In terms of early political careers, recruitment 
patterns of MPs in the main parties of the "First" Republic 
(DC, PSI, liberal parties [PRI, PSDI, PLI] and former PCI) 
were very similar (table 2)10. Regardless of their party 
affilation, about half of the parliamentarians had first 
experienced the tenure of some political office in a party 
structure (47% in the PRI and PLI, 48% in the PSI and PSDI, 
53% in the PDS and R ifondazione  Comunista, 54% in the DC)11.
A different picture emerges from the analysis of the 
early career pathways of the MPs elected in more marginal 
parties. The right-wing party, the MSI, was the expression 
of a well-structured subculture which required of its 
representatives long-standing allegiance and militancy 
(Ignazi 1989; Tarchi 1995). Thus, 63% of MSI 
parliamentarians had begun their career at a very early 
stage in the party youth organization12. The Legs Word
1® This similarity among the different parties was a new characteristic 
of parliamentary recruitment. In 1979, for instance, almost 75% of the 
Communist MPs had started either in an adult or a youth party office, 
whilst less than 30% of the Christian Democrats had followed this career 
path (Guadagnini 1983, 287). Such a career convergence may be regarded 
as a clue to the progressive homogeneization of the parliamentary class 
in the 1980s.
11 Not only is the share of party recruits practically equal among the 
MPs of the major parties, but so is the proportion of those coming from 
other political origins. The number of representatives who began from 
local politics varies between 25% and 32%; those from interest groups 
(unions, professional lobbies, and so on) between 7% and 10%; those from 
public authorities between 2% and 6%; those from civic associations 
between 2% and 4%. Altogether, in each of these parties the 
parliamentary group seemed to be formed by one third of former young 
party recruits, about one fifth of party veterans (mostly from local 
sections and federations), about one quarter of local councillors, about 
one tenth of individuals trained in the defence of corporate interests, 
and, occasionally, a few prestigious non-political figures.
12 In particular, when the former youth party secretary Gianfranco Fini 
became party leader, he was able to reward his generation of youth party 
sub-leaders by helping them to be elected to parliament. As a
^ 1 .  Y -   ------- . . . ■ l . L .  U H M
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proposed itself as the protector 
correspondingly, 47% of the MPs in 
politics from local government.
of local autonomy; 
the League entered
3 . The Tim ing o f  th e  P o l i t i c a l  A p p ren tic e sh ip  o f  
I t a l i a n  MPs
Studies of the Italian parliaments of the 1970s have 
shown that MPs used to begin their political career early 
(Cotta 1979, 176 ff.; Guadagnini 1983, 287; Di Palma-Cotta
1986, 57). This was still the case in the 1990s. Affiliation 
to political parties continued to occur in the years of late 
adolescence, and offices were already taken in the early 
adult years. The mean age at which parliamentarians stated 
to have had their first political office was 2613; 55.8% of 
them had it when 25 years old or younger. We will refer to 
these MPs as "early starters".
"Early starters" deserve special attention: they are
precisely the reference group for the politically ambitious *
consequence, in 1992 83% of the MPs under 45 years of age in the MSI had 
held office either in the Fronte della Gioventù (the youth section of 
the MSI) or in the right-wing university student movement (FUAN).
*3 On average, for those who began their political career in a public 
non-elective authority (e.g., health councils [USL] or public transport 
boards), the age of entry into politics was 33; it was 31 for those who 
learnt the rudiments of politics in associations or interest groups; it 
was 28 for those who began in local government; finally, it was 26.5 for 
those who first held an office in the party, and just 22 for those who 
first held an office in the youth organization of the party. The younger 
the aspirant politician was, the more "ideological" and the less 
"administrative" was his first political experience. Indeed, youth 
parties have always been more preoccupied with ideology than their adult 
counterparts, not to speak of the other political institutions 
considered here. Their main activities were the organization of debates 
and rallies, the publication of brochures and papers, and proselitism.
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youth who form the object of this research. Within this 
category of MPs, former youth party activists constitute the 
large majority (63.4%). Moreover, if "early starters" are 
divided into "backbenchers", "frontbenchers", and 
"superelite"14, the share of former youth party activists 
increases with parliamentary power (figure 1).
F igure is The e n try  p o in ts  o f  "early  s t a r t e r s " MPs by their 
p a rlia m en ta ry  power
Youth parties have been the points of entry of more 
than 75% of the "early starters" who reached the status of 
minister, party national leader, or president of a chamber
14 These groups are based on the highest political office ever held: the 
" Superelite* includes MPs who were serving or had served as ministers, 
president of a chamber of parliament, national party leaders, or union 
secretaries (this operational definition differs from Calise and 
Mannheimer's [1982]); "Frontbenchers" include those who were or had been 
chairman or vice-chairman of a parliamentary committee, or junior 
ministers; "Backbenchers" refer to all the others.
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of parliament. The chances of success associated with any 
other stepping-stone to political life are comparatively 
negligible. Thus, individuals who take up a political career 
in their twenties should value youth party offices as by far 
the most favourable entry points for reaching the summit of 
Italian politics.
Table 3: Age o f  e n try  in to  a c t iv e  p o l i t i c s  o f  MPs from  
different p a r t ie s  (in  row %)
AGE
PARTY
Under 25 
56
Over 25 
44
DC 62 38
PDS, RC 61 39
PSI, PSDI 60 40
LEGA NORD 15 85
PRI, PLI 49 51
MSI 61 39
Others 42 58
N = 552
In the 1948-1972 period, 65% of the MPs of the PCI, 48% 
of those of the PSI, and 33% of those of the DC had held a 
party office before the age of twenty-five (Cotta 1979, 
179). From the mid-1970s onwards, as these parties began to 
give rise to a covert form of consociationalism (Pizzorno 
1993 and 1995)15, their recruitment patterns tended to 
converge (Di Palma-Cotta 1986, 57). At the beginning of the
15 Analyses of the behaviour of political elites in the "First Republic" 
in terms of consociationalism can also be found in Calise (1993), Amato 
(1994, 227), Fabbrini (1994), Revelli (1994). A step toward considering 
post-war Italy as a case of consociationalism (under the revised label 
of «consensus democracy») was already taken by Lijphart (1984, 211 ff.).
1990s, the DC, the PDS (former PCI), and the PSI seemed to 
prefer to recruit parliamentarians who were already 
seriously committed to politics when still very young (table
3). On average, these MPs' debut into active politics 
occurred when they were 24 years old16.
On the other hand, representatives of the Lega Nord had 
become active in politics at the age of 3817. In all cases, 
entry into parliament of the representatives of the League 
required a short apprenticeship. Due to its sudden success, 
which also implied relatively limited intra-party 
competition for access to a legislative seat, the Lega Nord 
was the party in which the time between the initial 
recruitment into a political office and the election to the 
legislature was the shortest: 7.5 years, against 20.5 years 
for DC parliamentarians, 20.2 for those in the PDS and the 
MSI, 19 for those in the PSI, 15 for those in the PRI, 12.5 
for the others. In the Lega Nord the time it took for 
aspiring candidates to become MPs seemed also to be very 
regular, as indicated by the strong correlation (r=.76) 
between the age of first political office and the age of 
election to the legislature18.
8 1
16 MSI parliamentarians had also entered politics at the age of 24.
17 The higher age of entry into active politics of the parliamentarians 
of the League, who formed the majority of the newly elected MPs in 1992, 
accounts also for the significantly higher age of entry into politics of 
the then parliamentary "debutants" (27 years old). There were strong age 
variations among the deputies of the Lega Word, however. The youngest 
(born in 1966) as well as the oldest (born in 1910) elected MPs belonged 
to the League. (In fact, there were older senators in the 1992 
Parliament, but they kept their lifelong status as former Presidents of 
the Republic or as appointees of the President of the Republic).
18 This correlation is based on 41 cases only (out of 83 MPs of the 
League), since the earlier steps in the political careers of the
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The length of political careers varied more within the 
then major parties19. The mere size of these parties perhaps 
made the control of careers less tight and less centralized. 
Especially in the DC and PDS, entering active politics 
earlier did not lead to an earlier entry to parliament. This 
was also true of the MPs elected between 1948 and 1972 
(Cotta 1979, 242). There may be a general rule - hinted at 
by Schlesinger (1966, 182) - that a precocious recruitment 
is not a prelude to a faster and more brilliant political 
career. Yet, in the Italian case there was a significant 
exception to this rule for MPs who had spent their 
apprenticeship in the ruling bodies of a party youth 
organization. Recruits from youth parties succeeded earlier, 
and they were also more s u c c e s s fu l in their political 
careers20.
Leghisti were particularly difficult to discern. It may be that this 
lack of information meant that they did not serve in any politically 
significant body before parliament. A study of local candidates of the 
League suggests that associational activism and frustrated rank-and-file 
party militancy (in the PSI most frequently) were their main previous 
political experiences (Segatti 1992, 258-62).
19 The total correlation between age of entry into active politics and 
age of election into the legislature was . 25 (exclusively due to the 
strong correlations within Lega Nord and MSI groups).
20 Additional Italian evidence falsifies Schlesinger's rule. In the 
early 1990s in Italy individuals who had began their professional life 
as politicians tended to remain in the same career line more than any 
other occupational category of the upper class (Schizzerotto 1993, 38). 
The career immobility of Italian politicians is without comparison: they 
have the lowest rate of intragenerational mobility within the Italian 
upper class; the Italian upper class is less mobile than the rest of the 
population; the Italian population changes occupation during working 
life less frequently than the bulk of Western people (Cobalti- 
Schizzerotto 1994, 225 and 236).
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Let us consider these two points in succession.
P o l i t ic a l  careers were more rapid fo r those who en tered  
p o l i t i c s  through party youth  o rg a n iza tio n s. The mean age of 
the first parliamentary election of MPs who had started 
their career in the youth party was 41.9, whilst for those 
who had entered politics from a different route it was 
46.421. Given that the average duration of post-war 
legislatures in Italy was under four years, a four and a 
half year difference means that MPs coming from a youth 
party tended to be elected at least one legislature before 
their colleagues of the same cohort.
Table 4: E n try  p o in ts  by  parliam entary  power o f  I ta l ia n  MPs 
in  1992-94 (in  row %)
I Youth 
I party
Adult
party
Local
gov.
Public!Lobby, 
autor.1 Union
Assoc­
iation
Other
Backbenchers 26 20 32 5 8 5 4
Frontbenchers 31 17 31 4 8 5 4
Superelite 53 19 10 4 6 3 5
N = 826
A lso the relative p o l i t i c a l  success o f  p a r lia m en ta ria n s  
appears to  be l in k e d  to  th e  s ta r t in g  p o in t o f  th e ir  c a r e e r s. 
More than half the superelite (53%) was drawn from former 
leaders of party youth organizations (table 4)22.
2* The mean age of first election to parliament shows a constant rise 
from 1976 to 1992 (Censis 1994, 39). Newer MPs have probably entered the 
Chambers at a proportionally older age than their senior colleagues 
since a longer career was required for qualifying for a parliamentary 
seat. This is likely to be an indicator of the progressive 
"petrification" of the Italian political system until 1994.
22 Moreover, 54% of the MPs who had started as party youth activists 
subsequently became members of a national party executive.
8 4
Furthermore, youth parties seem to have given an impulse to 
political careers, irrespective of the age of entry into 
politics of future MPs. Even among the superelite members 
who turned to active politics a f t e r  the age of 25 (17 
individuals), the majority (9 individuals) began in a youth 
party. Thus, it was not the younger starting age, but the 
locus of the apprenticeship which helped future members of 
the superelite in their career achievements23.
Table 5: A p p ren tices  in  a p a r ty  youth  o rg a n iza tio n  by
g en era tio n  among th e  1992-94 I ta l ia n  MPs ( in  %)a
1
1| PARTY
GENERATION OF MPs 1
War Reconst.|Cold-wari Protest|
DC 43 28 | 21 | 45
PDS 31 24 f 18 | 25
PSI 8 33 | 24 | 47
RC 10 10 | 26 | 24
MSI 50 44 | 42 | 83
PRI 29 42 | 38 | 50
PLI 0 33 | 13 | 17
Others 0 22 | 11 | 21
N - 826
Each cell shows the proportion of MPs who have held a youth party 
office in each party in each generation
Finally, which cohorts, among Italian parliamentarians 
elected in 1992, were more extensively recruited from party 
youth organizations? Could it be that youth party offices
23 Moreover, members of the superelite who came from youth parties 
obtained their first parliamentary seat when they were 39, whilst their 
equally successful colleagues who had started their career in other 
political institutions had to wait until they were 45 (almost as long as 
backbenchers).
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were the entry points of senior MPs, but are not favourable 
starting points for the current generations of young 
aspirants to a political career? To answer this question, 
MPs were divided into four generation sets (table 5)24.
Youth organizations played an increasingly important 
part as political entry points of Italian MPs of the early 
1990s. Ex-activists of these organizations amounted to only 
12% of the MPs born before 1926, but 26% of those born in 
the 1926-36 period, 27% of those born in the 1937-45 period, 
and 35% of those born after 1945. The younger a 
parliamentarian was, th e  h ig h e r  the  chances th a t he had 
belonged to  a r u l in g  body o f a youth p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n iza tio n.
Party differences are substantial. Among Christian 
Democrats, the passage through a youth political group was 
especially frequent among both the oldest and the youngest 
generation of MPs. In the first case, this was due to the 
paramount role of catholic youth organizations in the 
political socialization of Christian Democratic elites: 71% 
of "war generation" parliamentarians of the DC that 
participated in youth politics belonged to the youth section 
of the A zione C a tto lic a . The share of those who emerged 
through catholic organizations is lower among younger DC MPs 
{36% in the "reconstruction generation", 22% in the "Cold- 
War generation", and 11% in the "protest generation"). While
24 Those who were born before 1926 were young and active during World 
War II: they belong to the "war generation"; those b o m  between 1926 and 
1936 were young soon after World War II: they are part of the 
"reconstruction generation"; those b o m  between 1937 and 1945 had their 
first political experiences in the Cold War climate: they are called the 
"Cold-War generation"; those b o m  after 1945 were young at the time of 
the youth protest: they are therefore labelled the "protest generation".
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catholic bodies lost importance as training grounds for 
future Christian Democratic elites, the DC Youth Movement 
gained momentum, testifying to the fact that in its 
recruitment policy the DC was increasingly freeing itself 
from church influences. The "secularization" of youth 
recruitment paralleled the growing autonomy of the party 
from the early organizational and ideological links with the 
local parish25.
Among the parliamentarians of the PDS, one out of four 
MPs had an office in the FGCI (the youth section of the 
Communist Party)26. The largest proportion of former Young 
Communists is found in the oldest generation - those who 
reconstituted the FGCI immediately after the war. From 
approximately 1975, the FGCI provided fewer MPs, since the 
PCI began to look for people who had been politically active 
on the Left outside party structures - at least in the 
earlier stages of their political involvement (Sebastiani 
1983, 121-2; Lange et a l. 1991) . However, the FGCI
leadership remained a pathway for political careers at the 
highest level in the PCI. According to a Leninist conception 
of party personnel, future leaders of the PCI were carefully 
groomed and then moved up to the apex of the internal 
hierarchy. Leadership in the youth party was held as a
25 The fact that 22% of the former young activists in catholic groups in 
the 11th legislature were not elected under the DC flag attests to the 
same process.
26 This figure also includes the MPs of Rifondazione Comunista, in large 
part elder and obscure grassroot militants put forward as "true 
communists* by that party at its first electoral contest.
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training ground for subsequent adult party leadership27, it 
was actually reserved for rising stars such as the general 
secretaries-to-be Enrico Berlinguer, Achille Occhetto, and 
Massimo D 'Alema28.
In conclusion, it is often argued that in the first 
fifty years of the Republican era the Italian political 
class was drawn from party structures; it would be more 
correct to say that, to a large extent, the real breeding 
grounds were party youth organizations. The bulk of 
parliamentary personnel had already made its way to the top 
of these youth organizations, whose ruling bodies have been 
an important reservoir of political recruitment in Italy - 
at least in the "First" Republic.
27 In the PSI too, «according to Nenni, the youth party secretary was 
expected to become the "adult" party secretary general. Before Craxi, we 
all thought that this form of political succession would have taken 
place in the PSI; both Signorile and Manca had this expectation» (1.6, 
PSI leader).
28 One of the adult leaders interviewed recognized this almost 
paradigmatic role of the youth organization in the Communist Party: «the 
FGCI used to be the fundamental channel of selection of new leaders, 
especially those with an intellectual background and style» (1.4, PDS 
leader). In contrast, mid-level FGCI elites were not given many chances 
beyond local politics. Another political leader (who subsequently left 
the PCI) describes the rigid structuring of careers in the Communist 
Party for lower level youth party leaders (as was he): «After holding an 
FGCI office, I became assistant-mayor and mayor in my hometown. Had I 
remained in the PCI, my career would have come to an end there. My 
ascent to national leadership prominence happened completely outside the 
PCI» (1.2, AD leader).
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4 . Where Have They Gone? The O ccupational D estiny  o f  
Former Top A c t i v i s t s  in  the  DC, PCI, PSI Youth O rganiza tions
Thirty former general secretaries of a political youth 
movement sat in the 11th Italian Parliament29, Indeed, a 
leadership role at early age formed the background of the 
bulk of the leaders of the "First" Republic. The most famous 
of them, Giulio Andreotti, had his first political success 
when appointed general secretary of the Young Christian 
Democrats in 1944. Many of his successors also had 
outstanding careers (in particular, Emilio Colombo who was 
minister thirty-two times and Franco Maria Malfatti ten 
times). The formerly dominant leader of the PSI, Bettino 
Craxi, was prominent among the Young Socialists' of the end 
of the 1950s. All the "number twos" in the PSI of the 1980s 
(Valdo Spini, Claudio Signorile, Enrico Manca, Claudio 
Martelli, Gianni De Michelis, and Giulio Di Donato) were 
part of the executive committee of party youth 
organizations30; the post-Craxi "new" Socialist Party (SI) 
secretary Enrico Boselli was Young Socialists' national 
secretary in the mid-1970s. The leaders of the PCI-PDS and 
the MSI emanating from the youth sections of their parties 
have already been mentioned.
29 Six belonged to the DC and PSI, five to the PDS and the MSI, three to 
the PRI, two to the PLI, one to La Rete and Lista Pannella.
30 Manca and Signorile were national secretaries of the Young Socialists 
in the 1950s-1960s; Spini was a leading figure in the late 1960s-early 
1970s; Martelli was a member of the executive committee of the Young 
Republicans in the 1960s; De Michelis started as a right-wing militant, 
but then changed his mind and reached the leadership of the "lay" 
students' movement (UGI); Di Donato was national vice-secretary of the 
Young Socialists* Federation in the 1970s.
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Were these individuals exceptional? Was their 
background in  th e  youth p a r t ie s  acciden ta l? If this is the 
case, we should expect their former colleagues as leading 
activists in the party youth organizations not to have 
followed a political career31.
Table 6: P o s it io n s  held  in  1990-93 by members o f  1974-77 
e x e c u tiv e  com m ittees and n a tio n a l co u n cils  in  DC, PCI, PSI 
yo u th  o rg a n iza tio n s  (in  column %)
| YOUTH PARTY OFFICE
1990-93 Nat. Council Execut.Commit.
OFFICE 74 26
Parliament 4 11
Nat.Influence3 13 15
Loc.Gov.nmentb 18 24
Loc.Authority0 20 14
Party Office0 7 10
Priv.Company 
No «who*s who»
1 2
37 24
n = 435
a Positions of national influence (directors of State owned
companies, chairmanship of governmental agencies, top civil 
service and unions offices, national TV or newspaper editors)
b Regional, provincial, or capital city councillors or executive
members (including mayors)
c Directors of local authorities, banks, unions; local radio-TV and 
newspaper editors
^ Full-time party office at national or provincial-regional level
In fact, th e  bu lk  o f  th e  youth p a r ty  lea d ers  o f  th e  
mid-1970s became fu l l - t im e  p o l i t i c ia n s  (table 6). Between 
1990 and 1993, more than half of the 1974-77 ruling elite of
31 Analyses contained in this section are based on a dataset of former 
youth party activists described in note 7.
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the MGDC, FGCI, and FGS held a powerful position either as 
parliamentarians (10.5%), regional councillors (5.3%), 
councillors in provincial or capital cities (19.3%), members 
of party executive committees (9.6%), directors of public 
companies and organizations (9.6%, mostly in the financial 
and banking sector), leaders of associations at a national 
level (1.7%), or top civil servants (3.5%). Others were 
directors of regional or smaller scale public non-elective 
authorities (8.8% in transport, gas, rural banks, hospitals, 
and public agencies alike) or leaders of local interest 
groups (5.3%). In  t h e i r  e a r ly  f o r t i e s ,  th re e out of fo u r  o f  
th e  form er to p  a c t i v i s t s  in  th e  p a r ty youth o rg a n iza tio n s  
earned th e ir  l i v in g  in  p o l i t i c s 32.
As in the adult parties, members of the com ita to  
c e n tra le or d ir e z io n e  n a z io n a le (the "executive" of the 
party) and members of the larger c o n s ig l io  n a z io n a le (the 
"parliament" of the party) constitute two different strata 
of political actors, distinct not only in terms of real 
decision-making powers, but also in terms of career
prospects. Former members of the d ire z io n e or com itato  
c e n tr a le have almost three times more of a chance of 
entering parliament in their forties than their colleagues 
of the c o n s ig l io  n a z io n a le . They are also more likely to be 
registered as holders of one or more «who’s who» positions. 
They more often wield power in political institutions at the
32 Among the best known figures, one should mention a confederate union 
secretary, two party secretaries, three junior ministers, an employers* 
union secretary, a mass Catholic organization leader, a party paper 
editor, the editor of the most popular TV news.
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national level, whereas former national councillors in the 
youth party are more likely to have become incumbents of 
locally based political bodies. Since the national councils 
in the MGDC, FGCI, and FGS were composed of the local 
leaders of the movements, this career development seems to 
reproduce, at an adult level, the pattern of influence which 
they had as young politicians.
Table 7: O ff ic e s  he ld  in  1993 by men and women d e leg a tes  to  
MGDC, FGCJ, FGS n a tio n a l co u n c ils  and e xe c u tiv e  com m ittees 
between 1974 and 1977 (in  column
GENDER
1993 Male Female
OFFICE 91 9
Parliament 6 5
Nat.Influence 14 10
Loc.Gov.nment 20 10
Loc.Authority 19 8
Party Office 7 7
Priv.Company 
No «who's who»
2 0
32 60
N « 435
Gender too is influential (table 7). Not only were 
women a tiny minority (9%) of the youth party officers in 
the 1970s33, and discriminated against in relation to access 
to the ruling boards of the movements (less than 8%): they
33 Youth parties used to be all-male structures. In the 1990s dataset 
women constituted 3.8% of the Young Socialists, 6.5% of the Young 
Christian Democrats, and 20% of the Young Communists. In their youth 
organizations as in Parliament (Guadagnini 1987 and 1993; Cattaneo- 
D ’Amato 1990, 47-60) and local governments (Bettin-Magnier 1989, 65
ff.), the PCI and subsequently the PDS always gave more room to women 
representatives than any other party (particularly from the early 1970s 
onwards).
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were also less able (or interested) to build their future 
career on that political experience. While only 32% of the 
young males who were members of youth parties' executive 
committees in the mid-1970s did not appear in the 1991 and 
1994 «who's who», this was the case for 60% of their female 
colleagues.
Table 8: P o s itio n  h e ld  in  1993 by members o f  E xecu tive
Committees (EC) and N ational C ouncils  (NC) in  th e  youth  
o rg a n iza tio n s  o f  th e  DC, PCI, and PSI between 1974 and 1977 
( in  column
1993
POSITION
DC
Youth
PSI
Youth
PCI
Youth
1 EC NC EC NC EC NC
Parliament 29 6 9 3 7 2
Nat. Influence 22 13 21 17 9 6
Loc. Gov.ment 21 21 28 12 23 19
Loc. Influence 0 21 21 19 12 17
Party Office 14 7 7 8 11 4
Priv. Company 7 0 0 3 2 0
No «who's who» 7 32 14 38 36 52
N = 435
Political achievements of activists at the two levels 
of authority in the youth organizations (national council 
and executive committee) are different across parties (table 
8). The DC and PSI were not only the two major governmental 
parties in the political history of Italy after World War 
II, but also the parties in which the importance of the 
youth sections as agencies for recruitment of the adult
political class was the greatest34. Young Christian 
Democrats and Socialists at the top of their organizations 
in the 1970s had more of a chance of success as a result of 
that preliminary political experience. Former young 
Christian Democrats were especially less likely to have 
abandoned political activity than their PCI and PSI 
counterparts, and were particularly likely to be elected to 
representative institutions and to party offices. Fifteen 
years later, only 7% of the former top officers and 32% of 
the former national councillors of the MGDC were not in the 
Italian «who's who». Thus, almost one in three of the most 
influential and one in fifteen of the lower level officers 
in the DC youth organization had a seat in parliament. The 
others were regional councillors, mayors, presidents or 
members of boards of national banks and other national 
enterprises, central offices of farmers' unions, and so on.
These career achievements are a little less common 
among the former top activists of the Youth Socialist 
Federation. The relatively lesser success of former Young 
Socialists seems to be due to the changes of political line 
in the party under Craxi's leadership from 1976 to 1993. As 
the youth section was orientated toward the left35, not only
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34 However, the largest party youth organization was the FGCI, which 
counted almost 500,000 members in 1950 and still some 50,000 in 1989 
(Bardi-Morlino 1992, 481). Before being dissolved together with the 
Communist Party in 1991, the cost of the organization had reached about 
200 millions lire per month. Party informants claim that when the ex-PCI 
youth section was rebuilt afterwards (with the name of Sinistra 
Giovanile nel PDS), this was on a far cheaper basis.
35 Not only in Italy, left-wing parties have youth sections which tend 
to be always more leftist than "adult* members. To close them down as a 
result, for a period or more, is quite a normal solution to possible
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did Craxi disband it for almost a decade, but he also 
marginalized many of its former leaders who since then 
remained in "political exile" in their local strongholds36.
Compared to their DC and PSI counterparts, fewer former 
national activists of the Communist Youth Federation gained 
a prominent political office as adults in the 1990s. Some 
seem to be lost in the machine as party functionaries; 
others abandoned the party, possibly as a consequence of the 
PCI split of 1989 (for instance, a former FGCI national 
secretary was elected to parliament on the R ifondazione  
Comunista list). The main cause of the exclusion of more 
than one third of the former top activists of the FGCI is 
likely to be due to the fact that the PCI had less control 
of political appointments (l o t t i z z a z i o n e ), except in some 
regions (Tuscany, Umbria, and Emilia-Romagna). In general, 
the DC and PSI could offer better career prospects than the 
PCI37.
embarrassments deriving from their ideological deviations (for British 
examples, see Abrams-Little 1965, 320).
36 One of the senior leaders interviewed admitted that such a «local 
isolation perhaps has saved me, keeping me far from a certain system 
that has broken down in the 1990s» (1.6, PSI leader).
37 Since the province of residence of young activists in this dataset is 
unknown, it is not possible to test the hypothesis of unequal 
geographical distribution of political career achievements in Italy.
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5. C onclusion
The ruling bodies of the party youth organizations were 
the most common entry points of parliamentary careers in 
Italy in the early 1990s. This was even more the case for 
three categories of MPs: those who represented the major
parties, those who were incumbents of higher political 
offices, and those who entered politics at a younger age. 
Besides parliament, former top activists of party youth 
organizations could usually reach a number of other 
political posts when older. Thus, the «structure of 
political opportunities» of the "First" Republic gave many 
chances of access to the political class to the limited 
circles of young people groomed by "specialized" party 
institutions.
Perhaps a party youth organization performed a
comparable function only in the USSR, where Komsomol stood 
out as the main selectorate of political elites (Harasymiw 
1984; Klugman 1989)38. Would-be apparatchiks affiliated to 
it when still very young. And when guessing who would have
38 Additional comparative data are few and old. Two clearly contrasting 
cases are West Germany and Britain. «Activity in party youth 
organizations is not [a] prerequisite for a political career» in 
Germany, where «a public representative normally enters politics via 
community politics» (Herzog 1978, 257; also Herzog 1975, 75-9). But 
German party youth organizations are different at least as regards an 
important aspect - the age limit for membership, which was 35-40 in 
Germany, was rarely over 30 in Italy. In Britain, the Young Liberals 
could claim «to have launched many important political careers - those, 
for example, of Sir Winston Churchill and Mr. Harold Wilson - [and that] 
most of the present [in the mid-1960s] party leaders are graduates of 
the student organization themselves» (Abrams-Little 1965, 326-7).
V '
become «the new Soviet man», they could not help thinking: 
«The new Soviet boy!» (Klugman 1989, 22)39. * v
It is plausible that by the early 1990s the young who 
were politically ambitious in Italy were concentrated among 
the counterparts of "Soviet boys". Generally speaking, young 
aspiring politicians are likely to seek to enter politics at 
the entry point which was most favourable in the recent 
past. Once this sort of main door to political careers has 
been identified, we may expect that those who pass through 
it form a population of individuals that are most determined 
to pursue a political career40. Consequently, in the 
following chapters the incumbents of ruling offices in the 
Italian party youth organizations will be regarded as young 
adults who, with good reason, aim at becoming professional 
politicians.
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39 The almost simultaneous weakening and fall of the Italian and Soviet 
political class in the late 1980s-early 1990s has perhaps a common 
cause: the low «permeability», as Putnam (1976, 47-8) calls it, of the 
political recruitment system. In general terms, these two cases confirm 
that «the more confined the recruits are to a particular stratum of 
society, the narrower the channels of entry, and the more esoteric the 
institutional socialization patterns, the greater is the danger of elite 
isolation» (Tapper 1976, 79), and, hence, of its breakdown. Such an 
argument is applied to the Italian case by Cotta and Verzichelli (1994).
40 This does not lead to a complete census of the young people who 
intend and attempt to become political professionals, but there is 
probably no way to draw such a census.
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CHAPTER IV
COMPARING YOUNG POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND NONACTIVISTS:
DATA AND METHODS
J. Young P o l i t ic a l  A c t i v i s t s :  A S e le c te d  M inority
Young political activists are rare in every generation. 
Even in 1968 (perhaps the time of highest youth political 
mobilization in the twentieth century)1, the large majority 
of people in their twenties remained aloof from politics 
(Lipset 1972, 75 and sparsim ; Altbach 1989, 7-8). It has 
been estimated that no more than 10% of young people was 
involved in political activities in any country (Rezsohazy 
1994, 252).
A large body of comparative evidence demonstrates that 
usually mature individuals tend to devote more time and 
attention to political affairs than young adults (Lane 1959,
217-8; Milbrath-Goel 1977, 114-5; Verba-Nie 1972, 138 ff.; 
Dawson et al. 1977, 84-5; Milbrath 1981, 227-8; Marsh-Kaase 
1979, 102; Percheron-Chiche 1991, 154-7; Parry et al. 1992,
155-61; Kriesi 1993, 88-9). Although youths may develop an 
interest for the greatest ethical-political issues as a 
consequence of the late adolescence «identity crisis»
1 In search of precedents, American observers had to recall the radical 
students of the 1930s (Lipset 1966, 351-4); in Europe, the only 
comparable (in scale and scope) mobilizations of young people dated back 
to some of the nationalist upheavals of the first half of the nineteenth 
century (Altbach 1969; Braungart 1984).
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(Jennings-Niemi 1974; Adelson 1975), political activism is 
not among the most common «adolescent role exits# (Hagan- 
Wheaton 1993)2.
Indeed, the political involvement of young people in 
contemporary Western societies appears to be extremely low3. 
In the twelve countries of the then European Community, no 
more than 5% of the 15-24 year old respondents to an 
official mass survey claimed to belong to a «political party 
or group# (EC Commission 1989, 44), While 16% of the young 
Europeans expressed «much» or «some» «interest in politics#, 
the proportion of Italians (12%) was the lowest (ibid., 27). 
Among young Italians, moreover, lack of interest in politics 
and despising politicians seem to go together: in 1992 only 
12.2% of 15-29 years olds expressed «some or much trust in
^ why does active politics not attract young people? It may be that, 
today as in the past, young people «have too many competing interests 
and preoccupations to find the costs of involvement worthwhile» (Sigel- 
Hoskin 1981, 52). In a cost-benefit perspective, they cannot afford to 
participate in political groups and other voluntary associations (Curtis 
et al. 1992, 147; Janoski-Wilson 1995, 281). Perhaps this is even more 
the case with the increasing postponement of the mean age of first full 
employment and the transformation of youth into a «moratorium stage» in 
the life course (Galland 1990). As a consequence, «[Les] traits 
attribués à la réalité des intérêts - fluctuants, diffus, dilués - des 
jeunes conduisent sans doute plusieurs d'entre eux à ne pas se voir 
porteurs d'intérêts réels. Comme leur perception de la politique tend à 
ramener1 cette dernière à une activité de défense et de promotion des 
intérêts, il demeure possible que se trouve ainsi expliqué le fait 
qu'ils se tiennent plutôt en retrait de la politique» (Hudon-Hébert 
1994, 370).
3 An extraordinary degree of political mobilization among young people 
was spurred instead by the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. In 
particular, figures for the DDR show that about 80% of young people 
belonged to the youth organization of the Communist Party (FDJ) in the 
1980s (Voigt 1988, 60). However, the dramatic fall in the level of
political participation of East German youngsters after reunification - 
only 2.6% of 16-29 year olds were affiliated to a party in 1992 
(Schneider 1995, 285) - demonstrates that, without public constraints, 
low political involvement during youth is prevalent everywhere.
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politicians». This was the lowest figure in the 1983-1992 
youth surveys (De Lillo 1993; Cavalli-De Lillo 1993, 288-9).
Concomitantly, the number of young political activists 
in Italy has sharply declined. While in 1970 7.3% of a large 
sample of 18-25 year old respondents claimed to be involved 
in party activities (Scarpati 1973, 249; also Tullio Altan- 
Marradi 1976, 472 and 488), only 6.2% in 1983, 4.1% in 1987, 
and 2.7% in 1992 among the young respondents to the lard 
Institute's regular surveys have taken part «at least twice 
in the last three months» in the activities of «political 
organizations» (Cavalli-De Lillo 1993, 286; cf. also
Caciagli 1987). Yet, albeit young people have proved 
increasingly «resistant to regimentation in the
organizational structures of the traditional parties» 
(Bardi-Morlino 1994, 269), some of them continue to be
attracted by active politics within parties. This selected 
minority constitutes the focus of the investigation that 
follows. 2
2. A c t i v i s t s  and N o n a c tiv is ts :  Sampling and C o n tro llin g  
In Italy as in other countries «many parties have youth 
organizations, aiming to attract new blood into the party» 
(Norris-Lovenduski 1995, 188). Although with much more
limited powers, these organizations tend to mirror the party 
to which they are linked in almost every aspect of their
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internal life4. As their senior counterparts, in particular, 
youth party local and national leaders are elected by the 
members or the delegates of the organization to which they 
belong. Yet competition for youth party offices is markedly 
lower than in the "adult" structure, making the recruitment 
of incumbents essentially a matter of supply.
The costs of taking such offices are indeed high. On 
the one hand, material and symbolic rewards are modest: some 
taste of leadership, the right to participate in the 
meetings of certain "adult" party committees, and small 
fringe benefits (at best a desk and a telephone in the party 
headquarters). On the other hand, these offices require a 
heavy personal involvement and dedication and exclude their 
holders from other occupations at a crucial moment in life - 
when people of the same age choose their career5. Youth 
party activists specialize instead in rallying, writing, 
criticizing, speaking in public and networking within the 
political world. Their activity tends to coincide with that 
of full-time politicians6.
4 Literature on the youth organizations of the Italian parties is almost 
non-existent in quantity and poor in quality except for some historical 
research. A bibliographical review can be found in Dal Toso (1995, 355-
8).
5 A former national secretary of the Young Socialists recalls: «It was 
hard, extremely hard to lead the organization. One had to move to Rome, 
change one's life... Economically, we received almost nothing. 
Everything was public, it was a 24-hour day job. And we were about 25-26 
years old. Not everyone could afford it. Some came to see this life as a 
deadlock and left» (1.9, PSI leader).
6 We assume that an individual holds a full-time political office when 
politics is «the sphere of activity to which the individual devotes a 
large part of his work time and effort - irrespective of source of
Although referring to a variety of sources* 7, in the 
main the following inquiry contrasts a sample of 115 
activists of four Italian party youth organizations with the 
generation to which they belong8. Where possible, this 
comparison is based on national census data about the 
population of the same cohort. In the majority of cases, 
however, the relevant items for this research design were 
not included either in the census statistics or in other 
surveys. Therefore, a revised version of the questionnaire 
submitted to the political activists was applied to a 
control group of 322 individuals aged 18-30 living in 65 
different neighbourhoods of the provinces of Florence and 
Pistoia9.
income» (Czudnowski 1975, 168}, All the young party activists that will 
be examined in this investigation conform to this standard.
7 In addition to the activists-nonactivists dataset, reference is 
particularly made to ten open-ended interviews conducted in 1993 and 
1994 with former youth party leaders who have became top-ranking 
political leaders: three ministers (one in the DC, one in the PSI, one 
in the PRI), three party general secretaries (in the PR, AD, and the 
SI), two party vice-secretaries (one in the PDS, one in the PPI), two 
parliamentarians (one in the PPI, one in the PDS). These interviews had 
three main aims: to find out about the dynamics of recruitment in youth 
parties in the previous twenty years in greater detail; to see how adult 
leaders consider * their party youth organizations; to obtain a more 
global picture of recruitment policies in the Italian parties. Nine of 
these interviews were tape-recorded.
8 Activists were interviewed in 1993, either personally by the author, 
or by post in the case of twenty-three individuals who could not be 
contacted directly. About the difficulties in contacting and 
interviewing party elites in Italy, see Pridham (1987, 78-80).
9 Questionnaires were administered personally to this control group by a 
team of undergraduate students of the Faculty of Political Science of 
Florence in the spring of 1993. Each respondent was located drawing by 
lot a number of streets, street numbers, and flat levels which were then 
randomly combined. A reserve list was also formed. Three incomplete 
interviews were discarded from the final dataset.
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F ig u re  1: Age s tru c tu r e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i s t s  and
n o n a c t iv is t s
32 
30 
28 
26
24
Age
22 
20 
18
16 Nonactivists Activists D Median value
□
Mn-Max 
£=» 25%-75%
As was to be expected10, no individual in the control 
group held any office in party organizations. We will, 
therefore, call this the sample of "nonactivists". Its age 
structure is similar to that of the sample of activists, 
even though younger people are slightly more numerous 
(figure 1). On the other hand, the control group is very 
close to the population in terms of class structure of the 
family of origin (figure 2)11. Women are instead over­
10 The total number of youth party officers in Italy can be estimated to 
range between 2,500 and 3,000: that is, about one out of three thousands 
people of the same cohort.
11 In terms of individual occupation, the sample can be considered 
representative of the basic division between young people who work and 
those who do not, as workers are approximately in the same proportion as 
in the reference population (39.5% vs. 47.1%). In greater detail, 
however, job-seekers and unemployed persons are under-represented (5.3% 
vs. 23.1%), while individuals that are not in the labour force (mostly 
students) are over-represented (55.2% vs. 29.7%) (Istat 1995a, 171, 173, 
198 and 203).
103
represented (56%).
Figure 2: C lass com position o f  the  n o n a c t iv is t s '  sample and 
th e  p o p u la tio n a
Bourgeoisie Petty Routine Blue collars
bourgeoisie white
collars
Data about the population are drawn from Cobalti-Schizzerotto's 
sample (1994, 72). The four classes are a collapsed version of 
Erikson-Goldthorpe' schema: "Bourgeoisie"* classes I-II; "Routine 
white collars"* class III; "Petty bourgeoisie"* class IV; "Blue 
collars"* classes V-VI-VII. Family class of respondents has been 
assessed on the basis of the highest rank occupation of parents
Most of the analysis will be carried out on the sample 
resulting from the combination of the two independent random 
samples - those of activists and nonactivists - according to 
a «case-control» design (also known as «response-based» or 
«choice-based» sampling)12. This type of design is popular
12 As anticipated (chapter II, note 62), multivariate data analysis will 
consist of logistic regressions applying the random sampling maximum 
likelihood estimator. Logistic regression makes it possible to measure 
the effect of two or more independent variables over the probability of 
a given event (here, having taken a party office). The use of this 
technique with response-based samples also is statistically legitimate 
when the response function takes a logit form and samples are small (as
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in medical research, and especially in epidemiology, since 
it appears particularly suitable for the study of the 
determinants of rare traits - such as certain diseases 
(Clayton-Hills 1993, 153-65; Wacholder 1995). In fact, more 
common survey procedures (i.e., simple random sampling) 
would not produce enough variation in the dependent variable 
of interest13.
Although seldom used, case-control sampling processes 
are also «potentially very useful in sociological research» 
(Xie-Manski 1989, 283). Even a most conservative appraisal
recognizes that they «help us to gain some valuable 
information about the empirical plausibility of a causal 
inference» (King et al. 1994, 141). At the very least, a 
case-control study serves to «generate a more precise 
hypothesis than we began with» (ibid., 142)14. Indeed the 
chief aim of this investigation is to generate such a 
hypothesis, which may be tested with other research designs 
and samples in the future15.
in this case); only the parameters of the intercept cannot be 
interpreted properly (cf. Prentice-Pyke 1979; Xie-Manski 1989).
13 Yet, surveys that need to include rare elements in the population 
employ «disproportionate stratified sampling» - that is, a sampling 
scheme which is conceptually equivalent to the «case-control» except 
that the variables on which the stratification is made are independent 
rather than dependent (cf. Kish 1965, 406; Blalock 1967, 301-2; Fabbris 
1989, 103 and 109-10).
^  Note, however, that King et al. (1994) have in mind the application 
of this research strategy to «qualitative» (i.e., with few cases) 
studies.
15 This relative understatement of the research aim takes into account a 
methodological limit of this study: namely, the difference in the 
geographical base of case and control sampling (national for activists, 
local for nonactivists). On the other hand, consider the following:
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3. The A c t i v i s t s '  Sample
The youth organizations from which the sample of 
activists was drawn were affiliated with the four main 
Italian parties at the 1992 national elections: the DC-PPI, 
the PDS, the PSI, and the Northern League. These 
organizations are: the G iovani Popolari (former MGDC, youth 
organization of the DC and then of the PPI), the S in is tr a  
G iovanile  n e l PDS (former FGCI, youth organization of the 
PDS), the Federazione G iovanile  S o c ia l is ta  (youth 
organization of the PSI), and the Movimento G iovanile  d e l la  
Lega Word (youth organization of the Lega Word)* 16.
a ) The sample of nonactivists is satisfactorily representative of the 
youth population in terms of family class, occupational situation, and 
political participation;
b) In terms of value orientations, existing research on Italian youth
signals «un processo di modernizzazione culturale che ha coinvolto i 
giovani di tutto il paese [sì] che quindi non si può più parlare sul 
piano degli orientamenti culturali dei giovani di modelli culturali 
diversi circoscrivibili in termini geografici» (Cavalli 1990, 355; cf. 
also Burgalassi 1991, 32). While sub-cultural differences seem to 
diminish, so that they are almost entirely ignored in the most recent 
report on Italian youth (Cavalli-De Lillo 1993a), youngsters of Central 
Italy, from whom the sample of nonactivists is drawn, are shown to 
occupy a median position between Northern and Southern peers in 
structural terms (e.g., economic opportunities, aspirations, and 
consumption patterns: Chiesi-Martinelli 1993, 53 ff.; Cavalli-De Lillo
1993b, 158 ff.).
c) On some explanatory variables, as will be seen, differences between 
activists and nonactivists are not only high, but also in line with what 
was expected.
16 The bulk of the Giovani Popolari were interviewed at their re­
founding congress in Rome (July 1993), when formally they were still 
representatives of the then-called Movimento Giovanile Democrazia 
Cristiana. Among young Lega Nord leaders, four parliamentarians of that 
party were included; even though not formally members of the youth 
organization, they are to be considered as belonging in effect to the 
leadership core of the young Leghisti, since the Movimento Giovanile of 
the League has no national ruling body, in line with the regionalist 
ideology of the party. The Young Socialists were interviewed on the eve 
of their dissolution; their number is smaller than foreseen, but it 
reflects the then comparatively reduced size of that youth organization. 
Lastly, among the Young Socialists were included the national leader and
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Table 1 : The sample o f  a c t i v i s t s  by p a r ty  and power
I POWER
+
PARTY
+
■4*— —— ———— — — —— — — — — — K —— — —— — + —| | DC | PDS | PSI-ADj LEGA | Totals |
—— — — — — — + — — —— —H— ----------------------h  — — — t-—
NATIONAL LEADER 
Row %
12
32.5%
18
48.6%
1
2.7%
6
16.2%
37
LOCAL LEADER 
Row %
20
45.4%
13
29.6%
2
4.5%
9
20.5%
44
LOCAL SUB-LEADER 
Row %
22
64.7%
4
11.8%
7
20.6%
1 j 34 
2.9% |
All Grps
54 35 10 16 115
+------------------+--------+ -------- + --------+-------- +--------- +
The universe of the activists in each party 
organization can be divided into three strata (table 1):
1) Members of the national ruling committees (d ire z io n e  
naziona le , e secu tivo  n a z io n a le ) : 15-20 individuals in 
each party youth organization;
2) Members of the national councils {c o n s ig lio  
n a zio n a le), substantially coinciding with local leaders 
(segretario p r o v in c ia le , s e g r e ta r io  r e g io n a le): about 
100 individuals in the G iovani P o p o la ri and the 
S in is tr a  G iovan ile , 50 in the Lega Nord and the 
Federazione G iovanile  S o c i a l i s t a ;
3) Members of the local executive committees {d irez io n e  
p ro v in c ia le , d ire z io n e  r e g io n a le): 400-500 individuals 
in the party youth organizations of the DC and PDS, and 
about 100 in the Lega Nord and in the Federazione  
G iovanile  S o c ia l i s ta .
Given the size of the corresponding universe of youth 
party members, only the local sub-leaders have to be 
regarded as a relatively limited sample (about 1/30th of the
three provincial leaders of the Giovani in Alleanza Democratica (the 
youth organization of a small liberal-socialist party which was formed 
in 1993 and took part in the 1994 general elections).
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reference population). The local leaders form a larger 
sample: about l/7th of the universe. Among top leaders, 
«dense sampling# was obtained (Coleman 1958; Black-Champion 
1976, 309): on average, half the members of the national 
ruling bodies were interviewed in each party.
These young men and women are in their mid-twenties. 
Formal limits of age for membership in the Italian party 
youth organizations quite often vary, but never go beyond 
3017. Sometimes these limits are increased to allow a ruling 
group to remain in power, to avoid sudden leadership gaps, 
or to prepare a succession. Usually, however, leaders are 
replaced when they exceed the age limit.
Table 2; Mean and standard d e v ia tio n  o f  th e  age o f  a c t i v i s t s  
by  p a r ty  and l e v e l  o f  power
PARTY I NATIONAL LOCAL LOCAL
LEADER LEADER SUBLEADER
I DC I 26.2 (1.8) I 26.1 (1.7) | 24.9 (3.3) |
I PDS I 23.6 (3.2) I 23.1 (2.8) | 19.8 (3.1) |
I PSI-AD I 26.0 (0.0) I 23.7 (2.1) | 27.2 (2.1) |
+ -  — — —  — — —  — —  — —  — — — — —  — — — — — +
I LEAGUE I 25.0 (4.0) | 24.1 (5.2) | 20.0 (0.0) |
I All Groups I 24.8 (3.1) | 24.7 (3.2) | 24.7 (3.6) [
+------------- +--------------+--------------+--------------+
17 Exceptions are reported in the youth organizations (Giovine Italia 
and FUAN) linked to the right-wing party (MSI): their leaders in the 
1960s and 1970s remained in power even when older than 40. Also by 
virtue of the explicitly non-democratic ideology of the party, in those 
cases appointment and confirmation from above were the recognized rule.
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Offices within the youth parties tend not to be given 
on the basis of seniority - neither of age (as table 2 
shows) nor of active militancy. On average, national leaders 
have been fully involved in politics for the previous three 
years? local leaders and sub-leaders for the previous two.
The different mean age of the activists in the youth 
section of the PDS and the PSI-AD requires some explanation. 
Activists of the PDS-linked organization took up their 
positions earlier than their peers in other parties, since 
the organization to which they belong was re-founded in 1991 
following the abandonment of communism. Instead, the seeming 
anomaly of the center-left activists (PSI-AD), among whom 
local sub-leaders are older than leaders, results from the 
heterogeneity of the party affiliation of the respondents - 
the older ones come from the traditional PSI youth 
organization, the younger ones from the more recent AD youth 
organization.
Members of this sample are drawn from all over Italy: 
42.6% from the North, 25.2% from the Centre, 32.2% from the 
South. Such a territorial distribution does not change from 
one party to another - with the exception of the Lega 
Word18. It probably mirrors the real diffusion of party 
youth organizations in the country.
*8 The Movimento Giovanile della Lega Nord is formally present only in 
Lombardia, Piemonte, Val d* Aosta, Trentino, Veneto, Fiuli-Venezia 
Giulia, Liguria, Emilia Romagna, and Toscana. Yet, 68.3% of its 7,772 
members in 1993 belonged to the Lombard Federation. This geographical 
concentration of the Young Leghisti was even higher than in the "adult” 
party, where Lombards made up 59.1% of total party membership.
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Table 3: P lace o f  residence  o f  the  young a c t i v i s t s  by t h e i r  
l e v e l  o f  power
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -| | PLACE OF RESIDENCE |
------ — + - — ---------------- ^------------ — H------------------- ------1— - —
| POWER | CITY® | TOWNb | VILLAGE0 | Totals |
+----------- +----------- +----------- +----------- +----------- +
NAT.LEADER 
Row %
22
59.5%
9
24.3%
6
16.2%
37
LOC.LEADER 
Row %
22
50.0%
11
25.0%
11
25.0%
44
SUBLEADER 
Row %
16
47.0%
9
26.5%
9
26.5%
34
All Grps
60 29 26 115
+----------- +----------- +----------- +----------- +----------- +
Capital of province
More than 30,000 inhabitants, not capital of province 
Less than 30,000 inhabitants
Finally, activists are not equally distributed in terms 
of the size of the town in which they live. City dwellers 
are in a majority: they form 30.2% of the Italian population 
(Istat 1994, 28), but 52% of young party activists. The 
number of individuals who live in an urban context even 
increases as we move up through the hierarchy of the party 
youth organizations (table 3).
4. Summary
This chapter has presented the data on which the 
empirical work which follows is based. After having 
identified top activists in the party youth organizations as 
the "prototypical political ambitious" among the Italian
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youth (cf. chapter III)19, a sample of these activists has 
been drawn and interviewed. This sample shall be contrasted 
with a random sample of nonactivists of the same cohort. The 
characteristics of both samples and their integration 
according to a case-control design have been described in 
the previous sections. The next chapters will examine 
individually the three types of factors - personality, 
social origins, and personal networks - pinpointed by the 
existing hypotheses (cf. chapter II) about the roots of 
political ambition.
19 That youth party officers have political ambitions is also shown by 
the fact that about one third of them have already been elected to 
municipal and provincial councils.
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CHAPTER V
THE PERSONALITY TRAITS OF YOUNG POLITICAL ACTIVISTS
1. A P re d isp o s itio n  fo r  P o l it ic s ?
Almost without exception, studies comparing political 
elites and the mass public show that there are strong 
differences on many planes, including the p e r s o n a lity  t r a i t s  
and value orientations of the two groups1. In the context of 
democratic and representative regimes, this finding raises a 
major question concerning political recruitment: Do 
preexisting psycho-cultural differences distinguish future 
politicians from their peers?
A positive answer is given by the psychological 
accounts of political ambition reviewed in chapter II (§ 
3 -1)2 • They assume that some individuals are exposed to 
pathological and specific pre-adult socialization processes
1 After the pioneer studies (Stouffer 1955; Converse 1964; Luttberg 
1968; Jackman 1972), the issue has been reformulated from both a 
methodological and a substantive viewpoint (Barton-Parsons 1977; 
Sullivan efc al. 1978; Nunn et al. 1978; Converse-Markus 1979; McClosky- 
Brill 1983; Fletcher 1988; Bamum-Sullivan 1989). In recent years, it 
has attracted revived attention (Sniderman et al. 1991; Lerner et al. 
1991; Shamir 1991; Gibson-Duch 1991; Duch-Gibson 1992; Sullivan et al. 
1993; and between party elites and members, Norris 1995b).
2 Critics of this view are numerous (Prewitt et al. 1966; Marsh 1971; 
Searing et al. 1973; Searing et al. 1976; Dowse-Hughes 1977; Searing 
1986; Renshon 1989). They hold that psycho-cultural traits are not a 
crucial factor in political recruitment processes, and that, in any 
case, they are likely to change as actors pass from one political role 
to another. In more general terms, research on the personality of 
different occupational strata shows strong evidence «in opposition to 
those who see the relationship between occupational conditions and 
personality as resulting solely from selective recruitment and job- 
molding» (Kohn-Scholler 1983, 122; cf. also Spenner-Otto 1985).
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that generate orientations which are particularly suited to 
political roles. These individuals will thereafter seek to 
take a political career. The stress on psycho-cultural 
traits gives substance to a «selective recruitment 
hypothesis»: political activists and leaders emerge because 
of their somewhat special personality which has been 
acquired early in life3. !
To test this hypothesis, young politicians, who should 
have experienced the supposedly crucial socialization 
processes a short time ago, form a more adequate population 
than the adult political elites who are usually the object 
of research. The test will consist of a comparison of the 
self-perceptions and orientations of young political 
activists and nonactivists. The more this set of psycho- 
cultural traits is found to differ between the two groups, 
the more supported is the «selective recruitment 
hypothesis». Similarity between activists and nonactivists, 
on the other hand, would cast serious doubts on the 
hypotesis.
A number of personality factors have been suggested as 
antecedents or correlates of political ambition in the 
literature (cf. chapter II, § 3.1 and § 3.3). They are the 
following:
3 I n c id e n ta l l y ,  such  a  p o s i t io n  h as  im p o r ta n t n o rm ativ e  consequences. 
F or in s ta n c e ,  i t  le a d s  t o  a t t r i b u t i n g  th e  f a c t  t h a t  e l i t e s  a re  more 
t o l e r a n t  th a n  th e  mass p u b l ic  t o  th e  c a p a c i ty  o f  th e  sy stem  o f p o l i t i c a l  
r e c ru i tm e n t  to  s e l e c t  "en lig h te n e d *  p e r s o n s .  T h e re fo re ,  « s e le c t iv e  
r e c ru i tm e n t  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  co n g ru en t w ith  d em o cra tic  e l i t i s m  and 
c o n s e rv a t iv e  v a r ia n t s  o f  d em o cra tic  th eo ry »  (S u ll iv a n  e t  a l .  1993, 54) .
113
(a) Adolescent isolation;
(b) Adolescent value crisis;
(c) Adolescent insecurity;
(d) Authoritarianism;
(e) Dogmatism;
(f) Cognitive complexity;
(g) Attitudinal consistency.
Indicators of each of these factors have been gathered 
in the interviews with activists and nonactivists, with a 
view to ascertaining their relative ability to predict 
political involvement. In particular, the analysis will deal 
with the perceptions of change from adolescence ( § 2 ) and 
the contents and structure of value orientations (§ 3). The 
influence of personality traits on the disposition to become 
politically active will then be assessed on the basis of all 
empirical findings (§ 4)4.
2. .Entering th e  A d u lt Age: S e lf-P e rc e p tio n s  o f Change 
According to psychopathological accounts of political 
ambition, politicians are held to take up their career 
because of a higher need to compensate for pre-adult 
deficiencies such as a sense of isolation, insecurity, and 
low self-esteem. If activism is a "cure" for these 
"illnesses", activists should then recognize5 more of a
4 Needless to say, the analysis that follows does not claim to provide a 
full picture of the respondents' personality.
5 Self-recognition is the most correct way of recording compensatory 
changes of ego from a psychoanalytic point of view, inasmuch as 
psychoanalysis holds that there is no recovery without self-awareness. 
Psychologists give some evidence that self-reported items of subjective
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change in themselves after their entry into politics than 
nonactivists after their entry into a job or a university. 
Thus, the "sense of change" expressed by respondents may be 
interpreted as indicating the fulfillment of p r e v io u s ly  
e x i s t in g  psychological needs - social adjustment, cultural 
adjustment, or the enhancement of the sense of personal 
control. Let us examine the matter in greater detail.
2 .1 . S o c ia l Adjustment
Biographers of Churchill describe this leader’s 
childhood and adolescence as «almost pathetically lonely» 
(Rintala 1984, 381). Similarly, a significant theme in the 
life stories of the young radical leaders interviewed by 
Keniston (1968) is their isolation during adolescence. As 
one of them recalls, «I was fairly (pause) removed. I'd just 
go home after school and read. I had a few close friends, 
but I was never a big social-type kid...» (ibid., 79). And 
another: «For a long time, it seemed like, in junior high
school I really felt terribly alone» (ibid., 81). This 
feeling appears to have been overcome only later on, in the 
last years of high school, «because there was this large 
group of people with the same kind of values... » (ibid., 
79) .
A general case can be made about political activism 
deriving from a desire to associate with peers and to belong
states are less affected by transient mood than one may expect (Pavot- 
Diener 1993). Similar items are also common in large survey studies 
(e.g., Strumpel et al. 1976, 202; Jennings-Niemi 1981, 284-5; Veroff et 
al. 1982, 47).
115
to a homogeneous social group. Two questions in the context 
of this study addressed this possible basic motivation of 
social adjustment. One inquired about the perceived change 
in the number of friends after having assumed their main 
early-adult role; the other asked respondents to react to 
the sentence: «I feel part of a united group with a clear 
identity». In both cases, respondents indicated whether this 
was «more», «equally», or «less» the case than before.
Table 1: Change in  th e  sen se  o f  s o c ia b i l i t y :  «Compared to  
b e fo re taking up your p a r ty  o f f i c e  [ fo r  a c t i v i s t s ]  / jo b  or  
u n iv e r s i ty  [ fo r  n o n a c t iv is t s ] , how_._many_ fr ie n d s  do you  
have?»
MORE THAN 
BEFORE
SAME AS 
BEFORE
LESS THAN 
BEFORE Totals
NONACTIVISTS 
Row %
167
52.5%
117
36.8%
34
10.7%
318
ACTIVISTS 
Row %
58
50.4%
50
43.5%
7
6.1%
115
All Grps
225 167 41 433
About half the sample of young activists stated that 
there had been an increase in the number of their friends 
after having taken their main adult role - about the same as 
their apoliticized counterparts (table l)6.
6 Generally speaking, sociability in itself increases during early 
adulthood with respect to adolescent years. Youth appears as the most 
"experimental" stage in the lifecourse in the domain of social 
relations. Different pieces of research in the U.S. (Burt 1991) and 
Europe (H6ran 1988; Hollinger-Haller 1990, 115-6; Fors6 1991, 257) have 
shown that the experience of friendship has highs and lows: both the 
number of friends and the frequency of contacts rise until marriage, 
after which they decrease sharply, to recover and augment progressively 
until retirement, and finally diminish again.
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This sense of widening of sociability is more 
infrequent among activists of middle class origin: only 31% 
of these expressed the feeling of having increased the 
number of their friends as a result of their political 
activism. While for offsprings of families at the extremes 
of the social hierarchy party life can offer opportunities 
of interclass contacts, middle class young politicians tend 
to see their entry into politics as not having an influence 
on their social networks7.
Table 2: Change in the sense o f group b e lo n g in g : «Compared 
to  b e fo re  ta k in g  up your p a r ty  o f f i c e  [ fo r  a c t i v i s t s ]  / jo b  
or u n iv e r s i ty  [ f o r  n o n a c t iv i s t s ] , do you f e e l  p a rt o f  a 
u n ite d  group w ith  i t s  own i d e n t i t y ?»
MORE THAN 
BEFORE
SAME AS 
BEFORE
LESS THAN 
BEFORE Totals
NONACTIVISTS 
Row %
78
24.6%
136
42.9%
103
32.5%
317
ACTIVISTS j 64 
Row % 1 56.1%
32
28.1%
18
15.8%
114
All Grps
142 168 121 431
7 In an open-ended question, only a minority of activists justified 
political involvement in terms of a sociability need as the following: 
«1 wanted to participate and have an identity» (PDS local leader); «1 
like to be a member of the active part of society» (PPI national 
leader); «1 felt that my ideas and wants had to be shared with others» 
(PDS national leader); «1 just intended to socialize» (PSI local sub­
leader); «1 was moved by the pleasure of taking part in social life 
actively» (PDS local sub-leader). As may be expected, most of the 
answers to this direct question - «For which reasons, at a certain point 
in your life, did you wish to enter politics?» - were ritualistic. They 
can hardly be of use for analysis (cf. Norris-Lovenduski 1995, 169;
contra, Lehman Schlozman et al. 1995, 9-11).
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Identification with a single group is rare in modern 
societies, in which individuals live at the intersection of 
multiple affiliations. More than occupational and school 
groups, political parties are one of the few voluntary 
associations claiming to offer a strong sense of identity to 
their most active members. A «stronger than before» sense of 
group belonging is therefore to be found more often among 
young party activists than among nonactivists (table 2). It 
also follows that this feeling is more and more common at 
higher levels of power within the party: leadership roles 
imply deeper subjective involvement.
Table 3: Change in  the  sense o f  group be long ing  among young 
a c t i v i s t s  by p a r ty
MORE THAN 
BEFORE
SAME AS 
BEFORE
LESS THAN 
BEFORE Totals
DC
Row %
18
34.0%
20
37.7%
15
28.3%
53
PDS
Row %
32
91.4%
3
8.6%
0
0.0%
35
PSI-AD 
Row %
3
30.0%
5
50.0%
2
20.0%
10
LEAGUE 
Row %
11
68.7%
4
25.0%
1
6.2%
16
All Grps
64 32 18 [ 114
There is also a marked difference across the parties 
(table 3). Even before their relatively sudden disappearance 
from the Italian political scene, the DC and the PSI had 
already loosened their unifying appeal among the normally
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most idealistic cadres - the young activists. The end of 
these parties could thus be in part foreseen on the basis of 
the attitude that their younger recruits had towards them - 
as if they were "normal" social institutions such as firms
or schools. On the other hand, a strong feeling of group
affiliation was expressed by two thirds of the young
militants in the PDS and the League. The persisting strength 
of these two parties as identity catalysts among their
activists may even account, to some extent, for the greater 
longevity of the PDS and of the League in the turmoils of 
the Italian system8.
These large differences across the parties suggest the 
need for some caution in generalizing about a possible «need 
for group affiliation» as a precondition of youth activism. 
Subjective identification with a political group is not only 
a function of an individual need, but also of the group’s 
"groupness". Joining (and staying within) the DC and PSI in 
the early 1990s could hardly be determined by a drive to 
become part of a united pool of people, simply because these 
parties no longer had a sense of group unity.
2,2, Cultural Adjustment
According to some psychological models, during 
adolescence prospective activists would have to face unusual
8 Similar party differences emerged in response to the question of 
whether activists «feel [more, the same as, less than before] in tune 
with the people around» them. The item was included to gauge the 
psychological gratification linked to social adjustment. Activists and 
nonactivists have the same scores on this item; yet, the score is higher 
than average for the activists in the PDS.
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ideological worries, the solution of which would result in 
the decision to enter politics. For instance, a number of 
Keniston's (1968) young radicals describe adolescence as a 
period of unceasing intellectual unrest and struggle against 
a perceived state of confusion:
«1 became sort of disillusioned with most of the 
work I was doing... And I started to read. The academic 
work, I didn't consider it critical. I started reading 
a great deal, and got involved in reading philosophy 
and psychology and literature [.. ] I would literally 
start at one end of the library and just work back and 
forth and read everything that there was» (ibid., 82- 
3 ).
«For three years, like, maybe it did mess me up an 
awful lot. But it was a matter of how I dealt with it. 
And then I came out of it, you know, in the last years 
of high school and then went on to college» (ibid., 
87).
Table 4: Change in the sense of ideological coherence:
«Compared to before taking up you r party office [for 
activists] / job or university [for nonactivists], do you 
feel coherent with a system of ideas?»
MORE THAN 
BEFORE
SAME AS 
BEFORE
LESS THAN 
BEFORE Totals
NONACTIVISTS 
Row %
172
54.2%
116
36.4%
30
9.4%
318
ACTIVISTS 
Row %
53
46.1%
56
48.7%
6
5.2%
115
All Grps
225 172 36 433
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Table 5: Change in the sense of ideological clarity:
«Compared to before taking up your party office [for 
activists] / job or university [for nonactivists}, do you 
feel that your positions when faced with problems are 
clear?»
MORE THAN 
BEFORE
SAME AS 
BEFORE
LESS THAN 
BEFORE Totals
NONACTIVISTS 
Row %
142
44.6%
137
43.1%
39
12.2%
318
ACTIVISTS 
Row %
44
38.6%
55
48.2%
15
13.2%
114
All Grps
186 192 54 432
Italian young party activists and nonactivists were 
asked whether they felt they changed with respect to 
adolescence in terms of «coherence with a system of ideas» 
(table 4) and «clarity when faced with problems» (table 5)9. 
Activists have developed a lesser sense of «coherence» and 
«clearness» than nonactivists after adolescence10. In their 
own opinion, having entered politics does not correspond to 
having interiorized a more structured ideology. The other 
indicator of subjective consistency - «clarity when faced 
with problems» - does not vary at all between activists and
9 A following section (S 3.4) will analyze 'attitudinal consistency* as 
an objective and persisting trait, whereas this one deals with a 
subjective and developmental construct - i.e., whether respondents feel 
more consistent than they used to be.
10 Admittedly, there is some room for various interpretations of the 
question as regards the "before" respondents referred to. However, no 
psychological theory of activism states exactly how long it takes 
between the adolescent crisis of ideals and the actual entry into 
politics. Activists may have experienced such a crisis in a stronger 
form than nonactivists, but solved it some time before what they 
considered «before» in answering the question.
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nonactivists. In both groups, older individuals tend to 
think of themselves as having a more definite approach to 
reality.
2.3. Sense of Personal Control
The relationship between self-esteem in adolescence and 
subsequent political activism is crucial in many supply-side 
accounts of political ambition, according to which the 
adolescent who feels particularly powerless is more 
attracted by political work11. Another quotation from 
Keniston's (1968) in-depth interviews of young radical 
leaders summarizes the syndrome which is typically 
associated by psychologists with the adolescence of future 
activists ;
«I just hated those years... I felt very awkward. 
It was just awful because you were in that transitional 
stage, you were very nervous about your relationship 
with the boys, you felt very awkward and very unsure of 
yourself. I felt all of that...» (ibid., 79).
In this study, one question examines the respondents'
11 Often the personal traits dealt with in this section go under the 
rubric of 'personal competence': «Feelings of personal competence
represent an individual's evaluation of self-worth (in many or in 
selected areas) and his confidence in his ability to attain the goals he 
deems worthwhile» (Sigel-Hoskin 1981, 178). The concept is analytically 
composed of two dimensions: «self-esteem» and «sense of personal
control». It is to this second attitude that we turn more precisely in 
this section. In choosing the indicators for the empirical study, 
personal control was held to be more encompassing than self-esteem (cf. 
Gurin et al. 1978). In fact, «this concept includes some elements found 
in the notion of self-esteem - most notably, some overlap where both 
touch upon the ability to achieve one's goals. But personal control 
allows for a combined assessment of the self and of the worldly forces 
which exist to facilitate or impede personal aspirations» (ibid., 180; 
cf. also Rosenberg 1965, 5). The terms 'self-esteem', 'self-confidence', 
and 1 self-image' will be used here only as synonyms for ' sense of 
personal control'.
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«mastery of the future» compared to that of their 
adolescence12. Respondents were asked to assess whether 
their own future is «more, equally, or less uncertain than 
before» having joined the party (for activists) or work- 
post-secondary school (for nonactivists).
Table 6: Change in the sense of personal control: «Compared 
to before taking up your party office [for activists] / job 
or university [for nonactivists], do you feel that your 
future is uncertain?»
MORE THAN 
BEFORE
SAME AS 
BEFORE
LESS THAN 
BEFORE Totals
NONACTIVISTS 
Row %
97
30.5%
142
44.6%
79
24.9%
318
ACTIVISTS 
Row %
20
17.4%
80
69.6%
15
13.0%
115
All Grps
117 222 94 433
Political involvement was matched by neither a boost 
nor a decrease in the activists' sense of personal control. 
Stronger changes were experienced in the control group when 
taking up a job or enrolling in a post-secondary school 
(table 6). And although more powerful young activists tend 
to express an increase in personal control after their 
political activation in greater number than lower-level 
militants, there are about as many of them as there are
12 Obviously, studies exclusively focused on self-confidence can use 
richer batteries of indicators (e.g.. Rotter 1966; Ziller 1977). The 
huge spectrum of factors examined in the present inquiry forced us to be 
parsimonious with the items.
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self-confident nonactivists. Thus, there is little evidence 
to support Lasswell' s hypothesis, not even if limited to 
"true" (i.e., most prominent) leaders13.
What characterizes the perception of self 
transformation in the transition from adolescence to early 
adulthood among young political activists is some sense of 
relative stability. Compared to nonactivists, they are to an 
extent less likely to feel that a change has taken place 
within themselves. An index of Perceived Inner Change from
adolescence was built on the basis of all the items
described in this section (§ 2.1, 2.2, 2.3). The mean
standardized scores are .07 for nonactivists and -.24 for
activists. In terms of their perceived sociability, 
ideological consistency, and personal control, activists are 
more likely to state that they moved unaltered from 
adolescence to early adulthood.
Table 7; Standardized means of the index of Perceived Inner 
Change with respect to adolescence by family politicization 
(i.e*, presence of a politically active family member)
+ -----------------------+--------------------+
RELATIVE 
GROUP ACTIVIST
INDEX 
OF CHANGE
N
NONACTIVISTS NO .08 269
NONACTIVISTS YES .03 46
ACTIVISTS NO .07 17
ACTIVISTS YES -.25 93
+----------------------- +--------------------+
13 However, it may be that the time at which the survey was carried out 
(during the crumbling of the Italian political system under the attacks 
of the judges of Tangentopoli) the feeling of personal control of those 
activists who were sons or relatives of senior party officers and 
representatives was being eroded. Only 9.1% of them said to feel more 
confident in the future than «before», as opposed to 23.5% of the young 
activists without relatives in politics.
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Evidence thus shows that there is more continuity in 
the perception of the Self among those young people who take 
a political career than among "ordinary" young people. This 
is especially the case for those young activists who have 
one or more politicized relatives (table 7). The 
politicization of the activist's family plays a part in 
rendering the political initiation smoother from a 
psychological point of view. Such a potentially unstable 
career choice comes to be viewed as natural for the 
"political heir" as it is natural for the other youth to 
find a job or become a university student. This (very 
common) type of young political activist resembles more the 
carpenter's son entering the family workshop than Saint Paul 
on the road to Damascus.
3 . Dealing with the World: Patterns of Value
Orientations
In the myriad of analyses of political culture14, some 
empirical tool-kits have higher diffusion than others. A 
number of these constructs correspond to the orientations 
that, according to some hypotheses (cf. chapter II, § 3.1),
14 The "underlying", "latent", "profound" schemes that are held to rule 
our cognition and judgment have been dissected by scholars from 
virtually every research tradition without reaching a single firmly 
established understanding. The boundaries of the 'political culture' 
theme are shifting: «The concept of political culture has many members 
in its family, few of which share much more than a common name» (Gibbins 
1989, 3). This conceptual anarchy is paralleled by «the fundamental 
failure to settle on an operational definition of the internal structure 
of political culture, that is, of the variables of which it is composed» 
(Lane 1992, 363).
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go along with political ambition: authoritarianism, 
dogmatism, complexity, attitudinal consistency (or 
ideologization).
3. 1.  A u th o r i ta r ia n ism
A shortened version of the original F-scale, coherent 
with its successive reformulations (e.g.. Brown 1965, 476 
f f. ; Dekker-Ester 1987 ; Lagrange 1989; Scheepers et a l .
1990), has been used for the analysis of authoritarianism15.
Contrary to the hypothesis, activists have l e s s  
authoritarian attitudes than "ordinary" young people: the 
standardized means of the Authoritarianism index are -.29 
for activists and .10 for nonactivists. This is even more 
the case for the most powerful activists in our sample 
(national councillors, executives, and leaders in the youth 
parties): their mean score on the index (-.50) is less than 
half that of local sub-leaders (-.21). Party youth 
organizations, thus, appear to promote to higher offices 
those members who keep a more open mind16. In any case,
15 The Authoritarianism index to which reference is made is composed of 
three items on a 5-points Likert scale: «People can be divided in two 
distinct classes: the weak and the strong», «Obedience and respect for 
authority should be learnt soon in life», «Too much familiarity leads 
ultimately to lack of respect». The factor score coefficients used for 
creating the index were respectively: .43, .53, .53. The scale's 
reliability (Cronbach alpha) is .74.
16 A malicious alternative explanation could be that higher officers are 
more artful about socio-psychological scales, and therefore are more 
successful in masking their opinions conveniently (given the negative 
stygma associated with the Authoritarianism index). An argument against 
such an interpretation, however, is the lack of influence of education 
(which should imply more familiarity with social research instruments) 
on authoritarianism.
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evidence is not as expected: authoritarianism declines the
more youth is involved in political activities.
Figure 1: Standardized means of the Authoritarianism index 
by party preference (for nonactivists) and party membership 
(for activists)
■  Nonactivists DActivists
There are strong party differences, however. Young 
politicians of the PDS and the Northern League are at the 
opposite poles of the scale, while those of the PSI-AD and 
DC lie somewhere in the middle, closer respectively to the 
PDS and the League (figure 1). The authoritarianism of the 
young party activists (even more than that of voters) seems 
to accurately describe each party position in the Left-Right 
continuum of the Italian party system at the time of the 
study (Ricolfi 1994b, 38)17. Controlling for party 37
37 Generally speaking, this interpretation is consistent with the old 
criticisms of the F-scale as a construct for capturing an idelogical- 
free cognitive configuration (Christie 1954; Eysenck 1954). In fact, 
other research also shows that the scale fundamentally records a basic 
attachment or rejection of right-wing principles (cf. Eckhardt 1991).
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affiliation, other factors often found to affect 
authoritarianism, such as education or class location 
(Lipset 1960, ch. 4; Kohn-Schooler 1983, 19; Dekker-Ester
1987), prove to be irrelevant in our research context.
3.2. Dogmatism
A shortened version of the traditional D-10 Scale was 
adopted for the analysis of dogmatism1®. Differences between 
activists and nonactivists on this index turn out to be 
almost non existent (-.08 and .03 respectively). Few young 
party militants show high scores, either positive or 
negative. Women activists are markedly less dogmatic (-.40) 
than men (-.01), as well as their apolitical counterparts of 
the same gender (-.11 vs. .21). Interestingly, this 
corresponds to a rather commonly held view of women in 
Italian politics - more autonomous and «uncomfortable with a 
political culture which demands conformity within pre-set 
hierarchies» (Guadagnini 1993, 196; cf. also Di Nicola 1983,
122-9; Bettin-Magnier 1989, 81 )19. The younger group of
1® The Dogmatism index was constructed from responses to three 5-points 
Likert scales: «The best way to live is to choose friends and peers with 
the same tastes», «One should not attack people sharing his (or her) 
same ideals», «Before taking a decision, it is always wise to ask 
trustworthy persons». They were the three most significant items in 
DiRenzo's (1967a) comparison of Italian MPs and "ordinary" people 
(exception made for another items «There have been few true thinkers in 
history», the meaning of which appeared dubious and which also scored 
poorly in absolute terms in DiRenzo's work). Responses were standardized 
and factor-analyzed. Factor score coefficients (respectively .60, .73,
and .60) were used as weights for summing up the standardized values 
into the index (Cronbach alpha's reliability = .71). The scores
presented in this section correspond to the standardized means on the 
index.
19 The ideal message of a woman with a long political career to her 
younger colleagues is revealing: «To the newly elected women I would 
like to say: "you feel dislocated, and it is right like that; this is
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activists (under 25 years old) also shows less dogmatism (- 
.22) than their older peers (.01), possibly sharing with 
their female colleagues a stronger sense of autonomy from 
organizational rules. Viewed in this light, activists in the 
Northern League seem to be extraordinarily loyal to their 
party structure and ideals: their high level of dogmatism 
(.49) is unsurpassed by any other subgroup in the sample. As 
with authoritarianism, the young party officer in the League 
stands out from his colleagues of the other parties. Despite 
the relatively recent character of the League, the young 
activist of that party in the early 1990s resembles the 
traditional mass party cadre, tightly incorporated into the 
organizational structure and a true believer in the party's 
mission.
3 .3 . Complexity
Researchers have content-analyzed political leaders1 
talks in terms of the «integrative complexity» of their 
views (Driver-Steufert 1969; Tetlock 1983a; Tetlock 1983b; 
Tetlock 1985; Tetlock-Boettger 1989). In these works 
«integrative complexity» is referred to as a sensitivity to 
nuances and counterarguments to one's beliefs, and as an 
aptitude for multicausal analyses of facts and events. In 
filling out a questionnaire, a complex cognitive attitude 
leads the respondent to be dissatisfied with closed response
not an environment like all the others and those who pretend that they 
see nothing strange are prepared to play a mediocre role. It is better 
to preserve this sense of incredulity for how you see how things work 
(or not work)"» (Piva 1994, 79).
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items, and, on the contrary, to add categories, rephrase 
existing ones, give "it depends" answers, and openly 
acknowledge the multivariate nature of causation in human 
and social affairs. Complexity has thus been treated here as 
a latent personality feature emerging from four indicators:
a) being moderate in one's opinions (i.e., the mean number 
of non-polar responses to the whole battery of Likert 
items); b) m u l t ic a u s a l i t y in answering an open-ended 
question on the «most serious problem of the country and its 
causes» (dichotomized: unicausal/multicausal)20; c) 
uncertainty generated by closed-ended response items as 
revealed by the respondent‘s suggesting a non-coded 
alternative answer (dichotomized: coded/non coded); d) 
com plex ity as synthetically evaluated (on a three-points 
scale) by the interviewer21 on the basis of Tetlock's 
definition of the concept (cf. chapter II, § 3.1). Our
20 As regards the substance of these answers, a post hoc coding shows 
the same ordering of categories of problems among activists and 
nonactivists. The «low quality of the ruling class» (including political 
corruption, leaders' incapacity, and elites' inadequacy) is signalled by 
52.8% of the "ordinary" youth and 41.3% of the activists; «cultural 
crisis» (including secularization, moral weakening, and other socially 
diffuse value blemishes) by 28.4% and 33.7% respectively; «economic 
problems» (such as unemployment, inflation, currency devaluation) by 
21.2% and 29.7% respectively; «State organization defects» (bad 
institutional arrangements, malfunctioning of bureaucracy, excess of 
legislation, and fiscal inequality) by 20.8% of the control group and 
only 5.0% of the politically active group. All in all, activists appear 
more fatalist and indulgent in relation to the difficulties at the State 
level.
21 Methodologically, in Tetlock's studies coding was undertaken by 
trained students who were «unaware of the hypotheses to be tested and 
the sources of the textual material analyzed», and who have assessed the 
conceptual structure of the texts independently, reaching a good inter­
rater convergence (about r*.85) (Tetlock-Boettger 1989, 211). For 
practical reasons, no multiple arbitrators could be used in the present 
study. However in this case the external subjective judgment of 
complexity was not the only indicator for the concept.
130
Complexity index corresponds to the factor scores of the 
principal component (explaining 36.6% of the variance) that 
results from a factor analysis of these four variables.
Evidence goes against the hypothesis that political 
activists are more complex than nonactivists: on average,
"ordinary" young people have a higher level of cognitive 
complexity (.13) than political activists (—. 25)22.
Moreover, the high variability and lack of correspondence 
between complexity and party preference or membership 
confirms the merely cognitive nature of this index. In none 
of the cases are differences among activists and 
nonactivists significant.
Figure 2; Complexity and education (last school attended) 
among activists and nonactivists
■  Activists □  Nonactivists
1
-1 '
Lower secondary Upper secondary Post secondary
In both samples, however, education enhances complexity 
considerably (figure 2). In fact, social class effects are 
not significant once education is controlled. A similarly
22 These scores correspond to the standardized means of the index.
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positive influence is exerted by parental education on 
offsprings' complexity, although to a lesser extent for 
activists.
Associational affiliation (beyond party membership) 
also seems to promote more nuanced viewpoints (+.41 on the 
standardized mean). Inasmuch as it reveals a stronger 
sensitivity to others’ opinions, thus, complexity could be 
the missing intermediate link - at the cognitive level - 
between social participation and civic virtue (Almond-Verba 
1963, 266-73)23 .
Figure 3: Family politicization and complexity (standardized 
means)
Family politicization (i.e., having one or more 
politically active relatives) also has an effect on 
complexity (figure 3). However, while nonactive sons of
23 Further proof of this is given by the inverse correlation between 
complexity and personal network density (-.20). Those people who live in 
more varied social contexts develop more multi-faceted attitudes. The 
socio-psychological reason for this is likely to be that «multiple 
redundant paths of communication in a dense clique increase the accuracy 
with which attitudes of others are perceived and hence increase the 
agreement of one person's attitude with another's» (Erickson 1982, 164).
1
□  N onactivists 
BActivists
-1
No politicized 
kin
Politicized kin
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activists are very conscious of the controversial nature of 
the real world, the young who decide to follow their elders' 
lead into politics have more definite views: their
complexity is much lower (-.84 in standardized terms) than 
that of the nonactive sons of activists. It is as if second- 
generation activists had set aside the awareness of the 
intricacies of politics communicated to them by their 
politically active kins. Perhaps the very first years of 
militancy obliges them to come to grips with doubts and 
indecisions, in spite of the complexity acquired as a 
consequence of the political participation of some family 
member. If this is the case, then complexity may well be an 
initial spur to political activism, but a spur that 
disappears afterwards. Unfortunately, there is no way to 
test here the stability of activists' orientations, nor the 
validity of this emerging hypothesis.
3, 4 .  A t t i t u d i n a l  C onsis tency
Whether or not it is less true than in the past, 
political parties still constitute depositories of
ideologies more than any other social group. As a 
consequence, parties should attract more ideologically- 
minded people - that is to say, people whose value 
orientations are organized in a highly consistent fashion. 
Young party politicians can therefore be expected to have a 
higher «attitudinal consistency» than their nonactive 
counterparts.
In political research, «attitudinal consistency
measures assume that persons who use ideological dimensions
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of judgment ought to display attitudes that fit into 
ideologically coherent patterns» (Wyckoff 1987, 196). 
Various solutions have been suggested to identify these 
patterns and measure consistency accordingly; the method 
described by Barton and Parsons (1977) is used here24. From 
the clustering of five attitude items ("ethnocentrism", 
"approval of radical societal transformations", "importance 
of loyalty to hierarchy", "importance of authority in 
childhood education", and "opposition to abortion laws"25), 
three typical response patterns have been identified. These 
are regarded as basic ideological profiles26. They appear to
"Classical" studies {e.g., converse 1964) used the average 
correlation coefficient between pairs of items in elite and mass samples 
as indicators of attitudinal consistency. However, it has been 
demonstrated that this approach leads to unreliable results (Barton- 
Parsons 1977). Correlations can be very low even when members of a 
sample have highly structured attitudes (i.e., close to a common average 
score) but there are only minor variations around the group mean. Barton 
and Parsons have proposed taking the individual as the unit to be 
characterized as consistent or inconsistent with respect to the 
standards of basically consensual yardstick groups. These groups can be 
defined through cluster analysis. Each unit's distance from the mean of 
its most proximate standard group (or cluster) is interpreted as a proxy 
for its attitudinal consistency. The closer the unit is to the core of 
the cluster, the more consistent it is with an ideological profile. 
"Absolute" or “relative" scores (i.e., standard deviations above or 
below the population mean on the item score) on the attitude scales can 
be used to measure consistency with the standard response pattern. A 
relative measure was preferred here.
25 The items were phrased as follows: «It would be better if immigrants 
could live in areas especially for them, given their cultural 
differences»; «In a world such as ours, only the deepest transformations 
could really improve the situation»; «It is better to lose the esteem of 
work peers than that of superiors»; «Obedience and respect for authority 
should be learnt soon in life»; «Abortion is never acceptable». The 
latter item was not proposed in a Likert fashion, but as an option among 
four possible attitudes on abortion.
26 A k-means algorithm was used to explore a wide range of possible 
partitions (from 10 to 2 clusters solutions). Obviously, when the number 
of clusters increases, the amount of explained variance increases too 
(i.e., the internal homogeneity of the clusters and the degree of 
differentiation among them). The three clusters' solution seemed
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correspond to left-wing, catholic-center, and right-wing 
value orientations (fig. 4)27. Closeness to the core of 
these clusters can be interpreted as an indicator of 
attitudinal consistency of respondents.
Figure 4: Basic  id e o lo g ic a l  p r o f i l e s : p l o t  o f  s tandard ized  
means f o r  each c l u s t e r  ( a c t i v i s t s  and n o n a c t i v i s t s  toge ther)
Activists seem to be more consistent than nonactivists, 
but the difference is small. In standardized terms, the 
activists' mean distance from the core of the cluster is 
lower than average (-.17), while the nonactivists1 mean
particularly satisfactory. If one increases the number of groups 
further, only marginal increases of explained variance are obtained.
27 Voters and activists of the PDS (67.0%) and the PSI (46.1%) can be 
found mainly in the first cluster; those of the DC (51.9%) and the 
League (62.5%) in the second; voters of the MSI (66.7%) in the third. 
Only one activist (from the League) belongs to the third (right-wing) 
cluster.
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score is only slightly above the average (.06). Among both 
activists and nonactivists, members of the left-wing cluster 
(-.26) tend to stick together around a common set of 
attitudes more than those of the center (.01) and the right 
(.4 5)28. Regardless of one's political involvement, thus, 
within our sample of young people the subculture of the left 
proves to be more solid than that of the center, while that 
of the right seems much less structured.
Attitudinal consistency decreases slightly with 
education (rs=-.17). Education leads to more personalized 
belief systems fostering a higher degree of political 
sophistication. Consequently, the policy position of the 
politically sophisticated «will appear inconsistent when 
measured by standards based on what goes together in the 
population as a whole or even in the elite as a whole» 
(Barton-Parsons 1977, 178).
Yet the strongest determinant of the variance of 
attitudinal consistency among activists is - once again - 
their family politicization. Young militants lack ing family 
ties with senior politicians are much closer to a standard 
pattern of political values (-.56). They may afford little 
cultural eclecticism, as if allegiance to the basic ideology 
could compensate for their entry as strangers within the 
party social circles. In other words, attitudinal 
consistency is a significant predictor of political 
involvement for those young party activists who joined the
2® Note that the scores refer to the distance from the core of the 
ideological cluster. Hence, higher positive values stand for less 
consistent belief systems.
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party independently of family influence. They appear to be 
the "true believers" who conform to a core of socially 
identifiable values typical of the subculture that each 
party claims to represent. On the whole they are only a 
minority of activists, however, as will be seen in the next 
chapter.
4. Conclusion: P e r so n a l i ty  T r a i t s  and Youth P o l i t i c a l  
A c tiv ism
Past research on the modal political personality seems 
to lead to highly controversial results (cf. chapter II, §
3.1). The main empirical findings illustrated in the 
previous sections show that psycho-cultural factors do not 
help to distinguish between activists and the control group. 
Multivariate analysis attests that the only significant 
variable at a pc.Ol level is an increase in the "sense of 
group belonging" with the entry into early adulthood (table 
8). The theoretical meaning of this variable is far from 
clear, however. It is difficult to say whether it is the 
expression of a preexisting "need" for group affiliation, or 
rather an unavoidable, but not necessarily desired, 
consequence of participating in the life of any structured 
organization.
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Table 8: L o g i s t i c  regress ion  o f  youth p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv ism
(no=0; y e s = l) on s e l f -p e r c e p t io n s  and value o r ie n ta t io n s
Independent variables (b) SE (b)
Change In Sense of Sociability = more than in adolescence .174 .143
Change in Sense of Group Belonging = more than in adolescence .848* .150
Change in Sense of Group Attunement = more than in adolescence .299 .155
Change in Sense of Coherence = more than in adolescence .182 .148
Change in Sense of Ideological Clearness = more than in adolescence .212 .224
Change in Sense of Personal Control = more than in adolescence .262 .188
Authoritarianism index .281 .148
Dogmatism index .043 .153
Complexity index -.384 .154
Attitudinal consistency index .311 .148
Constant -1.001* .223
N = 391; 
* P < .01
The psycho-cultural dimensions analyzed in this chapter 
are not unimportant in  th e m se lv es. They shed light on 
interesting differences of Italian parties' cultures among 
these parties' novices. They also indicate that family 
continuity in political activism influences the new recruits 
in many ways: it makes their choice to become active less 
traumatic, their cognitive attitudes somewhat more complex, 
and their belief system less ideologically constrained. Yet, 
the conclusion remains that the I t a l i a n  young p a r ty  
a c t i v i s t s  o f  th e  e a r ly  1990s are hard ly  d i s t in g u is h a b le  from  
th e  p o l i t i c a l l y  a p a th e t ic  in d iv id u a ls  o f  th e  same age on 
p s y c h o -c u l tu r a l  grounds29.
29 The data of this study allow for some more analysis of activists1 
culture, but these are neither significant for the theoretical problem 
in question nor do they point out relevant differences between activists 
and the control group. In particular, as shown in table 9, young
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It might still be claimed that there were differences 
between activists' and nonactivists' orientations before 
activists entered politics, but they have disapperead 
a f te rw a rd s. This claim seems unlikely, however, as it 
implies that by taking different career routes activists and 
nonactivists have become similar. No existing theory holds 
that a differentiation of status leads to psychological and 
cultural homogeneity among social actors.
Overall, evidence has shown that political activists 
and nonactivists tend to have similar psycho-cultural 
traits. There is thus a strong case against the mainstream 
explanations for political ambition which are based on 
personality.
politicians appear to be more cosmopolitan than a national sample of 
2,500 young people (Cavalli 1994, 6). However, this difference decreases 
markedly when one controls for individual and parental education.
Table 9: Sense of belonging to territorial unities (row %)
|Sample i TOWN 1 REGION 1 ITALY 1 EUROPE |THE: WORLD
IN 1ST |Activists i 24.7 1 10.7 1 24.7 1 16.1 l 23.6
PLACE |It. Youth l 35.0 I 12.4 1 35.2 1 4.1 1 13.3
IN 2ND |Activists 1 15.9 I 7.9 1 16.1 1 18.4 1 21.6
PLACE jit. youth i 19.7 1 21.5 1 30.6 1 16.8 I 11.4
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CHAPTER VI
THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF YOUNG POLITICAL ACTIVISTS
1. In tro d u c t io n
Despite the huge attention paid to the processes of 
intergenerational mobility by modern sociology, in the 
«innumerable studies of the social origins of elites [which] 
have been written since the beginning of the twentieth 
century», usually «only the occupations and education of 
politicians have been investigated; [.. ] the question of 
family background has almost invariably been ignored» 
(Kaelble 1981, 81 and 112). Yet, such a question is 
fundamental in relation to a key aim of this study and of 
all research on political recruitment: to «provide
information about the distribution of opportunities within a 
society and about the likely extent of "sponsored" rather 
than competitive upward mobility» (Parry 1969, 105).
It is well-known that these opportunities are very much 
restricted for the access to higher political offices. A 
comparative analysis of legislatures, for instance, shows 
that «the "iron law of social bias" remains a global 
phenomenon» (Norris 1995, 1). But does this law apply at
lower levels of political involvement? Is it effective even 
in the early manifestations of political ambition - in our 
case, among the activists of the Italian party youth 
organizations? Seeking to answer this question, individual- 
and family-level data which to some extent go beyond the
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usual background information will be examined in the 
analysis that follows.
2. A scribed  Advantages: Gender, Class O rig ins , and 
Family P o l i t i c i z a t i o n
Of the several social categories which are under­
represented among political elites, women are in the 
foreground. A gender gap exists worldwide, to a varying 
degree, in political groups and institutions (e.g., Blondel 
1973, 78-9; Putnam 1976, 32-3; Verba 1987, 285; Carroll 
1993; Norris 1995, 26). An explanation which currently seems 
to prevail attributes this gap to the differences of female 
and male ambition: women are apparently more issue-oriented 
(Costantini 1990). Generally speaking, gender-specific 
socialization patterns are held to generate lower 
aspirations to competitive and risk-bearing jobs among women 
(Gilligan 1982).
Cultural differences linked to gender appear strong in 
Italian politics, where politically active women are 
described as «strangers» who receive «tokens» (Balbo 1994J1. 
Younger generations seem to make no exception. Men are a 
large majority (80.9%) of youth party leaders and militants. 
Differences across parties are small. In all of them,
1 In the Italian case, the possible causes of the (self)-exclusion of 
women from politics are examined in zincone (1985, 155), Maria Weber 
(1986, 90 ff*), and Guadagnini (1993), who underscores the 
incompatibility of party cultures and women's culture. The many attempts 
by several parties and by the State (such as a compulsory fifty-fifty 
quota of candidates in the 1994 election) to induce a gender balance in 
political representation are reviewed in Bettin-Magnier (1989, 90-2).
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moreover, in the higher offices of the organization fewer 
women are incumbents. This would appear to be in line with 
the theories of gender-specific ambitions resulting from 
different socialization patterns.
Perhaps, however, not all is due to socialization. Data 
show that gender handicaps can be overcome, provided young 
women possess comparatively greater political and social 
resources - transmitted by their families - than their male 
colleagues. On the one hand, young women activists tend to 
"inherit" their status more than men: 22.7% of them have a 
relative who is (or was) a parliamentarian, mayor, member of 
a regional council, or party leader (the corresponding 
figure for male activists is 9%). On the other hand, young 
female activists more often than their male counterparts are 
daughters of upper class parents (59.1% vs. 50.5%) and of 
graduate mothers (36.4% vs. 18.3%). Their mothers, in 
addition, succeeded more often in their job careers: 27.3% 
of them are managers, entrepreneurs, or professionals, as 
against 6.4% of the mothers of the young male politicians. 
In sum, normal socialization patterns which are at the basis 
of women’s political passivity may be counterbalanced by the 
spur of family politicization, privilege, and mothers' 
emancipation. Young women seem to be able to have a say in 
politics if they have an adequate family background.
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Figure 1: Education o f  the  fa th e r s  o f  young p o l i t i c a l
a c t i v i s t s  and young popula tion  o f  the  same agea
100%
0%
Activists' Nonactivists'
fathers fathers
H  University degree 
0  Upper-secondary degree 
D  Secondary or lower degree
Based on Istat {1995a, 103-4). Data refer to the education of
Italian men aged 45-54 in 1991
Figure 2: Education o f  th e  mothers o f  young p o l i t i c a l
a c t i v i s t s  and young popu la tion  o f  th e  same agea
A ctivists' N onactiv is t
m others s' m others
H  U n iversity  d egree  
E l U p p er-secon dary d eg ree  
□  S eco n d ary  o r lower d e c re e
a Based on Istat (1995a, 105-6). Data refer to the education of
Italian women aged 45-54 in 1991
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Figure 3: Occupation o f  th e  fa th e r s  o f  young p o l i t i c a l
a c t i v i s t s  and male popu la tion  o f  the  same agea
■  A ctiv ists ' fathers  □  M en  aged  4 5 -5 4
E m ployer, Self-em ployed  W h ite  collar B lu e  collar N o n -lab o ur  
pro fessiona l fo rce
Employer = more than 10 employees; Self-employed * small employer 
(less than 10 employee), trader, self-employed manual worker; 
White collar = private and public employees (including managers, 
university professors, teachers); Blue collar = industrial and 
rural workers. Population data based on Istat (1995a, 174-6), 
referring to the Italian male population aged 45-54 in 1991
Figure 4: Occupation o f  th e  mothers o f  young p o l i t i c a l
a c t i v i s t s  and female p o p u la tio n  o f  th e  same agea
■  A ctivists' m others  Q W o m e n  ag ed  4 5 -5 4
E m ployer, S e lf-em p loyed  W h ite  collar B lu e  collar N o n -lab o u r  
pro fessiona l force
a Occupations classified as in figure 3. Population data based on 
Istat (1995a, 177-9), referring to the Italian female population 
aged 45-54 in 1991
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Although women activists more than their male 
counterparts are drawn from among the better off, both tend 
to over-represent the upper strata of Italian society. Their 
fathers' and mothers' educational and current occupational 
status are markedly higher than in the youth population as a 
whole (figures 1 to 4). University graduates are three times 
more numerous and high school graduates twice as numerous 
among the parents of young political activists than among 
the parents of their age peers. Similarly, the number of 
businessmen and professionals among activists' parents is 
three times higher than in the population as a whole; the 
number of mothers with white-collar occupations among 
activists is twice as large as among the mothers of Italian 
young people2. Only among the Young Communists and the Young 
Socialists does one find some young party activists from 
relatively lower class family backgrounds (13.3% have 
working class origins ) ; but none of them is a national 
leader.
Data about Italian young party activists, thus, 
confirms and qualifies the rule: the better-off tend to be 
more involved in politics from a young age (Milbrath-Goel 
1977, 90 ff.; Milbrath 1981, 221-5; Percheron-Chiche 1991, 
173). «The importance of socioeconomic status for 
participation in the earliest stages of adulthood», that 
Beck and Jennings (1982, 96) found in the U.S., is evident 
in Italy too. Young party activists' parents belong to the
2 Similar results were found in a larger surveys more socially active 
young people are better-off than apathetics of the same cohort (De Lillo 
1993, 81).
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upper strata of both the hierarchy of educational 
credentials and that of occupational status.
This analysis can be expanded to consider the class 
position of the young as a result of the j o i n t class 
position of their parents3. From the crosstabulation of the 
occupations of the fathers and the mothers of respondents, 
six social classes are derived4.
3 to identify family class position with that of the male head of the 
household is the object of much debate (cf. Heath-Britten 1983; 
Goldthorpe 1983; Crompton-Mann 1988; Baxter 1994; for the Italian case, 
Beccalli 1991; Trifiletti 1991). Critics stress that this traditional 
approach should be abandoned inasmuch as gender inequalities diminish. 
Erikson's (1984) «dominance principle», consisting in assigning the 
family the highest class position held by either of its adult members 
(husband or wife), has become the solution most commonly adopted. 
However, the «dominance principle» seems somewhat inadequate when one is 
concerned with processes of intergenerational transmission and 
socialization (as is the case here), rather than with movements between 
social classes per se (cf. Lampard 1995). It is unlikely, for instance, 
that the sons of doctor-nurse couples are socialized in the same manner 
and with the same range of future occupational opportunities as the sons 
of doctor-lawyer couples. As class heterogamy characterizes 45.1% of the 
Italian couples, and 64.8% if housewives are included (Cobalti- 
Schizzerotto 1994, 146), from the class assignment of Italian families 
on the basis of combined (husband-and-wife) data emerges a picture which 
is substantially different from the existing images of stratification.
4 The six family classes (upper-upper, lower-upper, upper-middle, lower- 
middle, upper-lower, lower-lower) are obtained cross-tabulating the 
occupational positions of husband and wife on the basis of Erikson- 
Goldthorpe classes:
HUSBAND
WIFE | I-II | III | IV | V-VI | VII
I-II
III
IV
V-VI
VII
|UPPER-UPPER 
|LOWER-UPPER 
|LOWER-UPPER 
j LOWER-UPPER 
|LOWER-UPPER
|LOWER-UPPER (LOWER-UPPER (LOWER-UPPER 
|UPPER-MIDDLE(UPPER-MIDDLE|LOWER-MIDDLE 
|UPPER-MIDDLE(LOWER-MIDDLE|UPPER-LOWER 
|LOWER-MIDDLE|UPPER-LOWER |UPPER-LOWER 
|LOWER-MIDDLE|LOWER-MIDDLE|LOWER-LOWER
|LOWER-UPPER 
|LOWER-MIDDLE 
|UPPER-LOWER 
|LOWER-LOWER 
|LOWER-LOWER+-------------- --------------------—+---------- - -+-- +-
Note that it makes no difference in this classification whether the 
economic head of the household is the husband or the wife. Moreover, if 
there is a housewife or an unemployed person in the couple, the class 
position of that spouse is assumed to be immediately inferior to the 
class position of the working spouse (e.g., a housewife married to an
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Figure 5: Family c la ss  o f  young p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i s t s  and
n o n a c t i v i s t s
50
Upper- Lower- Upper- Lower- Upper- Lower-
Upper Upper Middle Middle Lower Lower
□  Nonactivists
□  Local sub-leaders 
■  Local leaders
□  National leaders
Figure 5 provides a synthesis of the class disparity 
between “ordinary" young people and party activists. More 
than half of the young politicians (52.2%) are offsprings of 
the upper classes: at least one of their parents belongs to 
the service class. This over-representation is almost 
entirely balanced by the under-representation of offsprings 
of the lower classes (22.6% of activists), while the number 
of young people from middle class origins is about the same 
in the two groups (25.2% among activists and 32.3% among 
nonactivists). Apart from this common class advantage, the 
figure shows that national leaders and lower level activists 
of the party youth organizations tend to come from very 
similar origins.
artisan [class IV] is considered to belong to class V; together they 
form an upper-lower class family).
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Table 4: H ighest p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t io n  achieved by a r e l a t i v e  
among a c t i v i s t s  and n o n a c t iv i s t s
+-- +—-—-+—-—-+-—
| | NONE | PARTY | LOCAL | LEADERa | OTHERb |
| | | MEMBER |REPRESENT.| j |
+------------+---------+--------- +--------- +---------+--------- +
|NONACTIVISTS | 275 | 26 | 20 J 0 | 0 |
| Row % | 85.7% | 8.1% j 6.2% j 0.0« j 0.0« |
j
(ACTIVISTS [ 17 | 19 | 49 ( 13 ( 13 j| Row % | 15.3% j 17.1% | 34.1% | 11.7% | 11.7% J
+--------------------+---------------+----------------+----------------+--------------- +----------------+
a Mayor of capital city, regional councillor, MP, member of national 
party board
b Trade union or political movement activist
Prospective politicians not only belong to h ig h e r  
strata in society, but which are also c lo s e r to politics: 
The family transmission of political interests seems 
extraordinarily common (table 4). On average, youth party 
activists state that they have more than two politically 
active kins5; and more than 85% of them have some relative 
in politics, at least a party member. While this proportion 
remains the same at all levels of power within each party 
youth organization, local and national leaders are more 
often the direct heirs (in 15% of the cases) of someone who 
is (or was) a political leader of some importance (mayor, 
regional councillor, MP, member of a national party 
executive). This is in line with «biographical accounts of 
famous political leaders and period pieces on student 
radicals [which] are replete with examples of people who
5 This average is slightly higher for national leaders (2.3) than for 
local militants (1.7).
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have followed in their parents' footsteps by becoming 
political activists» (Beck-Jennings 1982, 98; cf. also Hyman 
1959, 65-6; Marvick-Nixon 1961, 210; Prewitt 1970, 66-8; 
Aberbach et a l , 1981, 72-5; Eldersveld 1989, 70). In 
contrast, only 15% of nonactivists' families include a party 
member - the same proportion that was found in a larger 
survey of the Italian population (Sapignoli 1995, 233).
Figure 6: Young p a r ty activists who have a t  l e a s t  one
p o l i t i c a l l y  active r e l a t i v e  by  fa m i ly  c la s s
In our case, the higher politicization of the 
activists' families does not reflect the fact that activists 
are disproportionately drawn from upper class families 
(figure 6). The absence of association between family class 
and family politicization proves that the latter factor is 
neither a reflex nor a substitute of class origins for 
entering politics: it tends to be a constant. Thus, the 
meaning of the family "inheritability" of political activism 
cannot be merely accounted for by a class theory of 
political recruitment.
Table 5: R e la t i v e s  o f  young p a r ty  a c t i v i s t s  who
p o l i t i c a l l y  a c t i v e
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are
N %
FATHER 71 75.5
MOTHER 36 38.3
BROTHER 35 31.9
SISTER 8 8.5
GRAND-FATHER 24 10.3
GRAND-MOTHER 4 1.7
UNCLE 20 8.6
AUNT 12 5.2
COUSIN 15 6.5
OTHER 7 3.0
A strong family transmission of political activism was 
also found in an Italian study of the mid-1960s (Tosi 1980, 
140): about half of a sample of militants of the DC and the 
PCI were sons of party members and officers. Tosi 
underscored the centrality of fathers as role models for 
political activity, and hypothesized that «through the 
father the family is inserted into a wider network of 
ideologically homogeneous relationships which indirectly 
reinforce and increase the authority of the father's 
influence» {ibid*, 143). Some thirty years later, as more 
than three quarters of the fathers of young party activists 
are politically active, the parental influence on the 
offsprings' political involvement seems even more manifest 
(table 5). Since our young activists hold more important 
offices than Tosi's militants, it may also be that the 
father's role counts more the higher the political 
ambitions. As we have seen, this does not mean that youth 
party activists are the children of first-rank political 
leaders; these young people can probably aim at more 
rewarding and occupationally safer family-sponsored careers
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(journalism, jobs in public or semi-public bodies, and the 
like)6. Rather, it is the the lower level politician, unable 
to control other career opportunities, who is likely to 
incite his son's political ambition.
A large number (40%) of activists' fathers, 
furthermore, belong to an occupational category - civil 
servants - which cannot transmit job opportunities 
directly7. What they seem to transmit, instead, is a 
persisting commitment to the public sphere8. Such an 
intergenerational continuity, which was found to be a 
special feature of top Italian civil servants in a previous 
study (Putnam 1975, 96-7), can be explained either in 
psycho-cultural or in structural terms. Is it that fathers 
who are civil servants imbue their children with a vocation 
for public affairs? Or is it that they actively push them to 
reach a party office, for example by "suggesting" their 
names to the politicians they are in touch with as a result 
of their jobs?
8 Evidence of the ability of Italian political elites of the "First*' 
Republic to secure access to high status jobs for their offsprings is 
reviewed in an anedoctal but well documented pamphlet (Locatelli-Martini 
1991). In an equally journalistic manner, some information about the 
recruitment and promotion practices of young party leaders in the 
Italian political class in the early Republican era can be found in 
Cesarini Sforza (1963).
7 The number is even larger if we exclude the fathers of young activists 
in the Northern League, 80% of whom are employers or self-employed. 
Leghisti's fathers are also less educated (graduates are 25% only); 
their mothers are more often housewifes (in half of the cases). On the 
whole, the families of young activists in the League seem to reflect the 
characteristics of that party's voters and leaders (cf. Diamanti 1992, 
229-30; Diamanti 1993, 98 ff.).
8 The usually stronger politicization of individuals obtaining public 
jobs (especially at higher levels, as is the case here) must also be 
reckoned with.
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Figure 7: Birth-order of young political activists and young 
population of the same agea
■  Act ivists D Y o u t h  populat ion
Onl y  chi ld First -born Mid or last  born
a Based on the birth structure in 1989 of the Italian families 
officially formed in 1967-68 (Monnier 1991, 35). Note that 1968 is 
the mean, median, and modal year of birth of the political 
activists in the sample
Finally, another ascriptive attribute is sometimes held 
to have an impact on political activism: birth order (cf. 
chapter II, § 3.3). Indeed, first-borns constitute more than 
50% of our young activists (figure 7). The relationship 
between birth order and family politicization is apparently 
consistent with two of the explanations discussed in chapter 
II - the «priority of heritage» and the «conformism» 
hypotheses. The fact that activists who are first-born 
children are more frequently the offsprings of elected 
parents (39%) than are only children (16.7%) or mid and 
last-born children (25%) could mean that young activists 
have either preceded their brothers in controlling the 
family political resources, or have felt more constrained to 
follow their parent's example, or both.
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3. Early Achievements: Study or Work?
In Italy as elsewhere, on the basis of their social 
origins individuals' educational and job careers tend to 
follow typical tracks (Cobalti-Schizzerotto 1993; Cobalti- 
Schizzerotto 1994). As Italian youth party activists have an 
initial class advantage over people of their age, they 
should be more likely to succeed at school and in the labour 
market. In particular, they may be expected not only to 
reach greater educational achievements, but also to conclude 
their studies and find a job more easily. Both of these 
factors may be held to buffer the tendency to political 
apathy of young people, which many authors attribute to the 
increasing uncertainties that they must face in order to 
find a stable occupation <cf. chapter IV, § 1). As we will 
see, this set of hypotheses is only partially supported by 
our evidence.
Figure 8: Occupational status of activists and nonactivists
Activists Non activists
□  Wi t h  a job
□  W ithout a job
Activists and nonactivists belong to a cohort (18-30 
years of age) whose social status is still fluid: some have 
not completed their education, some have not entered the
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work force. Perhaps the crucial divide between them is 
whether they work regularly or not9. Having a job makes a 
difference in habits and duties, available time and money, 
life plans. It brings adulthood closer. The occupational 
profile of the sample is thus better described by dividing 
it into two broad categories: those who have a steady and 
paid job and those who do not (figure 8)10.
As expected, a greater number of activists have not yet 
entered the work force11. Only among the young politicians 
of the Northern League students are not the majority (50%); 
in general, more than 60% of activists attend university or 
other schools, as against 24% of the 18-30 year olds in the 
population (Istat 1995a, 107; cf. also Istat 1995b, 31-4).
Yet, in contrast to what was expected, some aspiring 
politicians experience considerable difficulties in 
obtaining their post-secondary degree: 35.4% of activists 
over 25 are still university students. This means that they 
have three or more years of delay with respect to the 
prescribed timetable of university studies. This timetable 
is seldom respected, but Italian university students who
9 The second alternative includes both those who study and those who 
look for a job. Respondents who neither study nor work are a much lesser 
number in our sample of nonactivists (3.8%) than in census data and 
large surveys, perhaps because they did not fear stating their current, 
though irregular, work situation. Moreover, many students use to put 
their names on the unemployment register and may be classified as 
unemployed rather than students for official statistics.
Note that the former group is composed almost exclusively (86.3%) of 
individuals who have obtained an upper-secondary or lower degree. This 
proportion is about the same among activists (87.5%) and nonactivists 
(8 6 .2% ) .
11 Earlier data on the participants of the «courses of political 
formation« in the DC between 1982 and 1986 also recorded more than two 
thirds of students and unemployed young people (Berlinguer 1991, 24).
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accumulate so large a delay are estimated to be only 
10.4%12. One cannot of course know whether political 
involvement is the cause of this poor university record, or, 
on the contrary, a mediocre curriculum studiorum renders 
politics more rewarding. Although activists tend to resort 
to the first interpretation to justify themselves13, the 
second may be no less convincing, given that a university 
degree is a legal requisite for access to the higher grade 
posts in the Italian civil service and that it affects 
occupational achievements in the private sector even more 
than in other countries (Cobalti-Schizzerotto 1994, 208-10? 
Pisati 1995, 278-9). Inasmuch as a university degree can 
constitute a cushion in case of political failure, activists 
should be stimulated to graduate, not to delay14.
Whatever the reason for this may be, activists have 
longer but also often slower educational careers than their 
age peers. Meanwhile only a minority of them has a regular
12 Italian students who graduated in time constituted 14.8% of graduates 
in 1992; those who were late (fuori corso) 31.3% of the enrolled 
students; those with a delay of three or more years 33.1% of those with 
a delay (Censis 1995, 191). A more precise comparison with activists' 
educational achievements would require cohort data which are not 
available in Italy so far.
13 For instance, one of the former young leaders interviewed said: «1 
was in the process of a university career, I had already worked with 
professors... Therefore doing a good dissertation was important for me. 
But I was so much absorbed by political activity that I began to 
postpone writing. I didn't want to write a mediocre thesis. In the end, 
I did not graduate at all» (1.4, PDS leader).
14 As another former young leader interviewed recalls: «1 was somehow 
obsessed by the cases of other young party officers of the Youth 
Socialist Movement - they did not graduate. So they had no job, while I 
wanted to graduate and have my own job» (1.6, PSI leader).
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and paid job15. In large part they seem to take advantage of 
a better than average family socio-economic status to 
postpone both the exit from the educational system and the 
entry into the labour market. Probably , young party 
activists lean on their social origins to take time to 
decide whether politics shall be their adult job.
4. Conclusion; Social Origins and Youth Political 
Activism
Ascribed and achieved individual characteristics not 
only help to predict who belongs to a political elite, as 
recruitment studies always find (e.g., Aberbach et al. 1981, 
46-67), but also who aspires to enter that elite. As we have 
seen in this chapter, even in political groups apparently 
open to any young volunteer, in positions lacking any real 
power and that may constitute no more than a very first 
stage of an uncertain political career, some categories of 
individuals are predominant. Activists of the Italian party 
youth organizations do not form a social microcosm of the 
generation to which they belong.
From the bivariate analysis conducted so far, we found 
that the entrance into a political career as a young person 
is affected by at least the following social background 
factors:
15 However, more than 20% of activists are self-employed or employers, 
that is about twice as much as Italians of their age (Istat 1995a, 171).
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* Gender (being male);
* Urban residence (cf. chapter IV, §3);
* Father's education;
* - Mother's education;
* Upper class family position;
* Father's occupation in the civil service;
* Family politicization (having active or elected 
relatives);
* Birth order (being first born);
* Respondent's occupation (not having entered the 
work force).
Table 6: Logistic regression of youth 
(no=0; yes-1) on social origins factors
political activism
Independent variables <b) SE (b)
Gender (male=1) .842* .203
Urban residence " .158 .186
Father's education (university degree=1) -.226 .221
Mother's education (university degree=1) .268 .268
Family class position (upper-upper or lower-upper=1) .139 .227
Father's occupational sector (pub!ic=1) .055 .225
Politically active relative 2.222* .247
Birth order (first bom=1) .344 .175
Occupation (having a job=1) -.075 .187
Constant 4 .173 .323
N = 427;
* P < .01
While many of these variables overlap or are not 
significant, "gender" and "family politicization" have an 
independent and strong impact on youth political activism 
(table 6). In particular, family politicization more than 
any other background factor is at the basis of youth 
activism. To explain why, cultural and structural hypotheses
can be made.
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On the one hand, the families in which there is at 
least one adult activist may either influence their 
offsprings’ career choices directly, or overexpose their 
children to political affairs to such an extent that these 
children develop more positive orientations towards 
political activity than the rest of their generation. Either 
by passing onto the young an allegiance to a set of 
principles or an ideology, or by eliminating the anti­
politics attitudes to which the young are normally exposed, 
politically active relatives may promote a disposition to 
enter politics (cf. chapter II, § 3.3). On the other hand, 
the importance of family politicization can be explained, as 
it is in a growing body of research, in terms of pre­
existing personal contacts with persons who are already 
active in political organizations. Such contacts create an 
opportunity for the prospective young activist to be easily 
integrated into an organizational structure (cf. chapter II, 
§ 3 . 4 ) 16 -
These two types of explanations are not mutually 
exclusive. To bridge the gap between cultural and structural 
hypotheses about the processes by which one generation has
Having to account for parental influence on the participation in 
voluntary associations, Janoski and Wilson (1995) discuss two similar 
theories, which they call the «normativist» and the «structuralist» 
perspectives. These authors contend that the former theory explains 
activism in «community-oriented» and the latter in «self-oriented» 
associations. This distinction of voluntary groups assumes that «some 
forms of social participation have as their chief goal furthering an 
individual's self-interest, while others are intended more to protect 
the interests of a community as a whole» (ibid., 274). As the 
discriminating capacity of this dichotomy is arguable, especially when 
seeking to place party activism in one or the other category, Janoski 
and Wilson's attempt to adjudicate between the two alternative 
hypotheses appears to fail.
....... - '
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an influence on the political activity of the next is indeed 
a goal of several recent studies (Gould 1993; McAdam-Paulsen 
1993; Verba et al. 1995, 458). We shall return to this point 
in the last chapter. Before doing so, we need to consider 
that «it might be useful to think of origin statuses as 
being lodged in all the significant others one has, rather 
than conceiving origin statuses as located in parents alone» 
(Haller 1982, 24). Such an enlargement of the analysis is 
made possible by focusing on some aspects of the social 
networks of activists and nonactivists. This will enable us 
to obtain a more comprehensive view of the roots of young 
people's political ambition.
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CHAPTER VII
THE SOCIAL CAPITAL OF TOUNG POLITICAL ACTIVISTS
1 . Personal Networks and Political Involvement
Political ambition may be stimulated by some 
characteristics of an individual's social relationships. In 
particular, opportunities for political involvement may be 
increased by the existence of prior social ties with 
potential political sponsors and by the control of a large 
social capital (cf. chapter II, S 3.4).
Data on the social relationships of the young party 
activists and nonactivists in both their professional1 and 
non-professional2 activity were therefore examined in this 
study. As far as the professional context is concerned, 438 
relationships of the young activists and 1194 relationships 
of the nonactivists were mentioned; in the non-professional 
context, 411 and 1344 relationships were described by each 
category of respondents. Information was also collected 
about the relationships with their more politically involved 
family members («the relatives with whom you talk about 
politics»)3.
3 For activists, «politics» was considered as the professional context; 
for nonactivists, «work» or «school-university» depending on the 
profession declared by the respondent.
2 For both activists and nonactivists, reference was to «free time», 
«other activities», «personal relationships».
3 A more detailed description of network data and methods is provided in 
appendix A, which also includes an analysis of other aspects of 
activists' personal networks•
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We shall first examine whether these personal networks 
comprise possible political sponsors (§ 2)? then, we will 
turn to the larger networks of acquaintances directly 
accessible to the young activists and their apolitical 
counterparts (§3).
2. Sponsorhip and Support Ties
As parties have to do with power explicitly, social 
relations within them tend to be viewed in a hierarchical 
way: associates are regarded as being «superior»,
«subordinate», or «equal» to the actor. Among activists in 
Italian party youth organizations, 50% of the members of 
their professional network are defined as «superiors» in 
formal or informal political status, the other half being 
split between «subordinates» (22.5%) and persons of «equal 
rank» (27.5%).
In particular, at least one more powerful and older 
politician can be found in 92% of the professional networks 
of the young activists. Almost a quarter of the activists 
stated that this politician was already acquainted with them 
ten years earlier ( that is, when they were about 14 years 
old) ; in 75% of the cases he was known before they entered 
politics. Given the superiority of status, age, and duration 
of the tie with the young recruit, this network member can 
be regarded as the «mentor» who introduced his protégé into 
the party, subsequently counselling and sponsoring him. 
Hereafter we will call 'political mentors' those politicians 
in the network of a young activist who are older, more
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powerful, not related to him, and known by him already 
before entering active politics. The concept of 'mentor' is 
borrowed from Levinson's analysis of the transition from 
late adolescence to early adulthood:
«The mentor is ordinarily several years older, a 
person of great experience and seniority in the world 
the young man is entering. No word currently in use is 
adequate to convey the nature of the relationship we 
have in mind here. Words such as 'counselor' or 'guru' 
suggest the more subtle meanings, but they have other 
connotations that would be misleading. The term 
'mentor' is generally used in a much narrower sense, to 
mean teacher, adviser or sponsor. As we use the term, 
it means all these things, and more» (Levinson 1979, 
97)4.
A similar role can also be performed by a relative 
actively engaged in politics. Almost every young activist 
(precisely, 96.4%) has either a tie with such a relative 
(21.6%) or with a non-kin mentor (11.7%) or with both 
(63.1%). By contrast, the young nonactivists who have a 
politically active kin or declare that they «know a 
politician well» are 48.1%. The opportunity to follow a 
sponsor's footsteps seems to be a paramount condition for 
entering politics at a young age.
4 To my knowledge, the only analysis of a mentor relationship in 
political life is Kellerman's (1978) case-study of Willy Brandt.
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Table 1: The sponsors In the network of young party
activists
No sponsor
Party militant in the family 
Party local officer in the family 
City councillor in the family 
Provincial-regional councillor in the family 
MP-national party officer in the family 
Mentor only
Mentor + Party militant in the family
Mentor + Party local officer in the family
Mentor + City councillor in the family
Mentor + Provincial-regional councillor in the family
Mentor_ +_ MP - n at ional_ _p_arty_ of f icer^ _in_ _the_ f amily____
N %
4 3 . 6
5 4.5
8 7.2
2 1 .8
7 6 .3
2 1 . 8
13 1 1 .7
14 1 2 . 6
21 18.9
18 16.2
14 1 2 . 6
3 2.7
Mentors and family sponsors intertwine in activists' 
networks (table 1). However, mentors can be found in the 
networks of 77% of the activists without politicized 
relatives, but in only 59% of the networks of the activists 
who have active or elected family members. Thus, political 
mentors are often the substitutes for politically active 
fathers, mothers, grandparents, uncles, elder brothers or 
cousins. As their mean age is 10-11 years higher than that 
of the activists, they fit perfectly with Levinson's (1979, 
99) ideal-type.
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Table 2: The sponsors in the network of young activists of 
different parties
+■
1 SPONSORS 1 DC 1 FDS 1 PSI-AD 1 LEGA 1
1 NONE 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 1
1 Column % 1 2.0% 1 5.7% 1 0.0% 1 6.2% 1
1 MENTOR 1 10 1 1 i 1 1 1 1
1 Column % 1 20.0% 1 2.9% 1 10.0% 1 6.2% 1
1 RELATIVE 1 3 1 12 1 2 1 7 1
1
4
Column % 1 6.0% 1 34.3% 1 20.0% 1 43.8% 1
1 MENTOR+RELATIVE 1 36 1 20 1 7 1 7 !
1
_L
Column % 1 72.0% 1 57.1% 1 70.0% 1 43.8% 1
1
+-
All Grps Ï 50 35 1 10 1 16 1
The presence of some sponsors, and of mentors 
especially, is most noticeable in the "establishment 
parties" par excellence of 1993: the DC and the PSI (table 
2 ). Activists in the youth organizations of these parties 
are usually linked to both a politicized relative and a 
mentor. Membership in a personal corrente or in a patron- 
directed group is a possible explanation for such a 
hierarchical structure of personal relationships in the 
political life of young activists in these parties5.
The importance of political sponsors in the activists' 
social world is borne out by other evidence. In describing 
network relationships, respondents were also asked to 
indicate the persons whom they ask for help in case of 
«economic», «affective», «ethical/religious», «work-
5 In particular, the embeddedness of Young Christian Democrats in 
correnti cutting across party generations may explain why people over 40 
years of age constitute 23.2% - more than twice the average - of the 
members of their professional networks.
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related», and «political» (for activists only) problems. 
Prospective politicians find more often support on 
«affective» and «ethical» issues than on other matters 
(respectively 27% and 20.9% of the cases) in their 
professional context, whereas nonactivists tend to fall back 
on colleagues mostly for «economic» problems (22.7% of the 
cases) and seldom for less mundane questions (5.3% for 
«ethical» and 10.2% for «affective» matters). Young 
activists seem to share more intimacy within their
occupation than nonactivists, while they share less outside 
their political work: they are relatively unlikely to find 
support for solving «ethical» (22.6% vs. 34.8% in the 
control group) and «affective» predicaments (33% vs. 50.9% 
in the control group) among non-political friends.
These tendencies change with age and position. Older 
and more powerful militants claim that they rely less on 
party companions for affective and moral help, and 
conversely depend more on political relationships for 
material well-being: 23.1% of those over 25 years old and
22.2% of the national leaders even receive economic support 
from members of their political network. This happens most 
frequently among the Giovani Popolari (24.1% of the cases) 
who are probably involved in a more structured political 
career pattern and thus see this dependence as a more 
"natural" phenomenon6. For this group of activists, politics 
has become a job in which there are bosses and salaries7.
6 Young activists from the former DC are the most involved in their 
political relationships not merely for instrumental reasons: 31.5% of 
them find help in the political sphere for «affective», 29.6% for
«ethical», and 22.2% for «work-related» problems.
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Furthermore, those who provide one type of help are 
also those who are more likely to provide other types of 
help: that is, sources of support overlap. Although this is 
true among "ordinary" young people (33.5% of the network 
members who give some support give it on two or more types 
of problems) , such a concentration is even greater among 
young political activists: 49.4% of their "supporters" are 
looked upon for more than one kind of help* 8.
"Supporters" are likely to form the inner core of the 
network - those who are most trusted and to whom respondents 
feel closest. Concentration of support in few individuals 
can be interpreted as a sort of strict policy in one' s 
management of trust. As any politician, a participant 
observer noted (Bullitt 1977, 46), the young party activist 
must know many but have the confidence of few. The price to 
pay is stronger dependence on a handful of individuals 
within the network. In particular, these seem to be the 
senior leaders. In 71.2% of the cases, «political support» 
is provided by «superiors within the party». With this kind 
of helpers, moreover, agreement on moral (i.e., abortion) 
and political (i.e., voting) values is high (respectively
^ Activists who define themselves as «political professionals» amount to 
7%, and 19.4% of national leaders.
8 This concentration takes place along two clear lines, "material" and 
"spiritual". In particular, among activists "political" and "economic" 
support tend to be provided by the same network members. Kendall’s tau^ 
is an appropriate measure for these 2x2 table associations (cf. 
Dickinson Gibbons 1 9 9 3 ) .  Cross-tabulating affective and moral support in 
the professional context of the network, tau^ is .3 8  for young 
nonactivists and .56 for activists. In the non-professional context, 
taujj is .42 and .46 respectively. Tau^ association between political and 
economic support in the professional context of activists is .30.
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with 83% and 93.5% of them); other kinds of support are also 
provided by seniors in the majority of cases. Older 
individuals form 81% of those who give «political», 86% of 
those who give «economic», 85% of those who give «ethical», 
79% of those who give «work-related», and even 74% of those 
who give «affective» support. Therefore, the activists' 
support network, which defines the circle of the most 
significant others in personal networks, is not composed of 
equals but rather of bosses and mentors. These network 
members are the same as those with whom young activists have 
sponsorship ties. Thus, sponsorship ties are strong points 
of reference in the social world of the prospective 
politician both instrumentally and symbolically, given the 
wide spectrum of material and emotional help they provide.
These quantitative findings capture the essence of the 
narrative of early political life in Italian parties given 
by the former youth party leaders who were interviewed:
«The new cadres of the party used to emerge in two 
ways. Either a young man decided to "play the porter"
(fare il portaborse) to an adult leader, and then, with 
time, he took the place of this leader within the 
party, or he tried to find his role on the scene 
autonomously» (1.6, PSI leader).
«In many cases it goes like this: A boy follows a 
party leader from the beginning and becomes his 
representative within the youth organization. He fully 
supports the political line drawn by the leader. In 
practice, he is tied to him and he links his own 
political future to him. If unfortunately his 
"referent" is defeated in inner party competition and 
is relegated to the side-lines, or, even worse, dies, 
the young man’s career is seriously compromised» (1.3, 
PPI leader).
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3 . The Volume of Social Capital
Size is a key dimension of social networks, the 
measurement of which is however problematic, depending on 
the type of ties considered (cf. Sudman 1985; Sudman 1988; 
Huang-Tausig 1990)9 10. Conceptually network size hinges on the 
boundary specification of the network - on how restrictive
the criteria for inclusion are. In the context of this
study, personal networks have been defined as the
respondents' «significant others» (cf. appendix A, § 1)!0.
Yet, personal networks as defined above do not exhaust the 
acquaintances that form an individual's social capital. An 
estimate of the respondents’ volume of social capital, 
including all those persons to whom they have access for 
political or other matters, was obtained by using the 
respondents' telephone lists11.
9 Pioneer studies estimate that U.S. citizens know personally some 1,500 
people on average (Freeman-Thompson 1989; Killworth et al. 1984; 
Killworth et al. 1990) and have some social exchange with 26 persons in
10 consecutive days (Milardo et al. 1983); meanwhile, intimate friends 
can usually be counted on the fingers of one hand.
Young activists have a slightly larger personal network in their 
professional context (on average 3.9 persons) than people of the same 
age in their work environment (3.7 persons), but a smaller network in 
other settings (3.7 vs. 4.2 persons). Globally personal networks consist 
of about eight persons in both samples. If the same person was named as 
part of either the professional and non-professional context of the 
network, that person was included only in the first context to avoid 
over-representation.
11 Considering that the telephone is the «technology of sociability»
(Fischer 1992, 266), an original indicator of the volume of social
capital was used: the number of people under the D letter in the
respondents' personal telephone list (for its validity, see Freeman- 
Thompson 1989). The number found was then multiplied by a factor 
corresponding to the share of surnames under that letter (l/32th of the 
total) in the national telephone directory of 1992. The D letter was 
chosen when preparing the questionnaire since it is not very common and 
yet not too rare. Counting names in the list was thus not troublesome 
during the interviews, while the risk of grossly underestimating those 
who do not know anybody with a surname beginning by D was minimized.
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Figure 1: Volume of social capital of young political
activists and nonactivists
6 0  0 
5 0  0 
4 0 0
N um b e r  of  
a c q u a i n t a n c e s  3 0 0
2 0  0
1 0 0
0
N o n a c t i v i s t s  A c t i v i s t s
The general hypothesis about associational 
participation that «people become more or less active 
depending on the number of social ties they have» (Janoski- 
Wilson 1995, 272) seems here to be fully confirmed. Indeed,
the volume of the social capital controlled is one of the 
most striking differences between young political activists 
and non-active people of the same ages activists have access 
to three and a half times more people than nonactivists (534 
against 155 persons on average) (figure l)12.
Clearly, what was obtained is only an estimate of the volume of 
individuals’ social capital: nothing can be derived from this number 
about the resourcefulness and strength of the supporting ties (cf. 
chapter II, § 3.4). The indicator used is also imperfect for at least 
three reasons: a) because not everyone uses surnames in personal phone 
lists (some write first names instead), b) because these phone lists can 
include names of occasional acquaintances, and c) because some have more 
than one phone list (respondents could only refer to the one available 
to them when they were interviewed) .
•^2 Although the available evidence does not make it possible to find out 
how many of these people were known to the activists before entering 
politics, we argue that this was the case for the large majority of 
acquaintances. Firstly, because young activists have entered politics 
only two-three years earlier - too short a period to triplicate one's 
social capital. Secondly, because political involvement does not seem to 
yield a larger acquaintanceship: the correlation between years of party 
militancy and the volume of social capital is negative (r=-.26).
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The build-up of social capital seems to be the first 
investment strategy of young would-be politicians. The 
typical concern of the political man «to be widely known and 
liked - in short, to be popular» (Dahl 1961, 248) requires 
such a capital. Moreover, acquaintances are likely to supply 
information which can be turned into opportunities. Indeed, 
greater political ambition hinges on a larger volume of 
social capital: 355 persons among grassroot militants, 541 
among local leaders, and 678 among national leaders. 
Southern activists have more than double the number of 
acquaintances (841) than their Northern and Center 
counterparts. They appear to control patron-like networks - 
possibly inherited from mentors or relatives in politics. On 
the other hand, young leaders in the Lega Nord are the most 
"isolated", both as regards the size of their personal 
network (which globally includes one person less than on 
average: 6.6) and the volume of their social capital (429 
persons). In describing their political experience, some 
reported that there was a stigma attached to them when they 
decided to join the League - usually in the 1980s, when the 
party was actually scorned by public opinion (the press and 
the more educated). Their current relative isolation is thus 
likely to stem from the initial «climate of suspicion and 
contempt», as one of the young activists of the League 
stated.
Other factors also seem to be at the origins of a 
larger social capital - in particular among activists. These 
factors are family socio-economic status and respondents' 
birth order.
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Figure 2: The volume of social capital of young activists 
and nonactivists by family classa
■  Nonactivists □  Activists
Number of 
acquaintances
700
Lower Middle Upper
Family Class
a This is a shortened version of the family class assignment 
introduced in chapter VI (§ 2}; the upper class comprises the
upper- and lower-upper, the middle class the upper- and lower- 
middle, the lower class the upper- and lower-lower classes
That social capital is linked to socio-economic status 
(figure 2) is in line with past research on personal 
networks (cf. van der Poel 1993a, 71-2). Such a link can be 
interpreted as being an element of «Bourdieu’s key original 
insights [.. ] that there are immaterial forms of capital - 
cultural, symbolic, and social - as well as a material or 
economic form and that with varying levels of difficulty it 
is possible to convert one of these forms into another» 
(Calhoun 1993, 69). As Bourdieu (1994, 9; 1986, 242) wrote 
more recently, «grosso modo, capital goes to capital» in a 
process of «transubstantiation» of capital13.
13 After the pioneer studies on the «multiplying effect» of family 
social networks on other forms of capital among the French economic 
elite (Bourdieu-de Saint Martin 1978, 27-8), empirical research on
status attainment has gathered substantial evidence on the causal
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Finally, birth order affects the control of social 
capital in two ways: first-borns excel in the number of 
social relations they manage (608 persons for activists, 173 
for "ordinary" persons), while only children are the most 
isolated (460 and 137 persons respectively). Perhaps older 
sons and daughters are advantaged in having easier access to 
relations mediated by parents, since the age distance 
between them and their elders1 associates is not so high as 
to hinder mutual understanding. On the contrary, only 
children do not of course benefit from relations mediated by 
brothers and sisters: these handicaps may continue to have 
an effect in early adult years.
4. Conclusion: Social Capital and Youth Political 
Activism
Compared to individuals of their cohort who are not 
involved in politics, the leading activists of the Italian 
party youth organizations tend to have prior strong ties 
with senior political activists, either relatives or others, 
and a larger volume of social capital (i.e., of potentially 
accessible social relations).
According to a reviewed explanation (McAdam-Paulsen
1993), a prior relationship with an activist may not only 
give concrete opportunities to join a political 
organization, but also a role model stimulating involvement
importance of social capital (Lin et al. 1981a; Lin et al. 1981b;
Campbell et al. 1986; De Graaf-Flap 1988; for a review, Flap 1991, 6185- 
7).
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(cf. chapter II, § 3,4). Yet, why, among the many role
models which the potential recruits can find around 
themselves, do they come to choose the political one? Why 
should the model embodied by a politicized relative or 
friend be more attractive than that offered by the 
politically apathetic significant others, who are usually 
more numerous?
The existence of a link between the characteristics of 
activists' networks just examined - political sponsorship 
ties and a large volume of social capital - can help to 
answer this question. It can also explain how young 
individuals who are about 25 years old can be acquainted 
with more than five hundred people.
The first point to consider is that to be associated 
with persons with greater resources is coeteris paribus more 
rewarding than to be associated with persons with lesser 
resources (cf. Lin 1982, 133). Whoever is on close terms
with a resourceful person somehow enjoys this person's 
resources as well, whatever form these resources take. Thus, 
someone who has a strong tie with a person controlling a 
large and valuable social capital receives current or future 
benefits from it. Social and economic capital "spread" 
around their main holders in everyday life. This "halo 
fallout" from individual wealth, in any form of resource, 
makes those role models that are sustained by associates 
with more resources more attractive.
Adult politicians tend to have more resources than the 
man in the street, and especially more social capital. 
Substantial evidence on this point is given by the elite
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integration literature (e.g., Aberbach et al. 1981, 209 ff.; 
Higley-Moore 1981; Higley et al. 1991), and that on the 
citizens-representatives relations (Sharp 1982; Zuckerman- 
West 1985; Komito 1992)14. In Italy, to get back to our case 
study, even low-level local politicians have some 
acquaintance with a broad range of higher-level leaders and 
with more than 700 voters (Recchi 1991).
A general conclusion follows from these premises. Young 
individuals are likely to strengthen their ties with their 
most resourceful elders (relatives, friends, friends of 
relatives), regardless of the kind of capital these elders 
control and of their activity. When these elders are 
politicians, the young will be likely to come closer to 
them, to adopt their occupational role as a model, and to 
obtain some of their most typical resource: their social 
connections. The relationship with one or more sponsors will 
transfer onto the young recruit some of the sponsors' social 
capital15. In particular, the transfer of the volume of 
social capital is relatively easy. Moreover, this transfer 
does not mean that the original holder loses the control of 
the capital, as would be the case for economic capital.
14 There is also evidence that to participate significantly above 
average is associated with possessing a larger social capital (Verba 
1987, 64-5; Parry et al. 1992, 86 ff.).
15 Perhaps personal dispositions come into play at this point. They can 
help in a possible competition among siblings for being sponsored by 
those common relatives or friends who are most resourceful.
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Figure 4: Young political activists' volume of social
capital by type of sponsora
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a c q u a i n t a n c e s
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s p o n s o r  r e l a t i ve  r e l a t i ve  m e n t o r
A non-kin mentor is held to be the activist' s sponsor when in the 
activist's network there is at least one political fellow of 
higher rank, older and known before entering politics, and there 
is no political activist in the family
According to this explanation, the origins of the 
activist's social capital are primarily found in his 
political sponsor - a politically active relative or a 
senior non-kin mentor. The mentor, seemingly, adopts the 
younger politician and introduces him to his own 
acquaintances even more than an elected relative can do: 
young activists with a mentor enjoy a greater volume of 
social capital (figure 4).
Generally speaking, sponsors and mentors are likely to 
provide their protégés with far more social capital than 
introductory organizational ties. Open-ended interviews with 
the former leaders of the party youth organizations contain 
revealing passages in this regard:
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«In my time, many [activists in the youth party] 
were "adopted", let's say, by a leader. From this point 
of view, choosing a powerful "referent" in the adult 
party was important. [..] I had almost a family 
relationship with X [a PSI leader], since I was a desk 
companion of his son at school» (1 .6 , PSI leader).
«Ugo La Malfa [PRI's founder and first leader] was 
a close friend of my father, he used to come to our 
house often. Ferruccio Parri [first Premier of Italy 
after World War II] was very much a friend of my father 
too. [..] Parri and La Malfa were the two people who, 
concretely, worked as models in my training» (1.1, PRI 
leader).
«My father was an MP. He was in politics from the 
antifascist war onwards. My brother was in politics 
too. He was a member of the Sicilian regional council. 
I became a candidate for the Chamber after a tragic 
event: the Mafia murder of my brother. [..] I wanted to 
avoid the dispersion of the group of young people that 
gathered and formed around him» (1.3, PPI leader).
«A person who taught me a lot, especially as 
regards politics but not only, was Y [a communist 
politician], who later became mayor of Rome» (1.8, PDS 
leader).
«My father, you know, was a "rising star" in the 
DC when he died. I was a child. Some of his friends 
always remained with me, even more so when I entered 
politics» (I.10, PPI leader).
«Let's say that I "flirted" with many true 
masters: Ernesto Rossi, Altiero Spinelli, Niccolo
Carandini, Mario Ferrara. I spent a lot of time with 
them. I say I "flirted" because I was adopted 
intellectually by each of them in different periods. 
So, it happened that I left one for the other, just as 
when you leave a woman because you fall in love with 
another» (1.5, Radical Party leader).
«There was a person who influenced me enormously. 
[..] He was president of the ACLI [a large catholic 
organization]. A wonderful teacher, one of those 
figures that you probably don't find around anymore. He 
put me at the head of the study office in the ACLI. 
[ .. ] He made me start, I owe him a lot. I believe that 
I am a lucky guy, because I had such a teacher. Few 
people happen to meet a person like this. It is an 
accident of life. Finding a teacher is important and 
rare» (1.7, PPI leader).
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In the light of this new perspective on the supply side 
of political recruitment, cooption has to be viewed in the 
context of a more general process of capital transmission. 
It is interesting to note that this process parallels the 
process by which someone may become an entrepreneur:
«British data support the hypothesis - recently 
examined by U.S. economists - that entrepreneurs face 
capital and liquidity constraints. It appears that the 
effect is large. [But] a gift or inheritance of £5,000 
approximately doubles a typical individual's 
probability of setting up his or her own business. [..] 
The probability peaks at approximately £14,000» 
(Blanchflower-Oswald 1990, 20).
Initiating an economic and initiating a political 
activity at a young age are strikingly similar. «Capital 
constraints» have also to be faced when taking a political 
career. In principle, you can promote yourself impersonally 
- going to a party and asking for a position. Yet, this is 
as absurd as going to a bank and asking for a loan without 
any guarantee. In both cases, an «original accumulation» is 
needed to start a new business. The only difference is the 
form of capital which is essential. A bequest of economic 
capital makes a young entrepreneur, a special dowry of 
social capital is what makes a young prospective 
politician16.
16 These various forms of capital can be used in more than one domain. 
On the one hand, would-be entrepreneurs can manage to develop their 
business relying fundamentally on a high amount of social capital - 
e.g., for credit, information on opportunities, counselling. On the 
other hand, newcomers on the political market can profit from being 
economically more affluent than their adversaries (Berlusconi's case in 
Italy in 1994 is the most sensational example).
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The case for socio-structural explanations of career 
choices is thus strong. Empirical attempts to account for 
the emergence of both economic entrepreneurship and 
political activism mainly through personality-based 
approaches have failed (cf. Aldrich-Zimmer 1986, 4-7; 
McAdam-Paulsen 1993, 642-3). The location of actors in the 
social structure, conceived as the space of the positions of 
control of social resources, seems to affect career 
commitments more fundamentally.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE SO C IA L  PRODUCTION OF P O L IT IC A L  A M B IT IO N :  
TOWARDS A  GENERAL MODEL
1. The Roots of Political Ambition: Five Competing 
Models and Their Champions
In the mid-1960s an assessment of the literature on 
elite recruitment rethorically asked: «Do individuals marked 
for an adult political career experience initial political 
socialization in a manner which increases the probability 
that they will select themselves or be selected for 
political leadership?» (Prewitt 1965, 97). At the time, 
there seemed to be no good answer to this question. By the 
mid-1970s a critical review of the growing body of studies 
on ambition observed that «the most fruitful line of inquiry 
has addressed the social influence of significant others, 
but even here the interpretations of how these others mold 
and foster "ambition" are not firmly established» (Spenner- 
Featherman 1978, 409). Some ten years later, a large panel 
study on young ambitious people concluded that the «lack of 
resources and of peers and relatives with similar 
experiences persist as handicaps» in cultivating higher 
ambitions as an adolescent and then in fulfilling them as a 
young adult (McClelland 1990, 226-7).
These quotations suggest some moderate optimism about 
the long-term outcomes in this research area, as there has 
been a progressive qualification of the original question
about the roots of individual ambitions. In the last three ]
i
decades, a common focus has at least been established. Yet, *
the picture remains quite obscure. The processes by which 
the apparently crucial factor - the "significant others" -
i
enter the "ambition equation" are still accounted for in \
many different ways.
Fundamentally, accounts diverge on what is deemed to be 
really "significant" in the "significant others", namely 
their role either as symbolic defiuers of the differential 
chances for individual success or as structural bridges for 
the control of social resources. An effort is made here to 
reconcile these approaches.
Existing theories about the sources of political 
ambition have been treated extensively in chapter II (§ 3).
We can now reconsider and evaluate them in the light of the 
available evidence. Four (more or less explicitly stated) 
basic models can be identified in the literature. A synoptic 
view of these competing (although only in part mutually 
exclusive) models is provided in figure 1, which also 
contains a brief reference to the indicators which have been 
used for testing them in this inquiry. The models will be 
called after four legendary heroes of Greek mythology:
Oedipus, Hector, Ulysses, and Agamemnon. These heroes 
represent the "champions" of each theory. The conditions 
that made these heroes reach their leadership status seem to 
fit the different explanations of the emergence of political 
man. Their stories are used here as metaphors - that is, as 
the myths underlying the existing accounts of political 
activation.
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These four models are contrasted with a fifth which 
attempts to address some unresolved questions as well as to 
incorporate the narrative and evidence illustrated in the 
previous chapter. The champion of this model is not a 
legendary but a historical character of antiquity: Octavius, 
who took the name of Augustus as the first Roman emperor.
After reviewing the competing explanations ( § 1.1 to
1.5), their validity in the context of this study will be 
tested statistically (§ 2) . The broader implications of the 
preferred model will then be discussed (§3).
i ■ .
1.1. The Compensation Model: Oedipus
Political psychologists tend to posit that the ultimate 
roots of the political personality are in the afflictions of 
the family situation during childhood. In the words of
Lasswell (1950, 17), «the true politician learns to use the 
world of public objects as a means of alleviating the 
stresses of his intimate environment. Cravings for
deference, frustrated or overindulged in the intimate
circle, find expression in the secondary environment». In 
particular, repression as a child caused by the father's 
figure is held responsible for a lifelong low self-esteem. 
Although other antecedents have to occur for one to enter 
politics, a particularly low self-esteem is the necessary
precondition. The political personality pursues power to 
fulfill the need to compensate for an originally deprived 
self-image. Thereafter, this will be called the Compensation
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model of political activation1. Its champion is Oedipus, the 
mythical character which - through Freud's reading - lies at 
the heart of Lasswell's theory of the pdlitical 
personality2.
After Freud other psychoanalytical schools have 
proposed differing interpretations of the tragedy. Fromm’s 
image of Oedipus, more than Freud’s, fits with Lasswell's 
account of the political personality. His conception of the 
myth substantially disregards the element of incest and 
emphasizes the son's unconscious hostility to his father 
deriving from his painful situation as a rejected child 
(Delcourt 1981). Hostility unchains ambition for power, that 
is the desire to overthrow the father's authority and thus 
become the «conqueror of the earth» (in ancient Greece, the 
mother was a symbol of the earth).
1 A variant of this, known as the «Actualization Model» (Carlson-Hyde 
1980), originates from Barber's (1965) remark that a particularly high 
self-esteem is equally conducive to politics, since this personality 
trait smooths the difficulties usually perceived as elements of the 
political game. In a sense, according to this theory, high self-esteem 
makes politics appear an easier enterprise than it seems normally.
2 Even though scrupulous in all of his references, Freud deals with the 
original myth of Oedipus freely enough: «It seems evident the distance 
between the text of the tragedy and the reading of it by Freud t. . ]; it 
seems evident also the distance between Oedipus and the complex with his 
name as enunciated by his finder (or inventor?)» (Montanaro-Tsaxnopulos 
1988, 23). In fact, ambition is a central facet of the original 
character. Accounting for the near-ubiquity of the myth in different 
European cultures and for its roots in the prehistorical process of 
power transmission from father to son before the elder's death, Propp 
(1975, 116) notes that in all the older variants of the legend the young 
Oedipus is always characterized as «ambitious».
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1.2. The Crystallization Model: Hector
Although seldom given a full-blown theoretical status, 
the image of the political activist as *true believer" is 
quite common in the literature. In this model the family 
also induces ambition. Reference is made to a family context 
marked by a strong attachment to values, discipline, or even 
the inculcation of moral principles. Politics turns out to 
be the offspring's destiny, since it opens up the route to 
adapt the world to received and highly-revered standards. 
When such standards coincide with those of a party, the 
latter will form the context of political activation. This 
will be called the Crystallization model.
Hector, the Trojan hero, is its champion. He is the 
heir and the leader of his father's army. His leadership 
derives as much from an exceptional allegiance to the core 
of the values of his city as from his origins. Trained as 
the future head of his people, Hector is completely 
dominated by duty. He embodies the spirit of his people in 
its purest form. This makes him ignore any appeal to private 
feelings, like when his wife and family seek to discourage 
him from the fatal duel with Achilles. A win or die logic 
underlies his commitment to political and military action3.
3 Reference is limited to Homer's character. Hector is rather different 
in modern dramas, such as Jean Giradoux's La guerre de Troie n^ura pas 
lieu.
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1.3. The Sensitization Model: Ulysses
Without dismissing the family role in promoting the 
political activation of the young, the Sensitization model 
plays down its capacity to determine the value patterns of 
the new generations. Political scientists (such as Prewitt 
and Putnam) and sociologists (such as Merelman) who have 
independently proposed this explanation begin with the 
assumption that socialization does not crystallize attitudes 
and beliefs. Yet it does restrict the intellectual interests 
of the young and transmits to him the adequate capacities to 
satisfy such interests. Because of these mechanisms, family 
politicization serves primarily to make political activism 
an option for the youth as he asks himself what he is to do 
in life. In addition, «it produces a particularly open and 
flexible political learning style» (Merelman-King 1986, 
476). Parents and other important figures train those 
cognitive capacities which seem typical of politicians - not 
just some minimum competence, but also the awareness of the 
complexity of public problems.
Ulysses' story and character illustrate this pattern of 
socialization and entry into political activity. Ulysses was 
not only a king's son, but he descended from a god: on his 
father's side his great-grand father was Zeus himself, and 
on his mother's side Hermes. He therefore received an elite- 
level education. In his youth «he travelled much. A late 
tradition wants him to have been a student of the Centaure 
Chiron, like Achilles» (Grimal 1979, 469). As an adult, he 
always maintains a superior autonomy of judgment. All his
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acts demonstrate that he bases his leadership on an uniquely 
keen and flexible spirit. As the Sensitization model claims, 
Ulysses has family roots which lead him to be overexposed 
and almost unavoidably pushed toward political leadership, 
while also giving him the chance to develop the personality 
traits particularly suited to such a leadership.
1.4. The Identification Model: Agamemnon
Family members are considered as merely a segment of 
the circle of significant others who affect the decision to 
become active in the Identification model. The model is more 
detailed than the previous ones, even though it does not 
specify the timing of the process leading to the full and 
sometime risky commitment4. Fundamentally, it attempts to 
give a socio-psychological explanation to the presence, 
which is frequently found, of an already involved friend or 
kin in the personal network of those who are recruited. The 
basic tenet of the theory is that «it is the centrality and 
importance of our relationships with others that serve to 
establish and sustain the salience of various identities> 
(McAdam-Paulsen 1993, 647). A prior strong tie with somebody 
who is active stimulates or (more often) reinforces the 
adhesion to a reference group. The strong tie appears to 
have a twofold impact. On the one hand, it recalls one' s 
attachment to a «salient identity> (or role model) as
4 The model derives from McAdam's (1988) study of a high-risk form of 
activism: the Freedom Sunnier Movement for the advancements of civil
rights in Mississippi in 1964. However, it may constitute a more general 
model of self-recruitment to public activities and positions.
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promoted by a reference group. On the other, it communicates 
the possibility to act coherently with that model by joining 
a concrete group. One becomes active in the absence of 
opposition from other significant others.
Seemingly, the epic hero who experiences such a process 
of activation is Agamemnon, «the king par excellence in the 
Iliad, as commander in chief of the Greek army» (Grimal 
1979, 19). The preconditions of : activism in the 
Identification model - strong ties with persons who have 
been active earlier, adhesion to a reference group, no 
opposition from other significant others - are met in 
Agamemnon's mobilization for the Trojan war. Firstly, he has 
a strong tie with Menelaus, the offended husband of Helen, 
who is his brother. Secondly, Agamemnon is moved by group 
loyalty. He has sworn a pact of solidarity with all the 
other pretenders to Helen's hand. Not only would they not 
have opposed the man chosen by Helen, but they would also 
have helped each other had one of them been attacked. Third, 
in taking his decision Agamemnon finds no resistance in his 
family as other Greek heroes do5.
5 His wife, Clytemnestra, does nothing to keep him home - for many 
reasons. On the one hand, the expedition is designed (at least in 
principle) to rescue Helen, Cly temnestra ' s sister. On the other, 
Clytemnestra ' s affection for Agamemnon is dubious. She had been 
kidnapped by her current husband from Tantalus, who Agamemnon had 
killed. Moreover, Agamemnon had sacrificed his wife's daughter Iphigenia 
to the gods. Finally, that Clytemnestra is not exactly desperate for 
Agamemnon's engagement in the expedition is proved by her love-affair 
with Aegisthus during her husband's absence - a love that will lead her 
to kill Agamemnon when he comes back.
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1.5. The Rational Identification Model; Octavius
In proposing a fifth account of the process of 
political activation, an attempt is made to integrate the 
Sensitization and Identification models and solve a basic 
problem inherent in them, namely why the political identity 
is chosen by the young would-be politician as most salient. 
The Sensitization model answers 'routine"; the 
Identification model indicates 'reference groups". These 
explanations are unsatisfactory. On the one hand, why does 
not every offspring in politicized families become 
politically active? Routine is an insufficiently 
discriminating explanation. On the other, why do future 
activists choose some reference groups instead of others? 
The Identification model merely shifts the problem one step 
backwards.
As a theoretical starting point, the Rational 
Identification model assumes that individuals adopt 
identities that are compatible with the maximization of 
their future status6. Family and milieu politicization are 
maintained as fundamental factors in producing future 
activists. Yet, the model sets aside psychological processes 
of norm and value transmission. Without denying that these
6 Structural sociology, «with its emphasis on the constraints and 
opportunities that influence behavior» (Mizruchi 1994, 335), is the
underlying framework of the model. Although it may be close to rational 
choice theory in its implicit rationality premise (individuals seek to 
control as much capital as they can), it does not assume «exogenously 
formed preferences»; rather, it tries to explain how these preferences 
are formed (that is, the constraints and opportunities which lead to a 
particular action).
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processes take place, it is doubtful that they follow a 
stable pattern. The stress is placed rather on the presence 
of a typical configuration of opportunities as the crucial 
antecedent of youth commitment. Families intervene as 
"bridges" of social mobility, passing on to their children 
«concrete resources [. . ], especially the key resources of 
insider's information about the rules of the game and 
interpersonal connection» (Bertaux 1995, 72). In our
particular case, if the «family has friends or relatives 
among politicians, there will be an added incentive to enter 
politics and entrance in the job will be facilitated» 
(Blondel 1965, 132). More precisely, the theoretical path
explaining the emergence of youth political ambition (and 
why this is limited to a tiny minority of any new cohort) 
can be summarized in three steps (figure 2).
Firstly, the young man must have a prior tie with a 
political activist - a family member or somebody known 
through family ties. In early adulthood, when individuals 
are socially expected to find a career, the young must 
regard this social relation as the greatest potential for 
his future (step # 1 in the figure). The prospect of
entering politics due to this tie must be assigned a higher 
return than those provided by educational achievements and 
ascriptive occupational opportunities together7.
7 Particularly favourable is an incomplete control on the main resources 
of social mobility: young actors completely lacking these resources do 
not dare to aspire to public offices, while those who possess both 
(i.e., acquired credentials and ascribed professional chances) do not 
need to look for an alternative career line (as the political one).
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When these initial conditions are met, the prospective 
politician comes to see the activist identity embodied by 
the potential sponsor as the one most convenient for himself 
(step # 2). This is not sufficient, however. As the young 
man approaches politics, the relationship with the senior 
activist must take on a sponsorship nature. This is revealed 
by the transmission of some * capital of departure" onto the 
recruit (step # 3)8.
In this way, the model can claim general validity. What 
may vary mostly from one context to another is the nature of 
the "capital of departure" which is crucial in the 
recruitment process. This depends on the culture prevailing 
in the specific political system, as this culture defines 
the forms of capital most valuable politically. In Italy, at 
the time of the study, it was social capital; elsewhere it 
may be cultural or economic capital.
8 In more general terms, the model posits that individuals' assessment 
of ends is fundamentally rational, but also that this assessment brings 
about the taking of a new identity, which makes the ends become a matter 
of passion rather than interest. Thus, the emergence of ambition is 
regarded as a process in which culture and structure interplay: 
identification parallels resource transmission.
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The "champion" of this model of political activation is 
Caius Octavius, alias Caesar Augustus, the first emperor of 
Rome. His story is worth recalling briefly9.
The concern for posterity through descendance was 
highly felt in the Latin world. It was very probably also 
shared by Julius Caesar, who had no direct descendants10. At 
the apex of his glory (45 b.C.), he made the Roman Senate 
vote a provision that allowed for the transmission of the 
prestigious office of pontifex to his adopted son, whoever 
he should be. Immediately afterwards he made his last will, 
which remained secret until his death. Caesar's heir and 
adopted son was to be his sister’s grandson, Octavius. Roman 
historians magnify this choice as a sign of the dictator' 
farsightedness, or stigmatize it as a «whim» (Ferrero 1925, 
29). Indeed Caesar had two more nephews, Quintus Pedius and 
Lucius Pinarius11. The young Octavius (he was only 18 at the 
death of Caesar) seemed of delicate health to his 
contemporaries, whilst Pedius was described as a «fortis 
vir» by Cicero in 54 b.C. Moreover, Octavius had very little 
military and political experience as compared to Pedius',
9 The main sources used about Octavius' life and personality are Jones 
(1970) and Parain (1978).
10 Roman paterfamilias aimed at a delicate balance between having too 
many heirs (who would have dispersed the deceased's estate) and none. As 
a consequence, the average number of male sons for senators at 55 (the 
age at which Caesar wrote his testament) was 0.8 (Sailer 1994, 57). 
Therefore Caesar's case - he had had only one daughter who died in 
child-birth in 55 b.C. - was probably not too exceptional.
11 Despite Suetonius' reference in his Lives of the Caesars (83, 2) to 
Octavius, Pinarius, and Pedius as «sororum nepotes», several clues lead 
modern historians to suspect that the latter two were Caesar's direct 
nephews (Wissowa-Kroll 1937, 19.1, 38-40).
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who had fought on Caesar's side many times, had taken part 
in a triumph, and had been an incumbent of several civil 
offices. Was Octavius chosen because he was more courageous, 
brilliant, or ambitious than his cousins?
Probably not. Caesar did not even have the chance to 
test Octavius' military value, given that the young man was 
shipwrecked off Spain and joined his granduncle's army only 
at the end of the campaign of 45 b.C. Moreover historians 
and biographers agree that the future emperor was not a 
particularly talented general.
So, why Octavius? Explanations based on character have 
no grounds other than fantasy. On the contrary, the 
structure of Caesar's family is an established fact. This 
structure constrained the dictator's choice. When he wrote 
his testament, Octavius was 18, Pinarius about 30, and 
Pedius 43. At that time Caesar was 55 years old. He was in 
good health. He was not expected to abandon power soon. In 
demographic terms, as a Homan high-status citizen his life 
expectancy was about 15 years12. Octavius was nothing more 
and nothing less than the heir with the right age. Although 
equally valid, his cousins were too old. By appointing 
Octavius, Caesar intended to extend as much as he could his 
own control on the future of Rome. In contrast to his 
cousins, he could still be moulded at his granduncle's 
pleasure13.
12 The difficulties of modelling life tables in ancient Rome are 
reviewed in Sailer (1994, 12-25).
13 As Caesar was reported to cry in front of the statue of Alexander the 
Great in Gades at 32, for the Greek leader ruled the world at the same
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Of course, Octavius was not an outsider. His father, 
who had been praetor and governor of the province of 
Macedonia, died just before a probable election to the 
consulate. But the young man had not even had the time to 
show special qualities or motivations. Thus the opening of 
Caesar's will created an «unexpected situation [that] 
imposed new duties and stimulated new ambitions» in this 18 
year old man (Hammond-Scullard 1970, 149; italics added).
Caesars will made him not only the adopted son of the 
dictator (whose name he took), but also the chief heir of 
his wealth. The symbolic legacy granted him the loyalty of 
Caesar's soldiers, and the material bequest put an 
extraordinary capital for political uses at his disposal* 14.
Young Octavius' ambition, in sum, arises when the 
conditions of the Rational Identification model are met in 
sequence. Firstly, the family milieu gives him the chance to 
associate with a political leader. Secondly, in terms of age
he fits with this leader's will to perpetuate himself. This
determines his ranking of future opportunities and,
consequently, his taking of a new identity (witness the
adoption of Caesar's name). Finally, he receives the
mentor's symbolic and material wealth. This inheritance is
age, one may speculate that the dictator planned to have a heir as 
powerful as Alexander the Great when in his early thirties.
14 The beginning of Augustus' autobiography (J?es Gestae Divi Augusti) 
recognizes that this capital was decisive for his precocious and 
successful entrance into politics: «When 19 years old, I formed an army 
on my own decision and at my own expense» (italics added) . How important 
this capital proved to be is witnessed by the rest of the Res Gestae, 
which consists above all of a scrupulous account of the future emperor's 
prodigality with soldiers and citizens.
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the precipitating factor for the political activation of the 
man who will be the first Roman emperor.
2. Testing the Models ■ . .
Which of the reviewed models better accounts for the 
process of political activation among contemporary youth? 
Two separate tests will be conducted in this section with 
different empirical datasets and theoretical scope. Firstly, 
the case-control study on the activists of the Italian party 
youth organizations - specifically designed to test these 
models - will show that the emergence of political ambition 
(i.e., being a youth party officer) follows the lines of the 
Rational Identification model. However, the developmental 
nature of the process cannot be fully accounted on the basis 
of this dataset. Moreover, the relatively small size and 
geographical concentration of the control sample inhibits 
making wide generalizations from the empirical findings (cf. 
chapter IV, §2).
These two problems tend to be cancelled out with the 
second and complementary analysis, based on the «Survey on 
Social Mobility and Education in Italy»15. This survey 
recorded on the one hand whether respondents were party 
members and their interest for political activity, and on 
the other hand some indicators of the Rational
15 The survey was carried out in 1985 by a team formed by M. Barbagli,
V. Capecchi, A. Cobalti, A. De Lillo, and A. schizzerotto. The national 
sample comprises 5,016 cases. 1 thank the research team for making this 
dataset available to me. The following analysis is limited to the 1,670 
cases in the 18-30 year age limits.
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Identification model. In the explanation of the grass-root 
party militancy of young people, the model will perform as 
expected.
c 2.1. The Five Models Contrasted
A full comparative test of the contending models is run 
by using logistic regression with the original case-control 
dataset. The binary dependent variable in the analysis is
political activism (coded "1' for young activists, "0" for
young nonactivists). In addition to the five models
introduced and discussed earlier, personal and family
attributes representing various aspects of "social
centrality1" (gender, occupation, parental class and
education, urban residence) are taken as forming a baseline 
model16. These dimensions of inequalities define what has 
been called a «standard theory of political participation» 
(Sciolla-Ricolfi 1989, 139-40) against which the more
specific models accounting for political activism must be 
contrasted17.
In the Compensation model, youth political activism is 
aimed at overcoming weaknesses that emerged earlier in life. 
In particular, the political activist is expected to feel 
empowered and encapsulated in a group more so than when he 
was at a younger age. Three dummy variables were designed to
16 Bivariate analysis of the impact of all the independent variables has 
been carried out in the previous chapters (V, VI, and VII). A more 
precise description of these variables is in appendix B.
17 The original formulations of this theory date back to Lane (1959,
195-7) and Milbrath-Goel (1977, 87 ff.). Empirical validations are
extremely numerous; in Italy, see Barbagli-Maccelli (1985) .
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record these crucial changes in the conception of Self with 
respect to adolescence/ namely a stronger sense of personal 
control/ sociability/ and group belonging.
The Crystallization model postulates that young
individuals become politically active because they seek to 
act according to their well-structured principles and to 
reinforce their adhesion to an ideology. In so doing, 
incipient party politicians are expected to be more dogmatic 
and ideologically consistent than their age peers. Three 
variables are therefore included in the model : the presence 
of a higher sense of ideological consistency than in 
adolescence (binary), the Dogmatism index score, and the 
Attitudinal Consistency index score.
The Sensitization model maintains that activism stems 
from a family tradition of political involvement, 
particularly because this moulds a specific cognitive 
complexity which is deemed typical of the political 
personality. The existence of kin actively engaged in 
politics takes account of the structural premises of the 
model; the respondents score on a Complexity index18 is 
meant to capture the effect of these premises on his 
character.
In the Identification model, attention is mostly paid 
to the existence of a reference group that works as a 
«recruitment context»19. The support of the family and peers
18 This is a simpler version of the Complexity index discussed in 
chapter V, based only on the tendency to choose polarized scores in 
response to the opinion items of the questionnaire. This version of the 
index was preferred in order to minimize missing data.
19 This is operationalized by recording the long-standing commitment of
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are additional factors facilitating activism; they are 
operationalized as the number of family members and long­
standing friends, known at least since the age of 16, 
supporting the same party as respondents.
Finally, the process of activation in the Rational 
Identification model comprises three stages. In the first 
stage, the young individual evaluates the available assets 
for choosing a career. The existence of a politically active 
kin is a crucial inducement when it is accompanied by an 
incomplete control of the main resources of social mobility 
(either because of an educational deficit20 or the lack of 
an inheritable family work21). In the second stage, family 
ties introduce the incipient activist into politics and to 
the future mentor, if he is not a relative. In the third 
stage, the direct relationship with a senior politician is 
assumed to lead to full-time political activism as it 
implies the transfer of some ’'‘capital of departure" for 
political work, that is to say, in the context of this 
study, social capital, and in particular its volume.
the respondent to an association or structured group activity with a 
strong cultural identity (e.g., parishes, misericordie, case del popolo, 
environmental organizations).
20 Not only the end of curricula at high school, but also the inability 
to complete a university course before the age of 25 is taken as an 
indicator of low educational success.
21 Parents' control on the work opportunities of their offsprings is a 
difficult condition to gauge. However, it is likely to depend mainly on 
parents' occupations. Young people whose fathers are entrepreneurs or 
self-employed have a greater chance of following in their fathers' 
footsteps (for Italian evidence, Cobalti-Schizzerotto 1994). Hence, 
respondents were considered to lack an inheritable job when their 
fathers and/or mothers were not entrepreneurs or self-employed.
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The results of the logistic regressions show that the 
Rational Identification model performs much better than the 
others (table 1). Having a "kin in active politics", a "poor 
educational curriculum" or no "family-controlled opportunity 
of work", at least one "prior tie with a senior politician" 
(i.e., a potential political sponsor), and a large "volume 
of social capital" rule out the effects of all the 
alternative explanatory variables of youth activism (except 
gender, as we shall shortly see).
None of the other hypotheses survives the test. Yet 
sociological theories of youth activism are more sustained 
than psychological ones. The baseline hypothesis, which 
describes political ambition as a derivative of social and 
especially class inequalities, cannot be abandoned on the 
basis of psychological characteristics alone. Among these, 
only an "increased sense of belonging" proves to distinguish 
significantly the two groups of respondents, unless Rational 
Identification variables are introduced.
The parameters of the regression equation suggest three 
remarks about the preferred model. Firstly, the coefficient 
of the variable "incomplete control of the main resources of 
social mobility" is significant at the .01 level "only". 
This probably results from a relatively poor 
operationalization of the concept. Yet, the coefficient is 
positive and significant up to a point. Second, outliers22 
among activists are almost exclusively sub-leaders (10 out
22 These are the misclassified cases when the model is used for 
classification with the routine of the SPSS logistic regression module.
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of 11). Thus, the model seems to fit the recruitment pattern 
of the leaders in the party youth organizations particularly 
well. The greater the ambition to embark upon a political 
career, the better the model works.
Finally, and most importantly, the Rational 
Identification model does not seem to exclude an independent 
effect of gender on youth activism. Young women remain alien 
from active politics not only because they lack the 
resources and conditions that lead to activism, but also 
because they are women. Thus, little credit must be given, 
in this case, to theories imputing women's 
underrepresentation in politics to just their 
underrepresentation among the categories of people from 
which the majority of politicians are initially drawn (e.g., 
Darcy et al. 1987, 96). Unfortunately data do not allow us 
to unravel the puzzle of the extent to which women's 
exclusion is due to supply- or demand-side factors: more 
complex and not yet developed models of women's political 
ambition are needed. They should take into account the 
interplay of gender-specific socialization patterns, 
informal sanctioning and rewarding within parties, and 
feedback effects of these practices on women's career 
expectations. Only ad hoc research can treat the issue 
adequately.
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2.2. From Party Membership to Party Activism: How
Specific Is the Rational Identification Model
An opportunity to test the scope of these findings is 
given by the «¡Survey on Social Mobility and Education in 
Italy». Although designed for other purposes, this large 
survey includes items which can be held to operationalize 
the Baseline and the Rational Identification models of the 
origins of political ambition23. On the one hand, all the 
background variables (including *incomplete control of the 
main resources of social mobility" and excluding "place of 
residence") are identical. On the other, we can assume that 
"father's political interest" (Likert scale), "acquaintance 
with a politician" (binary), and "volume of social capital" 
(indicated by the "frequency of invitation by friends" on a 
Likert scale) constitute reasonably good proxy variables 
respectively for "political activism of relatives", 
"existence of a long-standing tie with a politician", and 
"volume of social capital"24.
Seemingly, no one in the Social Mobility survey works 
in a political organization or holds a public office. 
However, some are party members; the degree of the 
respondents' political interest is also recorded. Among the 
young respondents there are 115 party members, 60 of whom 
said that they were "quite to very much" interested in
23 Unfortunately, however# the survey does not make it possible to 
contrast the Baseline and the Rational Identification models with the 
others that have been discussed.
24 A more detailed description of the variables included in the models 
of table 2 is in appendix C.
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politics. The first group (young party members) represents 
the grass-root population from which the young party cadres 
and leaders are drawn; the second group (young party members 
with political interests) are a category of party members 
likely to be more active and to have some political 
ambition. Compared to the politically apathetic youth, these 
two groups constitute progressively narrower pools of 
eligibles to party offices.
To what extent does the Rational Identification model 
explain these two degrees of low-level party militancy? Were 
it fully able to account for grass-root militancy, the model 
would not be one of political ambition. Were it entirely 
unable to account for the basic forms of participation which 
are preliminary to deeper political involvement, the scope 
of the model would have to be limited to the specific case 
of activism in party youth organizations.
Table 2: Logistic regressions predicting "simple* party-
membership and "active" party membership
“S im p le" P arty  
M em b ersh ip
"A c tiv e "  P arty  
M em b e rsh ip
In d e p e n d en t v a ria b le s (b) S E  (b ) <b) S E (b )
G ender = m ale .165 .108 .319 .184
O ccupation » fu ll-tim e job . .360 .160 .100 .218
Fam ily C lass =  l-ll -.551 .349 -1.007 .585
Fam ily C lass -  III -.385 .188 -.618 .319
Father’s Education -  univ. degree -.044 .418 .112 .605
M other's Education = univ. degree -.060 .583 .425 .664
Father’s Political In terest .515* .120 .866* .186
A cquaintance w ith Politician .61 r .118 1.094* .270
Volum e of S ocia l C apital .195 .108 .513* .172
Incom plete C ontro l o f SM  R esources .036 .114 .058 .187
Constant -5.226* .711 -8.115* 1.026
N = 1,438 
*P<.01
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In fact, neither of the two prospects is true. Table 2 
shows that the politicization of the family of origin and 
some personal linkage with professional politicians are 
better predictors of "simple" party affiliation than social 
background. In addition to these variables, "active" party 
membership is significantly accompanied by a more intense 
social life. The odds that a respondent is an "active" 
member of a party are 9 . 5 2  times greater for those whose 
fathers had «much interest» in politics than for those whose 
fathers had «no interest» in politics, 2 . 9 9  times greater 
for those who «do» know a professional politician personally 
than for those who «do not», and 8 . 3 5  times greater for 
those who are invited by friends «more than once a week» 
than for those who «never» are25.
Yet, these factors form no more than a part of the 
Rational Identification model, according to which a key 
element in ambition-building is an "incomplete control of 
the main resources of social mobility" - educational 
achievements and family jobs (cf. § 1.5). This factor has no 
effect either on "simple" or on "active" party membership of 
young people. Hence, the incomplete control of the main 
resources of social mobility is not at the basis of these 
elementary forms of political participation, but only of
25 Logistic coefficients indicate «the change in the log odds of being 
in the category of interest {here, an "active* party member] on the 
response for a one-unit increase in the jth predictor li.e., independent 
variable], controlling for all other predictors in the model» (Demaris 
1992, 46). From log odds we have first derived the odds of being an
"active* party member associated with different values of the 
independent variables, and then calculated how much these odds increase 
by passing from the lowest to the highest values of the significant 
independent variables.
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more vital commitments to political life as those of top 
activists in party youth organizations. Although all the 
factors examined so far - father's political interest, 
acquaintance with a politician, volume of social capital - 
smooth the way towards some political involvement, they do 
not result in a career-oriented activism unless the young 
individual has relatively unbalanced opportunities of status 
attainment. Only possessing a good educational record but no 
easy access to a job, or the reverse, adds to "active" party 
membership a motivation to seek to live off politics.
Table 3: Logistic regression predicting control of a high 
volume of social capital (respondents "invited by friends 
more than once a week")
H ig h  V o lu m e  
o f S o c ia l C a p ita l
In d e p e n d en t v a ria b le s
—D*) S E  (b )
G ender =  m ale .111 .147
O ccupation = fu ll-tim e jo b .085 .186
Fam ily C lass *  M l .834* .231
Fam ily C lass =  III .179 .2 18
F a th e rs  Education *  university degree .115 .2 83
M other's Education -  university degree -.6 4 3 .551
Incom plete Control of S M  Resources -.045 .1 50
F ather’s  Political in terest -.282 .1 90
A cquaintance w ith Politician .445* .175
A cquaintance w ith Politician b y  Fam ily C lass M l .070 .172
C onstant -2 .7 23 * .6 49
N - 1,479 
*P<.01
In the main, the analysis confirms the view that the 
Rational Identification model seems to cover different 
stages of commitment to politics (cf. figure 2 in this 
chapter). Additional evidence (table 3) strengthens the 
hypothetical causal chain according to which a connection
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with a politician contributes to amplifying the whole social 
life of young people26. The significant effect of this 
connection on respondents' social capital - net of all other 
effects - is likely to describe a process of progressive 
"absorption" of politicians' social capital by some of their 
young associates.
Table 3 also reveals that an upper class origin 
enhances social capital more than being acquainted with a 
politician27. Yet, the introduction of an interaction term 
of "upper class origin" and "acquaintance with a 
politician", whose effect is not significant (last row of 
table 3), proves that these two determinants do not cumulate 
normally. Thus, they tend to be factors of production of 
social capital which are independent from each other. There 
are young people who control a larger than average personal 
network thanks to their class position, and others who have 
an equally larger network thanks to their association with a 
politician. The latter are those individuals who are most 
likely to develop a stronger involvement in political 
activities.
26 As might be expected, a logistic regression of the variable 
'acquaintance with a politician' shows that causality goes both ways: a 
more intense social life also increases the probability of knowing a 
politician.
27 The impact of an upper class origin on the volume of social capital 
fits with Homans' (1950, 182) assertion that «the higher a man's social 
rank, the larger will be the number of persons who originate interaction 
for him», and subsequent empirical evidence (Campbell et al. 1986, 109; 
contra, Verbrugge 1977). This may reflect a stronger class cohesion at 
the top of the social structure (as elitists postulate) which takes 
place through the «trans instantiation» of capital (as Bourdieu calls 
it). This hypothesis cannot be tested here, since the recipients of 
respondents' relationships are unknown.
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Empirical results give substantial support to the 
hypothesis that, to become aspiring politicians, the young 
need a combination of processes of identification and of 
calculations of opportunity. Processes of identification 
have an impact on political participation in general: 
entering a party is largely influenced by long-standing 
links to significant others who are in turn politically 
active. Yet a party office, which is a costly involvement 
almost only rewarded by some opportunity to move upwards 
politically, is most likely to attract those who also have 
some assets for status attainment but not enough of these to 
be sure of succeeding in their professional future, either 
because they lack family-based career prospects, or because 
they have had a mediocre school record. Politics, in sum, is 
an attractive career for the young person who combines 
political identification with a significant other, who may 
work as a role model but also as a resource provider, and 
uncertain alternative professional opportunities28.
28 The Rational Identification model is potentially appliable to the 
understanding of other processes of career choice. Existing research, in 
particular, suggests that it might bear some validity in different 
social fields * such as becoming a terrorist (Della Porta 1992, 273), 
entering direct selling corporations (Biggart 1992, 27-8), advancing to 
managerial positions in large high-tech firms (Burt 1992, 74-6 and 164- 
6). The cases of intergenerational transmission of a family business 
also fit with the model.
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3. The Rational Identification Model and the Political 
System
Our long journey through the data brings us finally to 
discuss a number of implications of the main results of this 
study. Although the Rational Identification model describes 
an individual-level phenomenon, this is of course related to 
general features of the political system. In order to place 
the micro model in a macro context, three main findings 
shall be again taken into account and discussed in the 
following concluding sections: the importance of sponsorship 
(§ 3.1) and of a high volume of social capital (§ 3.2), and 
the relative unimportance of psychological traits (§ 3.3) in 
the making of political ambition.
3.1. Political Sponsorship and Its Consequences
The crucial role of sponsors (who are usually 
relatives) in the early phases of political recruitment 
indicates the persistence of an «aristocratic tendency», as 
Mosca called it, in a political system: the political class 
can reproduce itself through generations.
Few refer to «aristocratic» and «democratic» tendencies 
in current political analyses. This distinction seems to be 
more successful in another field, that of the sociology of 
education, with Turner's (1960) contrast between «sponsored» 
and «contest» systems of school selection. These constitute 
substantially a rephrasing of Mosca’s types, but they add to 
the elitist framework the important idea that selection
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systems reflect the norms for upward mobility prevailing in 
different national cultures:
«In a selection system which follows the contest 
mobility norm, selections are delayed and individuals 
are allowed complete freedom for mobility through most 
of their careers. [..] In a selection system which 
follows the sponsored norm, individuals are selected 
for their ultimate careers very early, and departures 
from these early assigned careers are not permitted. 
Those who are selected for elite status are maximally 
separated from others, given specialized training and 
socialization, and guaranteed that they, and only they, 
will attain elite status» (Rosenbaum 1986, 142).
This can occur in the political as well as in the 
educational system. When personal sponsorship is necessary 
to enter active politics with some career ambition, as we 
have found here, the political system is pervaded by a 
«sponsored mobility» norm.
The family is central to this process. If it is always 
true that «without family there could not be any strategy of 
reproduction» (Bourdieu 1994, 11), this seems even truer in 
«sponsored mobility» systems. In this respect, our finding 
coincides with that of a study conducted about three decades 
earlier in Britain (the national paradigm of «sponsored 
mobility» for Turner):
«The principle of faultily succession is what 
emerges most clearly among the young activists of all 
parties. Four out of five young activists come from 
families with a record of political activity» (Abrams- 
Little 1965, 330)29.
29 A similar result was obtained by a large comparative inquiry of the 
1970s reporting that «58 percent of the European politicians [had] 
relatives actively involved in politics or government»/ almost twice as 
much as in the U.S. sample (Aberbach et al. 1981, 73) .
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More specifically, the youth party activists examined 
here are the sons, nephews, grand-children, and cousins of 
second-rank political office-holders. In this case, party 
elites recruit from their 'doorsteps*, not necessarily from 
within their homes.
This is consistent with the evidence showing an 
apparently high intergenerational mobility of the Italian 
political class (Schizzerotto 1993, 34 ) . Social mobility
studies tend to ignore that, even in the absence of a 
«transmission of status», there is a strong «transmission of 
situs» in the making of political ambition among the younger 
cohorts30. Young party activists are the offsprings of 
elders who are involved in politics, though not necessarily 
in the foreground31. Recruitment of these politicians-to-be 
seems to be an instance of what Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame 
(1988, 22-3) deem the most typical process of
intergenerational transmission: «transmission in an
equivalent form»: instead of being passed onto their heirs 
as they are («transmission in an identical form»), the 
resources of parents create the heirs' «conditions for 
action». The politically active kin controls political ties 
through which relationships with more powerful potential 
mentors, and hence political recruitment, are made possible.
30 Bertaux (1994, 91) holds that «ce phénomène de transmission du situs 
est, croyons-nous, d'une portée plus générale encore que celui de la 
transmission du status social».
31 This does not exclude the existence of a more specific cause of the 
intergenerational mobility of the Italian post-war political class: the 
demise of a whole generation of politicians at the break-up of the 
Fascist regime (Schizzerotto 1993, 34).
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In contemporary societies this indirect dynamic of 
transmission is probably more common and legitimate than a 
strategy of direct father-to-son succession.
The dichotomy of political selection systems which was 
mentioned above therefore needs to be revised. Even within a 
formally democratic framework there is room for marked 
variations in recruitment practices. A more analytical 
classification ought at least to include four types of 
situations, from a maximum to a minimum of openness: the 
«aristocratic tendency» can take a sponsored-dynastic or a 
sponsored-enlarged form; the «democratic tendency» can 
manifest itself as contest-unbalanced or contest- 
egalitarian32 .
For the importance of ascriptive ties, Italy belongs to 
the sponsored type; but because of the complex configuration 
of conditions which add to family politicization, Italy does 
not fall within the dynastic subtype. Its "tempered 
nepotism", so to speak, makes the Italian case a good 
example of a sponsored-enlarged system of political 
recruitment.
32 If the intergenerational transmission of the political profession 
were to reflect national patterns of occupational inheritance, as is 
possible but cannot be verified on the basis of the existing evidence, 
at one extreme of this four-fold typology we may find India, where 93% 
of sons take up their fathers' job, and at the other Sweden, where no 
more than 13% of sons have the same occupation as their fathers 
(Ganzeboom et al. 1991, 286; cf. also Treiman-Yip 1989, 390).
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What consequences follow? If «the ultimate significance 
of various kinds of eligibility and selection lies in their 
system consequences» (Seligman 1971, 1; cf. also Weber's
motto at the beginning of the thesis), how does the 
recruitment pattern described in the preceding pages matter?
Conclusions in this respect revolve around the point 
that, as all ascriptive criteria in public affairs, the 
sponsored system of recruitment is neither egalitarian nor 
efficient. Opportunities are not fairly distributed; and 
optimal candidates are possibly kept out from political 
offices33.
To defend sponsored recruitment, it is said to prepare 
new entrants to elite positions34. Through this system, 
«selections occur as early as possible so that the system 
can maximally benefit from the efficiencies of specialized 
training and socialization» (Rosenbaum 1986, 142). The
argument is based on a Platonic premise: leadership can be 
taught. Good government depends on good training of the 
governors. As is well known, Popper was highly critical of 
this contention35, which moreover seems very hard to test 
empirically.
33 Usually, left-wing scholars evoke the first problem; right-wing 
authors the second.
34 According to Bobbio (1996, 195), such an argument underlies Mosca's 
appreciation of the (partial) persistence of the aristocratic tendency 
in modern society.
35 The philosopher's position against specialized training for political
elites, regarded as an antecedent of a «closed society», is condensated 
in an aphorism: «The 'Han Friday' of the party leader is seldom a
capable successor» (Popper 1966, I, 135).
(HE
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Perhaps sponsored recruitment can be better defended on 
the grounds that it prevents conflicts among too many 
candidates for power positions. Even if one admits that 
contest recruitment constitutes an ideal procedure for the 
best men to emerge, the competition that it entails would by 
itself be damaging for the polity. Defending such an 
argument, Gibbon attributed the decline of the Roman empire 
to the decadence of the principle of heredity. Although the 
hereditary monarch is likely not to be the wisest,
«The superior prerogative of birth, when it has 
obtained the sanction of time and popular opinion, is 
the plainest and least invidious of all distinctions 
among mankind. The acknowledged right extinguishes the 
hopes of faction, and the conscious security disarms 
the cruelty of the monarch» (Gibbon 1952, I, 69).
As a corollary, a full meritocracy - namely, a 
perfectly contest-egalitarian recruitment system - would 
probably provoke an epidemic of unbearable frustration, as 
losers would be deprived of any illusions about their real 
capacities (cf. Goldthorpe 1994).
Sponsored systems of recruitment are probably more 
widespread than the egalitarian rhetoric suggests; indeed, 
they are more evident and no less dangerous in the economic 
world. Such systems undoubtedly conflict with the principle 
of equality, but it may be argued that they promote social 
stability36. Whether equality or stability is to be 
preferred remains a value judgment, however.
36 While the consequences in terms of inequality are easily demonstrable 
(evidence was given in chapter VI of this study), the consequences in 
terms of stability are not. Problems begin with the definition of the 
concept. Perfect equality may consist of an equal representation of
—wummuiumaiBnuuuugognugnmgaiag.
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3.2. Social Capital, Patronage, and Political Careers 
That the average Italian young party activist is in 
contact with more than five hundred people attests to the 
fact that in Italy social capital is not an outcome but a 
pre-requisite for a political career. But what is this large 
volume of acquaintances for? Is it the basis of 
clientelism37?
Clientelism is probably not the appropriate concept. 
In fact, the tendency «to set Italy apart, to put it [..] 
outside the group of cases which inform much of comparative 
political theory building» is particularly manifest in «the 
application of the term * clientelism" to practices which 
often look suspiciously like constituency or "pork-barrel" 
politics» (Lange 1980, 2 and 1; in more general terms also 
Lemarchand 1981, 7-8)38. While it is true that Italian 
politicians (including the younger ones) are at the centre 
of a wide network of social exchanges, they tend to do so in 
a pragmatic manner, giving rise to what Eisenstadt and
social categories among political participants; what perfect stability 
in a political system would be is unclear.
37 Research on clientelism recognizes that patronage relations are an 
«elusive» subject of direct observation and measurement (cf. Lande 1983, 
441*3) . Indirect indicators are normally adopted, such as the use of 
preference votes or the number of invalidity pensions in some areas.
38 The misuse of the * clientelism* label in Italy is perhaps due to the 
massive pre-existence of patron-client relationships in rural and under­
developed areas of the country. This is likely to have brought about an 
over-sensitivity to particularism among observers (cf. Eve 1993) . Yet, 
while patronage tends to be based on instrumental relationships, 
clientelism implies «that the obligations to protection and allegiance 
of patrons and clients respectively are not specific and not limited to 
some spheres of social behaviour, but cover all the aspects of it. {..] 
The exchange relation goes beyond the instrumental concession of 
favours, and it is strongly affective» (Catanzaro 1979, 79-80).
SeugggeBsn ■
214
Roniger (1984, 184-5) have called «addendum-like 
clientelistic relations» parallel to «universalistic inodes 
of generalized exchange». Rather than patrons, Italian 
politicians appear closer to the political «bosses» 
portrayed by Weber (1948, 109-10)39.
In this respect, Italy is not likely to be a very 
special case. Depurated of the deference of traditional 
patrimonalism, particularist exchanges turn out to be quite 
a normal feature of contemporary democracies (Roniger 1994). 
Some even argue that
«to the extent that the public domain is shrinking 
and the state correspondingly retreats from the purview 
of civil society, then the scope for the private 
appropriation of public resources together with the 
network building it both requires and expresses - in 
short, the scope for patronage-type behaviour - is 
bound to increase» (Theobald 1992, 190-1).
A similar diagnosis is sketched out by researchers who 
report the advent of a new type of political party in the 
Western world - the «cartel party» - in which goals «become 
more self-referential», activism «a profession in itself», 
membership reduced and «atomized» (Katz-Mair 1995, 19-21). 
By virtue of the emerging «interpenetration of party and 
state», party officers would also have «gained increasing 
access to patronage resources» - significantly, «the most
39 The transformation of "old* patron-client relations has long been 
detected in Italy and qualified as the emergence of «mass», 
«horizontal», «bureaucratic», or «party-directed» clientelism (Tarrow 
1967; Allum 1973; Caciagli 1977; Graziano 1973 and 1980; Gribaudi 1980; 
Chubb 1981; Walston 1987). Among these authors, yet, only Caciagli 
(1977, 113-4) feels the need to refer to the Weberian concept of
bossism, even though he finds the term "manager* more adequate. 
Terminological differences also probably reflect nuances of 
relationships at different times and places of investigation.
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obvious illustration [being] provided by the Italian case» 
(Mair 1995, 52-3).
Even if the insulation of political life from the 
public's interest on which the persistence of patrimonialism 
is ultimately predicated by both Theobald and Mair were not 
to increase, there is a fundamental reason why politicians 
would resort to large personal networks : the very nature of 
democracy as a market for votes. In any democratic system, 
the establishment of personal relations (preliminary to 
exchanges) between citizens and politicians may seem 
rational to both. Through these relations of potential or 
actual exchange, citizens aim to maximize the value of their 
ballot and politicians to pre-empt consensus. Thus, not even 
the coming of a more affluent and universalist society can 
undermine the rationality of patronage at the individual 
level (although collective outcomes are clearly sub- 
optimal) .
There can be, however, institutional constraints to 
patronage. Namely, the co-presence of majority voting, large 
constituencies, and weak parties can make the cost of 
political networking too high for the ordinary political 
aspirants. To a substantial extent, these three conditions 
have been fulfilled most recently in Italy40.
40 In 1993, the main political leaders of the country began to be sued 
and delegitiroated, and the traditional parties to break up. These events 
first favoured the introduction of a new electoral system (mostly 
majority voting), and subsequently, in 1994, the election of a 
Parliament with newly formed parties and an unprecedented number of 
novices (71 per cent).
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The change of the electoral system seems to have 
altered the hierarchy of the political resources for 
election. With the proportional system and the multiple 
preference vote, social capital was most useful in securing 
a certain number (not necessarily very high) of "safe" votes 
by means of patronage, and in swapping preference votes with 
other candidates on the list. Candidates who were most able 
to form alliances with other candidates in order to exchange 
each one's preference votes were prized. Conversely, a 
higher consensus is necessary for election with the majority 
system. In no constituency can a seat be obtained with less 
than 20,000 votes - a number of people that is difficult to 
win over with clientelistic methods alone41. Therefore, 
mass-scale political marketing and campaigns have a stronger 
impact. Economic capital counts more, social capital less. 
The entry into Parliament of a markedly larger share of 
employers and business owners (doctors, lawyers, and so on) 
and the reduction of political professionals42 among Italian 
MPs (from 61.2% in 1992 to 31.9% in 1994) seem to indicate 
that money has become more important in the political
41 Essentially because of time, there is an upper limit to the number of 
social ties that any individual (and political brokers as well) can 
manage. Personalized political machines (with functionaries and sub­
leaders) capable of managing thousands of relations indirectly may be a 
solution. In practice, such machines might be less productive than 
direct networking and, most of all, require something more than 
professional dedication: money.
42 MPs are considered to be 'political professionals' if they have no 
alternative occupation, if they have been elected in the last three 
legislatures, or if they have been mayors or regional councillors for 
the last 15 years without interruption. Different operational 
definitions underlie the classifications in Mastropaolo (1994) and 
Verzichelli (1994).
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recruitment of parliamentary candidates, much as is the case 
in other political systems based on majority voting (such as 
Britain and France)43.
Inasmuch as selection systems reflect value structures 
that lie at the core of a culture, the transformation of 
which follows the rhythms of the longue durée, the political 
ambition of the younger aspirants in the Italian system may 
continue to stem from a personal resource transfer dominated 
by family ties. However, inasmuch as institutional 
constraints such as voting systems affect political 
behaviour, the hierarchy of the relevant resources may 
change - with a possible decrease of the importance of 
social capital.
3.3. Politics Is Not a Vocation
Most political men seek to create an image of 
themselves as originally spurred by an inner vocation for 
politics. In societies in which political participation and 
interest are low, a large part of the public is likely to 
lack the competence and the arguments to discuss this claim. 
"Politicians are where they are because they were born with 
a politician' s mind" is how the governed often come to see 
political recruitment.
43 In Britain and France usually about two fifths of the 
parliamentarians are business owners (Mastropaolo 1993, 82*6). In
particular, among the elected with majority voting in the Italian 
chamber of Deputies of 1994, 35.3% are business owners, while they are 
only 20.6% among the elected with proportional voting. I thank Luca 
Verzichelli for these figures.
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Against such a simplistic yet popular view, this study 
has shown that structural opportunities more than 
personality traits condition entrance into politics at a 
young age44. The control of salient and specific social 
resources makes political ambition an essentially rational 
career decision. This conclusion probably goes beyond the
boundaries of our research focus. If being politically 
active is a rational choice even in almost uninfluential 
offices such as those of party youth organizations, so
should it be in more powerful and rewarding political 
positions. With very rare exceptions45, thus, "political
calling" seems to be a myth: the formula by which a
widespread tendency to psychologism is applied to politics 
in a secularized society46.
Such a potential tendency does no good to democracy. 
Indeed, psychologism as a way of interpreting political 
actions is not only unjustified, but it may even be
dangerous as it instills the feeling that democracy relies 
on special kinds of men. When circumstances wipe away this 
feeling, the loss of trust in politicians reverberates on 
the trust in the polity. The legitimacy of the political
44 Of course, this is no guarantee that prospective politicians will not 
develop abnormal personalities later in their career.
45 It must be clear that our treatment of political ambition covers the 
normal situation of young people entering politics, not the emergence of 
exceptional and charismatic leaders. For them psychological models are 
probably better suited.
46 Psychologism is defined as «the theory that society depends on the 
"human nature" of its members» by Popper (1966, I, 84), according to 
whom the term was coined by Husserl (ibid., II, 323). An important 
indicator of the success of psychologism as popular Weltanschauung is 
the rise of psychoanalysis in the twentieth century (Gellner 1985).
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system may suffer because of the unexpected disillusionment 
with political leaders.
On the contrary, when political careers are viewed as 
routine, the public can read the motives of their 
representatives' behaviours more realistically. While this 
realism may reduce political satisfaction, it certainly 
prevents risky disillusionments. If we know that we are 
governed by professionals who have their own interests, we 
can keep our eyes open. If we are aware that going into 
politics does not depend on "God's blessing" but tends to be 
of a more mundane choice, we can more easily preserve the 
critical attitude which lies at the heart of the democratic 
spirit.
nmnm
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APPENDIX A
THE PERSONAL NETWORKS
OF YOUNG POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND NONACTIVISTS
1. Collecting Network Data
In the context of this study, the concept of "personal 
network" has been used to refer to the subjectively 
significant social relationships which define the boundaries 
of any individual's unique «world of the fellow-men»1. As in 
all social network literature, personal network data consist 
of «a focal actor, termed ego, a set of alters who have ties 
to ego, and measurements on the ties among these alters» 
(Wassermann-Faust 1994, 42).
The first problem in social network research is that 
«the task of identifying network members is not so simple as 
asking respondents "Who do you know?"» (Campbell-Lee 1991, 
204). Indeed, «to bound a setting is to introduce the 
arbitrary» (White 1992, 72)2. Many strategies to define
1 This concept is illustrated by Schütz when tracing his outlook on 
social reality: «The social world contains a domain characterized by the 
immediacy of my experience of others. Human beings in this domain are my 
fellow-men; they share with me a common sector of space and time» 
(Schütz 1976, II, 22).
2 Any personal network may appear endless, since it is composed of the 
actors' social ties, of the ties of their ties, and so on. This ought 
not to eliminate the need to simplify reality somewhat. In sociology, 
the point was brilliantly exposed by Sorokin (1962, 5), who noted that 
«theoretically the existence and behavior of any individual influences 
to some infinitesimal degree those of all other individuals. However, 
this admission does not hinder the existence of different degrees of 
functional dependence between various individuals, beginning with the 
closest dependence, in which two or more individuals are bound by such a 
short "rope" that every action of one of them affects the action of the
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operationally the boundaries of personal networks have been 
proposed. Pioneer studies on social networks were based on 
respondents' enumeration of their «three best friends» 
(Laumann 1973) or the «six persons outside your home that 
you feel closest to» (Wellman 1979). A different strategy 
was introduced by McAllister and Fischer (1978), who began 
to operationalize personal networks on the basis of multiple 
name generators referring to specific social exchanges: 
questions about the people with whom respondents discuss and 
do different things together. This method was also adopted 
and expanded in network research on social support (cf. 
Tardy 1985; Wellman-Wortley 1990)* 3.
However, «discussion» is usually taken as the stimulus 
object. A standard point of reference is the network items 
included in the 1984 American General Social Survey (GSS), 
which asked with whom a respondent had «discussed matters 
important to him/her within the past six months» (Burt 1984; 
Campbell et al. 1984). This operationalization is convenient 
on many grounds, but questionable on others. «Discussion» 
can be a poor indicator for detecting «significant others». 
Personal attachments are not contingent on talking about 
certain topics - because talking about these is felt 
unnecessary or not interesting. Interactions with close 
associates rely on shared presuppositions, giving rise to
others [.. ], and ending with such a remote and intangible dependence 
that it cannot be noticed and therefore is practically non-existent».
3 Affective networks are also to the fore in social psychology, but they 
are dealt with under the label of 'close relationships', for the 
measurement of which a number of alternative operationalizations has 
been devised (cf. Berscheid et al. 1989).
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truncated and often unverbal exchanges which do not fit the 
ordinary meaning of 'discussion' (Gumperz 1982, 71-2). 
«Discussion» has therefore not been used as name generator 
of significant network ties in this study4.
Name generators reflect affective exchange, or specific 
exchange, or interaction, or role relations (van der Poel 
1993b, 50-4). Although these four types of name generators 
are not mutually exclusive, as has been shown by Van 
Sonderen et al. (1989), to keep them separate seems most 
appropriate for analytical clarity. The method adopted here 
was the following. Three different contexts of interaction 
were referred to: a) that of the professional activity, b) 
that of the non-professional activities, c) that of the 
family (with reference to members interested in politics). 
The stress was on the instrumental nature of the 
«significant others» in the first context and on the 
affective nature of those in the second and in the third 
context.
The name generator for the professional context was: 
«Who are those individuals you find yourself more in touch 
with in your main activity [politics for activists, work- 
school for nonactivists]?». For selecting the more elective 
significant others in the non-professional context, the 
following question was asked: «With whom do you have intense
4 More satisfactory is the name generator used in another large national 
survey of personal networks: the German ALLBUS of 1990. Respondents were 
asked to «think about the three people with whom [they] most often come 
together on a private basis» (Wolf 1994, 454; italics added). However, 
this operationalization excludes any contact developed within work and 
public contexts - a quite significant slice of social life, at least for 
the purposes of the present study.
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and enduring social relations?»5. The reconstruction of the 
family network, finally, was limited to a description of 
those family members who are more interested in politics, 
either because they participate in political activities or 
discuss politics with the respondent.
In addition, criteria based on specific social 
exchanges were used to select among personal network members 
a smaller number of social supporters with regard to 
«moral», «sentimental», «economic», and «work-related» 
problems (cf. chapter VI, S 2).
No upper limit to network size was predetermined. The 
interview routine even contained a probe eliciting more 
names in both contexts of interaction («Does anybody else 
come to your mind with whom you have been particularly close 
/ you have a particularly intense relationship?»). For 
practical reasons, however, up to five names in each context 
were recorded. This threshold is higher than the norm in 
most network surveys (three persons). As 48.7% of the 
political activists felt the need to name up to five 
significant others in their professional context (37.6% 
among nonactivists in their job setting) and 47.8% in the 
non-professional (54% among nonactivists), personal networks 
were eventually larger than they had been recorded: yet,
5 Long-standing social ties proved to be the bulk of the relationships 
in the non-professional context of respondents' life: 89.7% of the 
members of the activists' and 92.8% of the members of the nonactivists' 
non-professional networks were known for two years or more. Since on 
average activists took their leading offices in the party some two years 
earlier, there seems to be an almost complete coincidence of the non- 
occupational network resulting from the interviews and the one which 
existed before entering active politics.
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since memory is likely to select names in order of 
subjective importance, the core structure of the personal 
network is likely to have been captured by this procedure 
(cf. Freeman et al, 1987)6.
2. Organizing Network Data
Personal networks of the interviewed young activists 
and non-activists are described through different kinds of 
data:
a. Attributes of the network members (e.g., age, 
gender);
b. Attributes of the social relationship between the 
actor and each member of his network (e.g., 
«frequence», «duration»)7?
c. Attributes of the relations of the network members 
among each other (i .e ., «proximity»)8;
d. Structural attributes of the personal network (i.e., 
«size», «density», «homophily»).
8 The highest number of possible ties recorded by means of the procedure 
used is fifteen (five in professional context, five in non-professional 
context, five in the family). According to White (1992, 76), «in all 
times and contexts [.. ] to focus on just the relations intense enough to 
persist indefinitely vis-à-vis ego, there seem to be around sixteen as a 
mode - in early societies all reckoned in a kinship frame, or in our own 
society dispersed over peer, kin, work, and neighborhood».
7 Among all the attempts to classify the attributes of social 
relationships (cf. Turner 1988), perhaps the most satisfactory for 
empirical research is that of Sorokin (1962, 1-23), which was therefore 
used in this study, the only substantial exception being the fusion of 
Sorokin's «orientation» and «catexis» in one single dimension of 
regulation of social exchanges. Five dimensions of social ties were 
taken into account in data gathering: a) «regulative orientation», b) 
«hierarchy» (Sorokin calls it «dependency»), c) «duration» (or «time 
length of the tie»), d) «frequency», e) «extension» (to one or more 
institutional contexts). The last dimension was operationalized as a 
characteristic of the whole set of relations included in the network 
(called «interconnectedness»).
8 These data were obtained from the respondents and might not reflect, 
the reality of social relationships, but only how respondents perceive 
them. This is the relevant matter, however, since the focus is on the 
consequences deriving from respondents * interpretations of such 
relationships (cf. Krackhardt 1987).
BX
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This set of network data was divided into two files. 
The first file includes type a and type d data: respondents 
are cases, their attributes and those of their networks are 
variables. The second file includes type b and type c data: 
the ties forming each personal network are cases, the 
attributes of these ties are variables.
Social network research has several units and levels of 
analysis9. Relatively easy techniques of data integration 
with standard softwares (respectively, SAS and SPSS) are 
described in Wellman-Gonzalez Baker (1985) and Wolf (1994). 
The integration procedure used in the present study is 
conceptually equivalent to these; the only differences are 
due to the use of another statistical package (STATISTICA) 
for data management. Once integrated with attribute data in 
a standard matrix, computations with network items, as with 
all the other variables, were carried out with either 
STATISTICA or SPSS for Windows.
3. Activists and Nonactivists in Their Social Contexts: 
Differences of Personal Networks
Theoretically, social differentiation of ties and low 
density of personal networks can attest to the possibility 
of acting as a "bridge" among a variety of demands and 
interests, giving at the same time access to a wider range 
of resources (e.g., information, ideas, support). This point
9 A concise but bright description of the different levels of network 
data - individual, relational, and structural - is in Wellmann et al. 
(1991, 223-6; cf. also Wasserman-Faust 1989).
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is explicitly connected to the «strength of the weak ties» 
and «structural holes» arguments (Granovetter 1973; Burt
1992)10 • The hypothesis that a sparser network of social 
relations enlarges the actor's scope of opportunities can be 
extended to political purposes. Inasmuch as «the prototypic 
politician engages in logrolling» (March-Olsen 1989, 30), 
personal networks can be regarded as «infraresources» of 
power (Rogers 1974) - resources to obtain resources* 11. 
Having network members with different qualities and social 
positions may favour political activism, inasmuch as this 
gives access to diverse power resources and allows for in- 
between types of behaviour12.
^  These alternative versions of the same theory affirming the 
importance of differentiated networks for various instrumental purposes 
- like getting a job, being promoted manager, or finding a home - has 
been positively tested by a number of studies (Lin et al. 1981a; Lin 
1982; Campbell et al. 1986; Flap-De Graaf 1986; Lin-Dumin 1986; Lin 
1988; Requena 1991; O ’ Regan-Quigley 1993; Burt 1992 and 1995; even 
before Katz 1958). Other authors consider such a theory to explain 
instrumental action among upper social strata only (Marsden-Hurlbert 
1988; Wegener 1991).
11 A 'power resource' can be defined as all that can work as the 
motivational basis for somebody’s compliance with the actor. This 
definition is consistent with Nuttall et al. (1968, 352-3), Cartwright 
(1969, 152), Gamson (1970, 267), Rogers (1974, 1425), Bell (1975, 84), 
Burns (1978, 15-7), Lin (1982, 132).
12 In a different direction, the low network density of political actors 
may also be interpreted in socio-psychological terms as a correlate of a 
trait of the political personality: «high self-monitoring» (Snyder-Smith 
1986). People with this kind of trait «live in highly partitioned, 
differentiated, or compartmentalized social worlds in which they engage 
in specific activities with particular people. Further, their activity 
partners appear to be chosen because of the partners’ skill, expertise, 
or specialization in specific activity domains. In addition, when close 
friendships do exist in the lives of high self-monitoring individuals, 
they seem to be with people who are themselves relatively high in self­
monitoring. Moreover, this behavioral orientation toward choosing 
friends has its cognitive counterpart in the activity-oriented 
conception of friendship possessed by high self-monitoring individuals» 
(ibid., 73-4).
227
3.1. Network Density and Interconnectedness
In network analysis density is usually defined as «the
degree to which network members know one another apart from 
ties to ego» (Milardo 1986, 152). In operational terms, the 
density of a personal network consists of the number of 
existing relationships among network members divided by the 
number of the possible relationships among them. Only the 
presence or absence of these relationships are taken into 
account normally. On the contrary, actual ties are weighted 
here by the extent of their "proximity": the cases in which 
individuals in each possible dyad «do not know each other», 
«know each other but do not associate with each other», and 
«know and associate with each other» have been 
distinguished. Density, thus, can vary from 1 to 3 (1 when 
network members are unknown to each other, 2 when they know 
but do not associate with each other, 3 when they know and 
associate with each other).
Network members are more distant from each other in 
activists' non-professional networks than in nonactivists': 
the average density is 2.08 and 2.49 respectively. 
Seemingly, prospective politicians tend to choose associates 
who are not part of an established group, thereby forming 
the communication bridge among them.
Another measure of density was also provided. This is 
"interconnectedness", which corresponds to the extent of 
overlap of the three contexts of social relationships 
examined (professional, non-professional, and family). 
Respondents were asked to state whether most of the people 
they use to meet in one context are «unknown to» (-1),
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«known to» (0), or «known to and met by» (+1) those whom 
they meet in any of the other contexts (tables 1-2). The 
scores were then summed to form a global index of 
interconnectedness. - ' J
Table 1: «What kind of relations are there between the bulk 
of the people you associate with in your professional 
context and the rest of your associates?»
DON’T KNOW!JUST KNOW 
EACH OTHER|EACH OTHER
KNOW AND 
MEET
Totals
NONACTIVISTS 
Row %
148
47.1%
114
36.3%
52
16.6%
314
ACTIVISTS 
Row %
70
60.9%
37
32.2%
8
6.9%
115
All Grps \ 218 j 151 j 60 j 429
Table 2; «What kind of relations are there between the bulk 
of the people you associate with in your free time/other 
activités and the rest of your associates?»
+ + ---------------------- + ---------------------- -I------------------------+ ---------------------- +
DON’T KNOW JUST KNOW KNOW AND Totals
EACH OTHER EACH OTHER MEET
NONACTIVISTS 
Row %
33
10.2%
99
30.8%
190
59.0%
322
ACTIVISTS j 17 
Row % j 14.8%
56
48.7%
42
36.5%
115
All Grps j 50 j 155 j 232 j 437 j
Only for 7% of the young activists does the bulk of 
their political associates mix with some of their associates 
in other contexts of life, such as family members or 
colleagues in other activities. Among the workmates of
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respondents in the control group, this seems to happen in 
more than twice the cases. Similarly, only 36.5% of the 
young politicians (against 59% of the control group) state 
that the bulk of their non-professional network members 
knows and meets members of their networks from other 
settings. Interconnectedness is even lower among more 
powerful and older activists.
Whatever the measure used, to sum up, evidence shows 
that the more young people actively participate in political 
affairs, the more they will tend to separate their social 
relationships.
3.2. Homophily in Personal Networks
Embeddedness in a network of culturally similar 
significant others is likely to bring about pressures to
identify with significant others' standards. This may
facilitate political involvement. as it smooths the
resistance to recruitment offers in groups which are
consistent with these shared standards (Lane 1959, 108)13 •
Methodologically, a basic distinction exists between 
the similarity of attributes and of attitudes. Lazarsfeld 
and Merton (1954), introducing these two forms of social 
distance between associates, called them respectively
13 This hypothesis can be viewed as an extension of the "classic" 
network theory of voting of the Columbia school of electoral studies 
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Sheingold 1973): the more consistent are an 
individual's significant others in their political choices, the more 
convinced he will be in adhering to such choices (cf. also Festinger 
1954) .
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«status homophily» and «value homophily»14. Furthermore, the 
tendency to associate with most different others is to be 
distinguished from the tendency to associate with most 
varied others. The former refers to the dissimilarity 
between Ego and his Alters; the latter to the dissimilarity 
among Alters. For instance, if Ego is a man and his network 
is composed of two women, gender difference will be high and 
gender variety low.
Four types of indexes were thus created (figure 1) . 
Indexes of status difference and variety were created as 
regards attributest age, gender, profession, hierarchical 
position on the job. Indexes of value difference and variety 
were created as regards attitudes : dressing taste, opinion 
on abortion, vote preference15.
14 Lazarsfeld and Merton's path-breaking and unfinished research 
programme on these aspects of social relationships is rarely mentioned 
even in network research (for exceptions, Verbrugge 1977; Kandel 1978; 
Feld 1982; McPherson-Smith Lovin 1987). Implicitly, however, most 
network studies of social influence incorporate homophily in their 
explanations (for a review. Marsden-Friedkin 1993).
15 Mathematically these indexes correspond respectively to:
* Indexes of difference (in age, gender, profession, hierarchical status 
on the job, and in the various items of opinion) = V(Xx-2Axi/NAxi) 
where Ex is Ego's value and Ax^ each Alter's value on the binary 
variable (see Friedkin-Cook 1990);
* Indexes of variety (in age, gender, etc.) ■ sd Ax^, i.e. the standard 
deviation of Alters’ values. For calculating the index of professional 
variety, Alters' occupations have been dichotomized as equal to Ego or 
different to Ego.
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Figure 1 : Forms and references of homophily in network
composition
REFERENCE
Ego-Alters Alt ers-A11ers
FORMS OF Status Status Difference ; Status variety
HOMOPHILY Value Value Difference j Value Variety
3,2,1, Status Difference and Variety of Personal 
Networks
How similar are the attributes of network members and 
those of respondents? In this section, similarity of gender, 
age and occupation in the non-professional contexts of 
social relationships will be examined. As will be seen, save 
some exceptions, prospective politicians fish their most 
intimate associates from different occupational and cohort 
pools.
Only the index of promiscuity (i.e., gender difference) 
reveals no difference between the two samples. Although in 
the networks of the political activists men are a large 
majority (86.8%), this is simply due to the larger 
proportion of men among activists themselves.
In contrast, the non-professional networks of activists 
include individuals of differing age: the index of age 
variety is 4.22 for activists and 2.63 for nonactivists. 
Activists' social relations are more likely to stand at the 
crossing of more generations.
Occupational homophily is also different in the two 
samples. Political activists have a higher number of friends 
who do the same job as they do (50.2% vs. 40.9% among
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nonactivists) . This is almost exclusively due to the 
associative behaviour of executives and professionals (i.e., 
employers, managers, lawyers). Among "ordinary" young people 
these categories are the most open toward people from 
different occupations: 89.9% of their friends have a
different job. However, this is so only for 58.2% of the 
friends of the young executives and professionals who are 
politically active. More than the politically apathetic 
young entrepreneur or lawyer, the young entrepreneur or 
lawyer in politics is at the centre of a world of 
professional alter egos. Perhaps by selecting individuals 
from the same occupational milieu, upper status activists 
seek to play down their identity as politicians, which has a 
negative stigma in current culture (cf. chapter IV, § 1).
5.2.2. Value Difference and Variety of Personal 
Networks
In the social relations with significant others, 
«common values and strong personal attachments act both as 
cause and effect, modifying and in turn being modified by 
one another» (Lazarsfeld-Merton 1954, 36). However, such a
process of cultural homogeneization at the micro level is 
always to some extent reduced by norms of tolerance and by 
curiosity for diversity (ibid., 32-4). Therefore, personal 
networks do differ in terms of the level of opinion 
agreement of the members with Ego.
Three measures of cultural affinity are taken into 
account here: agreement on dressing taste (a basic element 
of the aesthetic dimension in youth culture), on abortion
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best policy (a basic element of the ethical dimension), on 
vote preference (a basic element of the political 
dimension).
Table 3 : Agreement between 
on cultural issues (%)
respondents and their associates
PROFESSIONAL TIES NON-PROFESSIONAL TIES
NONACTIVISTS ACTIVISTS NONACTIVISTS ACTIVISTS
DRESSING 53.8 46.3 65.2 57.0
ABORTION 71.8 78.9 77.2 79.3
VOTE 24.6 95.4 35.2 67.6
N=417 N=1,089 N=404 N=1,288
On average, agreement on a moral issue such as abortion 
seems most important in developing and maintaining social 
ties: in all contexts of social relationships, both
activists and nonactivists cannot stand to disagree with 
more than one quarter of their associates on average (table
3). Abortion is a most divisive issue in contemporary 
Western culture, and forms a real cleavage also among 
Italian young people: pro- and anti-abortists are almost 
equally represented in the two samples (57% and 43% 
respectively)16. What Dworkin (1993, 9) says of Americans 
can be said of young Italians: they find it hard «to learn
16 If «the war between anti-abortion groups and their opponents is 
America’s new version of the terrible seventeenth-century European civil 
wars of religion» {Dworkin 1993, 4; cf. also Jaffe et al. 1981, 100-9), 
such a «clash of absolutes» (Tribe 1990) is no less acute in Europe, and 
particularly in Italy where even two highly controversial referendums 
were held in 1981. In the most radical of these refererenda, 32% of the 
voters asked for a complete ban on abortion (Uleri 1994, 392).
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to live together disagreeing about abortion as they disagree 
about other matters». Overall, discordance on moral values 
is the least bearable cultural difference in the social 
relations of the young respondents.
Activists have a much higher degree of agreement on 
voting with non-political associates than nonactivists17. 
Young politicians tend to have extra-political friends who 
are politically like-minded and vote as they do. The 
activists' social world is, so to speak, a single party 
system. This is also the case if only network members known 
before entering politics are taken into account: 62.3% of
the friends of activists since the age of 16 cast the same 
vote (against 38.1% in the control group). As political 
apathy is often a strategy for muddling through conflicting 
loyalties with discording associates, finding oneself in a 
culturally uniform social world minimizes the risks of 
social frictions in taking a stance on politics. Possibly, 
political agreement with intimate friends may facilitate the 
choice to enter politics.
Value homophily also reflects party differences. In 
both contexts of their personal networks, young Leghisti 
disagree less on dressing styles, Young Communists on 
abortion, Young Christian Democrats on electoral choices. 
These variations may be due to long-lasting differences in 
party subcultures. The DC traditionally admitted a wide
17 The contrary was shown to be true in a survey of young members of 
voluntary groups (Sciolla-Ricolfi 1989, 30-1). This is probably one
among many differences between activists of parties and of other kinds 
of associations.
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spectrum of ideological positions among its members; such 
eclecticism was even perhaps the key of its electoral 
successes. The former Communist Party (currently PDS) 
functioned more as a "church" party and used to form a 
common culture in the social environment which it 
influenced: it had a clear say also on matters of private 
morality such as abortion. Finally, the Lega Nord emerged as 
the representative of a territorially concentrated but 
strongly rooted culture in which the material aspects of 
well-being, such as dress, are positively valued18.
18 Activists of the Northern League also show the highest degree of 
agreement with the relatives with whom they discuss politics on all 
three of the opinion items - abortion, vote, and dress.
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE MULTIVARIATE MODELS
OF THE CASE-CONTROL STUDY
Nonactivists Activists Group difference1
Mean* Sd Mean* Sd t-value Slq
Gender (male) .44 .81 7.23 .000
Occupation (student) .55 .63 1.36 .170
Family Ciass HI (head of household in classes 1 or II of Erikson* 
Goldthotpe schema)
.10 ¿37 7.06 .000
Family Class til (head of household in class III of Erikson- 
Goldthorpe schema)
¿23 ¿37 -2.95 .003
Father's Education (university degree) .11 .31 5.36 .000
Mother's Education (university degree) .08 22 4.11 .000
Place of Residence (city, i.e. provincial capital) ¿32 ¿52 3.90 .000
Sense of Personal Control (feels to master h» future more than in ¿25 .13 -2.65 .045
adolescence)
Sense of Group Belonging (feels to be part of a united social group ¿25 ¿55 6.09 .000
more than in adolescence)
Sense of Sociability (feels to have more friends than in .53 J50 -.38 .703
adolescence)
Sense of Consistency (feels more coherent than in adolescence) .54 .46 -1.47 .142
Dogmatism (index: cf. chap. V, § 3.2) .03 1.02 -.09 .95 1.07 .293
Attituctinal Consistency (index: cf. chap. V, § 3.4) -.06 .98 .17 1.04 -2.10 .036
PoliticaBy Active Kin (at least one family member or relative 
participates or participated in political life)
.02 .68 22.51 .000
Complexity (standardized number of opinion items for which a nan-
polar stance was expressed)
.04 1.03 -.14 .88 1.66 .098
Availability of Reference Group (working membership in culturally 
well-defined groups other than parties)
.06 .06 .07 .942
Political Agreement with Longstanding Friends (proportion of 
network friends known since the age of 16 or earlier who cast
¿36 .62 -6.21 .000
same vote as respondent)
Political Agreement with Family Members (proportion of family .50 .71 -4.85 .000
members who cast same vote as respondent)
Prior Availability of Potential Political Mentor (for nonactivists: 
knows a politician personally, for activists: at least one senior 
politician in network already known before entering the party 
organization)
.48 .96 9.92 .000
Volume of Social Capital (surnames in personal phone list under 4.88 4.23 16.69 16.40 -11-59 .000
the ’D’ letter)
Incomplete Control of Soda! Mobitty Resources (Either “poor 
educational record" [stopped studying before university or still 
student without a university degree at 25 or more], or “lack of 
inheritable job” [none of parents to entrepreneur, autonomous
professional, or self-employed!)
.36 ¿55 -3.44 .001
1 95% confidence interval 
1 Proportions for dummy variables
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APPENDIX C
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE MULTIVARIATE MODELS
OF THE SOCIAL MOBILITY STUDY
"Simpte'' Party Membership
Nonmembers Members Group
difference1
Mean2 Sd Mean1 Sd t-value Sig
Gender (male) .49 .59 2.16 .031
Occupation (student) .22 .13 -2.65 .025
Family Class l-ll (head of household in class t or II of Erikson-Goldthorpe .09 .06 -1.32 .027
schema)
Family Class III (head of household in class Ml of Erikson-Goldthorpe .14 .08 -1.80 .072
schema)
Father’s Education (university degree) .06 .04 -1.05 .294
/Worrier’s Education (university degree) .03 .02 -.34 .732
Father’s Political Interest (1 -4 points scale) 1.61 .80 2.00 .99 -4 62 .000
Acquaintanceship with Politician (knows a politician personally) .41 .73 7.10 .000
Volume of Social Capital (frequency of invitation by friends; 1 -5 points 2.42 1.01 2.57 .95 -1.50 .133
scale)
Incomplete Control of Social Mobility Resources (Either “poor educational .38 .32 1.20 .230
record" [stopped studying before university or still student without a
university degree at 25 or more], or ‘lack of inheritable job" [none of
parents is entrepreneur, autonomous professional, or seif-employed])
"Active” Party Membership
Nonmembers Members Group difference1
Mean3 Sd Mean3 Sd t-value Slg
Gender (male) .49 .65 2.00 .046
Occupation (student) .22 .23 .19 .852
Family Class /-// (head of household in classes 1 or II of Erikson- .09 .05 -.81 .420
Goldthorpe schema)
Family Class II (head of household in class III of Erikson-Goldthorpe .14 .08
-1.10 .272
schema)
Father's Education (university degree) .06 .05 -.12 .855
Mother’s Education (university degree) .02 .03 -.14 .893
Father’s Political Interest (1 -4 points scale) 1.62 .80 2.40 1.04 -5.82 .000
Acquaintanceship with Politician (knows a politician personally) .41 .90 6.36 .000
Volume of Social Capital (frequency of invitation by friends; 1-5 points 2.42 1.01 2.88 .85 -2.82 .005
scale)
Incomplete Control of Social Mobility Resources (Either ‘poor educational .38 .33 .57 .568
record" [stopped studying before university or still student without a
university degree at 25 or more], or ‘lack of inheritable job" [none of
parents is entrepreneur, autonomous professional, or setf-emploved])
1 95% confidence interval
2 Proportions lor dummy variables
i
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Questa pagina è da tenere a fianco del questionario per scriverci le risposti
TABELLE DI CODIFICA
TABELLA ATTTIVITA/ POLITICA
Persona Status Anni Età Sesso Prof Int Tipo Abb Aborto Voto
A . . . [ ] £ 3 [ 3 £ 3 £ 3 C 3 ( 3 C 3 £ 3 £ 3
B . . . [ ] [ 3 [ 3 £ 3 [ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 t 3
C . . . [ 3 [ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 [ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3
D » » « * * £ 3 C 3 t 3 C 3 £ 3 t 3 £ 3 £ 3 t 3 E 3
E . .. £ 3 C 3 C 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 t 3 £ 3
TABELLA TEMPO LIBERO/ALTRE ATTIVITÀ'
Persona Anni Età Sesso Prof Int Tipo Abb Aborto Voto
F ... [ 3 [ 3 £ 3 E 3 C 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3
G .... C 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 C 3 C 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3
H .... [ 3 [ 3 t 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 C 3 £ 3 £ 3
I . . . [ 3 [ 3 £ 3 C 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3
L .... [ 3 C 3 £ 3 £ 3 C 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3
TABELLA FAMIGLIA
Persona Status Int Tipo Abb Aborto Voto
M ..... [ 3 £ 3 C 3 t 3 £ 3 £ 3
N ..... [ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 C 3 £ 3
0 . . . . C 3 [ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 E 3
P ..... C 3 £ 3 ( 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3
Q . . . . t 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3 £ 3
TABELLA DENSITÀ' POLITICA TABELLA DENSITÀ' TEMPO LIBERO/ALTRE ATTIVITÀ9
A + B: [ ] 
A + C: [ ] 
A + D: [ ] 
A + E: [ ] 
B + C: [ ] 
B + D: [ ] 
B + E: [ ] 
C + D: [ ] 
C + E: [ ] 
D + E: [ ]
F + G: [ ] 
F + H: [ ] 
F + Is [ ] 
F + L: [ ] 
G + H: [ ] 
G + I: [ '] 
G + L: [ ] 
H + X: [ ] 
H + L: [ ] 
I + L: [ ]
ISTRUZIONI PER LA COMPILAZIONE
Il questionario che Ti sottoponiamo si compone di tre sezioni. Attenzione: le nsposte alle domande della seconda $ezjor.; 
dovranno essere segnate nella "tabella di codifica" (di colore giallo) sul retro della copertina.
Prima di cominciare, una raccomandazione: non lasciare domande senza risposta, che possono pregiudicare * 
rappresentatività del campione. Buon lavoro!
PRIMA SEZIONE: DATI SOCIOBIOGRAFICI
1. In quale Comune hai vissuto più a lungo nella Tua infanzia (6-14 anni)? 2. In quale Comune vivi adesso?
3. Anno di nascita: 19................  4. Sesso: M [ ] F [ ] 5. Stato civile:............................
6. Nella famiglia in cui sei cresciuto, sei/eri? 7. Quale titolo di studio hai conseguito?
[ ] Figlio unico [ 1 Licenza elementare
[ ] Primogenito [ j Licenza media inferiore
[ ] Figlio di "mezzo" [ 1 Licenza media superiore
f I Figlio più piccolo [ J Laurea
Sa. Hai un lavoro? Se sì, quale? 8b. Studi? Se sì, cosa? 9. Quale è/era la professione di 10. Quale è/era la professione J,
Tuo padre? Tua madre?
11. Quale titolo di studio ha/aveva Tuo padre?
[ ] Nessuno
[ ] Licenza elementare 
[ ] Licenza media inferiore 
[ j Scuola professionale 
l ] Licenza media superiore 
[ j Laurea
13a. Puoi dirci se la maggior parte delle persone che 
frequenti nel tempo libero facendo politica:
[ ] Non conosce i miei familiari
[ j Conosce i miei familiari, ma non frequenta casa mia 
[ j Li conosce e frequenta casa mia
12. Quale titolo di studio ha/aveva Tua madre?
[ 1 Nessuno 
[ ] Licenza elementare 
[ ] Licenza media inferiore 
[ j Scuola professionale 
[ ] Licenza media superiore 
[ ] Laurea
13b. Puoi dirci se la maggior parte delle persone che frequenti nel 
tempo libero o svolgendo altre attività extrapolitiche:
[ ] Non conosce i miei familiari
[} Conosce i miei familiari, ma non frequenta casa mia 
[ ] Li conosce e frequenta casa mia
14. In quale anno la politica Ti ha "conquistato" -si è cioè posta al centro dei Tuoi interessi? 19
15. Qual'è il tuo partito? 16. Quali incarichi politici ricoprì in questo momento?
..................................... Nel partito o mov.:..................... . ...................................
In altre istituzioni:.........................................................
17. Perché, a un certo punto della Tua vita, hai sentito di doverTi occupare di politica in prima persona?
18. Ti senti più cittadino (una risposta per colonna):
In primo luogo In secondo luogo
* della tua città U M
* della tua regione I) []
* italiano U u
* europeo 11 M
* del mondo [] [ )
19. C'è stata qualche persona o evento in particolare che Ti 
ha incoraggiato a fare politica?
SECONDA SEZIONE: I CONTESTI SOCIALI
ATTENZIONE: La maggior parte delle risposte alle domande contenute in questa sezione del questionario devono essere segnale 
nella "tabella di codifica" sul retro della copertina.
TABELLA ATTIVITÀ* POLITICA
20. Far politica significa stare a contatto con persone che collaborano a un progetto comune, pur occupando posizioni diverse 
Quali di queste persone Ti capita di frequentare anche al di fuori degli incontri del Tuo partito? Per favore indica le loro iniziali k 
nomi di battesimo, o abbreviativi) sotto la colonna PERSONA nella tabella ATTIVITÀ ’ POLITICA 21
21. E a quali persone che fanno politica, e che ritieni piu importanti ed esperte, Ti capita di telefonare o di intrattenerti con uni 
certa consuetudine per chiedere consiglio? Per favore aggiungi le loro iniziali (o nomi di battesimo, o abbreviativi) sotto à 
colonna PERSONA nella tabella ATTIVITÀ ’ POLITICA
34. Nel complesso, le Tue attività comportano un contatto quotidiano col pubblico? Indica qui sotto la risposta prescelta-.
[ ] Si per lo più sempre con le stesse persone [ ] Sì, per lo più con sconosciuti [ ] So
35. Ci servirebbe ora un indice standard di «sociabilità». Puoi essere così gentile da guardare la Tua agenda personale del telefono e
contare quante persone ci sono sotto la lettera D? Numero persone:.............
TABELLA FAMIGLIA
36. In ogni famiglia c'è sempre qualcuno che si interessa di politica -in senso lato- più degli altri. Nella Tua famiglia, c’è qualche 
persona che ha ricoperto qualche carica civica, associativa do di pubblica rappresentanza? Per favore indica il Tuo grado di 
parentela con costui (o costoro) sotto la colonna PERSONA nella tabella FAMIGLIA {ad es.: padre, zio. nonno, fratello, eie.}
37. Qual'è la carica più importante che ha/nno ricoperto questa/e persona/e? Per ciascun familiare indicato, scrivi sotto la colonna 
STATUS della tabella FAMIGLIA il numero che trovi qui sotto in corrispondenza al ruolo svolto:
0. Semplice iscritto 1, Incarico nel movimento giovanile 2. Incarico di sezione
3. Incarico nella fed. cittadina 4. Direttivo locale del partito 5. Direttivo naz.le del partito
6. Segreteria naz.le del partito 7. Amministratore comuna lei prò v.le 3. Sindaco /presidente provincia
9. Consigliere regionale 10. Parlamentare 11, Sottosegretario, ministro 12. Altro (spec.: ...............................)
38. Cè qualcun altro nella Tua famiglia che, sebbene non faccia politica attiva, parla spesso con Te di politica? Per favore aggiungi il 
suo!loro grado di parentela sotto la colonna PERSONA nella tabella FAMIGLIA
39. Mediamente, con che frequenza vedi ognuno di questi familiari -cioè, ci parli, fate qualcosa insieme, semplicemente state vicini 
l’uno all'altro? Per ciascuna persona, scrivi sotto la colonna INT nella tabella FAMIGLIA il numero corrispondente alla risposta che 
sceglierai nelle possibilità qui sotto indicate:
1. Più o meno ogni giorno, estesamente 2. Più o meno ogni giorno, brevemente
3. Circa una volta la settimana, estesamente 4. Una volta la settimana, foresemente
5. Più di rado, estesamente 6. Più di rado, brevemente
LE CARATTERISTICHE DEI LEGAMI SOCIALI
40. Come Ti regoli quando dai qualcosa (un bene, un servizio, un aiuto) a ognuna delle persone che hai inserito nella colonna 
PERSONA delle tre tabelle di codifica? Ci sono quattro possibilità:
1. Mi aspetto di ricevere in cambio quanto mi spetta per quello che dò o faccio, nei tempi e nei modi concordati
2. Mi aspetto che chi ho aiutato si sdebiti con me entro un certo tempo
3. Mi aspetto che mi sia riconoscente, anche se è impossibile ricordarsi e calcolare tutto quello che ciascuno di noi due fa o dà 
all'altro
4. Mi aspetto che si approfitti di me e cerchi di trarre vantaggio a mie spese
Segna nelle colonne TIPO di tutte e tre le tabelle il numero corrispondente al comportamento appropriato a ciascuna PERSONA
41. Pensa un attimo al modo di vestire di ciascuna persona che hai indicato. Puoi dirci se, in fatto di abbigliamento, avete gli stessi 
gusti? Segna nella colonna ABB di tutte e tre le tabelle S * Sì o N = No
42. Puoi dirci, per ciascuna delle persone che hai nominalo, se pensi che sia d'accordo o meno con Te sulla migliore soluzione del 
problema del l’aborto? Segna nella colonna ABORTO di tutte e tre le tabelle S * D’accordo o N = Non d'accordo
43. Puoi dirci, per ciascuna persona che hai nominato, se pensi che abbia votato come Te alle ultime elezioni? Segna nella colonna 
VOTO di tutte e tre le tabelle S = Sto N -  No
Restano ora da riempire le due tabelle DENSITÀ' POLITICA e DENSITÀ’ TEMPO LIBERO/ALTRE ATTIVITÀ’, che sono 
fondamentali per una corretta analisi sociopsicologica.
44. Considera i rapporti che esistono fra le persone che frequenti facendo politica. Ci sono tre possibilità:
7. Non si conoscono 2. Si conoscono ma non si frequentano 3. Si conoscono e si frequentano
Comincia a leggere le iniziali delle PERSONE A+B nella tabella ATTIVITÀ* POLÌTICA, pensa al loro rapporto e segna la risposta 
(1, 2, o 3) nella casella A+B nella tabella DENSITÀ' POLITICA; fai poi lo stesso per tutte le altre combinazioni (A +C, A+D, etc.) 
incluse nella tabella
45. Considera ora i rapporti fra le persone che frequenti nel tempo libero (o facendo altre attività extrapolitiche). Ci sono sempre tre
possibilità:
7. Non si conoscono 2. Si conoscono ma non si frequentano 3. Si conoscono e si frequentano
Comincia a leggere le iniziali degli individui A +B nella tabella TEMPO LIBEROfALTRE ATTIVITÀ ', pensa al loro rapporto e segna 
la risposta (1, 2, o 3) nella casella A+B nella tabella DENSITÀ' TEMPO LIBEROfALTRE ATTIVITÀ’; fai poi lo stesso per tutte le 
altre combinazioni (À+C, A+D, etc.) incluse nella tabella
46. La situazione economica di ognuno di noi è legata in qualche misura agii altri, e al rapporto con qualcuno in particolare (perche ;
dà opportunità, aiuto, lavoro, denaro, etc.). Quali ritieni che siano per Te le persone più importanti sotto questo profilo? Segna qui ± 
Tua scelta: PERSONA:............... PERSONA:...............
47. Qual'è la persona tra quelle indicate cui Ti rivolgeresti più volentieri nel caso di:
* un problema affettivo -> ..............  * un problema morale o religioso - > .........
* un problema politico * > ...............  * un problema di lavoro *>............
TERZA SEZIONE: I VALORI
Qual'è la Tua opinione su ciascuna delle affermazioni che seguono, già sottoposte ad ampi campioni di giovani in altre indagini?
1. Sarebbe meglio che i lavoratori immigrati vivessero in quartieri a loro 
destinati, dove potrebbero trovarsi più a loro agio date le profonde
Mollo
d'accordo
11
Un po' Incerto 
d'accordo
[) M
Un t*> m Stollo ir, 
disaccordo di.succi nd
I l  M
differenze delle loro usanze.
2. Si deve sempre evitare di attaccare in pubblico chi crede nei nostri stessi [] l )  ( 1 i l  11
ideali.
3. In definitiva, il miglior modo di vivere è scegliersi degli amici e [] I l  1 1 I l  1 1
compagni che abbiano i nostri stessi gusti e le nostre stesse idee.
4. Prima di dare il proprio giudizio su una data questione è meglio sentire M I l  f 1 I l  1 1
cosa ne pensano persone di fiducia.
5. In un mondo come il nostro, solo le più profonde trasformazioni M I l  I 1 I l  1 1
potrebbero migliorare realmente la situazione.
6. L'obbedienza e il rispetto per l'autorità dovrebbero essere imparate presto [] I l  1 1 i l  11
nella vita.
7. In via di approssimazione, la gente può essere divisa in due grandi classi: u Il [ 1 i l  I I
i deboli e i forti.
8. Troppa familiarità fra le persone, alla fine, può portare a una mancanza di [) I l  I 1 I l  ( 1
rispetto.
9. Un amico resta un amico anche se, malauguratamente, si scopre che ha [] ■ l i  I I I l  ( 1
commesso un reato e viene condannato per questo.
10. E' preferibile perdere la stima dei propri colleghi di lavoro che dei propri [] I l  1 1 I l  1 1
superiori.
Con quali delle seguenti opinioni suH'aborto Ti trovi più d'accordo?
[ } Ogni donna deve essere libera di decidere sui figli che \ ) L'aborto è ammissibile in casi di grave situazioni
sente di potere o non potere avere socio-economica della madre
[ ] L'aborto deve essere possibile solo se ci sono forti rischi ( ] L'aborto non è mai ammissibile
per la salute della madre o di malformazioni gravi del feto
Cosa è cambiato nella Tua vita rispetto a quando ancora 
non Ti occupavi attivamente di politica?
* Le mie opinioni sono coerenti con un sistema di idee
* Mi sento parte di un gruppo unito e con la sua identità
* Ho molti amici
* Le mie posizioni sui problemi sono nette
* Il mio futuro, come quello del mondo, è incerto
* Mi sento in sintonia con le persone che frequento
Sì, più di prima Come prima No. meno di prima
11 I I i
11 ( I i
u (1 i
11
[1
11
n
i
i
t l i l i
Potresti descrìvere succintamente i tuoi obiettivi politici principali?
A BREVE TERMINE: A MEDIO TERMINE: A LUNGO TERMINE:
Secondo Te, qual'è il problema principale dei partiti italiani oggi? E quali funzioni dovrebbe svolgere un partito politico nella som  
contemporanea?
Un'ultima domanda: qual'è, a Tuo giudizio, il problema più grande dell'Italia di oggi e quale ne è la causa (o le cause)?
»•«
Grazie infinite per la pazienza con cui hai voluto seguire tutte le istruzioni di compilazione. Il questionario è terminato. Ti preghiarr: 
di rinviarlo il prima possibile tramite la busta preaffrancata in allegato, accludendo anche, eventualmente, le osservazioni persona! 
che vorrai far presente e che saranno benvenute.
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